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DUE PROCESS RIGHTS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL, LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL BASES 
This study identified constitutional principles that 
make the right of "due process" applicable to non-public 
elementary and secondary school students. Relevant court 
cases and judicial opinion, in addition to scholarly 
writings, were reviewed to determine the relevance of these 
principles to the non-public school student. A legal 
argument was constructed to show that the constitutional 
right to the "due process of law" applied to non-public 
school students as well. 
The constitutional right to the "due process of law" is 
based on a guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. The Amendment states, II .nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." Public schools, 
considered an arm of the state, are obligated to provide the 
"due process of law" before depriving a student of the legal 
right to education. Legal opinion has, heretofore, judged 
private school students as beyond the grasp of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because private schools have not been 
considered an arm of the state. 
Five approaches to securing "due process" rights for 
private school students were presented and analyzed. These 
approaches sought to show that the constitutional right of 
students. Each chapter provided a different approach to 
overcoming the apparent "state action" requirement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The approaches were: (i) Natural Law 
and the natural right to fundamental fairness; (ii) the 
students' "property" and "liberty" rights to education; 
(iii) the constitutionally "fundamental" right that students 
have to education; (iv) the "public function" served by 
private education which would require private schools to 
follow the same procedures as public schools; (v) a 
reevaluation of the century-old "state action" requirement. 
All of these approaches were presented for the purpose of 
suggesting a legal, philosophical and educational rationale 
for securing "due process" rights for private school 
students involved in disciplinary action that suspends them 
from school. 
Both types of constitutional "due process" 
("procedural" and "substantive") were identified and applied 
to private school students. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional rights of non-public elementary and 
secondary school students have not been clearly defined by 
the courts. While the law relating to public schools has 
been developing steadily since 1960, 1 there have been 
relatively few cases relating to non-public schools. Since 
1960, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized 
certain rights to which public school students are 
entitled. 2 No case regarding the rights of non-public 
school students has ever been decided by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
The landmark case of Dixon v. Alabama recognized that 
students at public colleges have rights to the "due process 
of law." These rights are protected from federal 
1Although Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), is considered a landmark decision in the area of 
public schools, the case that marks the beginning of 
development of public school law is Dixon v. Alabama, 186 
F. Supp. 945 (1960), rev. at 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), 
cert. den. 368 U.S. 930 (1961). 
2 Dixon broke the judicial restraint to decide cases 
against the institution. Dixon awarded procedural due 
process protection for public school students. Subsequent 
cases of note are Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), 
that awarded free speech to public school students, Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), that awarded due process rights 
to public school students, and Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 
308 (1975), that awarded damages from a board of education 
to public school students. 
2 
interference by the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution3 and from state constriction by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 4 The right to "due process" was brought down to 
the public high school level, and presumably elementary as 
well, by West Virginia Board· ~of Education v. Barnette, 5 
and, subsequently, by Goss v. Lopez. 6 
The predominant constitutional reason why the Supreme 
Court has held that public school students are entitled to 
"due process" protection is because of the close connection 
between public schools and the state government. The public 
schools are financially supported and statutorily mandated 
by the state. There are state officers who are directly 
responsible for the effective running of the public schools. 
Public schools are viewed as an extension of the state. 
3 U.S. Constitution, Amend. V, provides in relevant 
part: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law." 
4 U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV, § 1 provides: 
" [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " 
5 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 63 7 ( 1943) . ("The Fourteenth Amendment . . . protects 
the citizen against the State itself and all of its 
creatures--Boards of Education not excepted.") 
6 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (Public school 
students are entitled to constitutional "due process" before 
being suspended from school.) 
3 
Thus, when the Fourteenth Amendment asserts "nor shall any 
state deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property without 
the due process of law" the courts have interpreted this 
clause as including public schools and their students. 7 
The predominant reason why the courts have not applied 
the constitutional protection of due process to private 
school students is because of the nature of the connection 
between the state and the private school. By definition, 
the private schools are not financially supported by the 
state, nor is their daily governance controlled by it. The 
Fourteenth Amendment's limitation to the "state" brought the 
Supreme Court to recognize over one hundred years ago that 
there must be a connection to the state government, 8 called 
"state action," before "due process of law" is required. 
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on this 
issue, some lower courts, beginning with Bright v. 
Isenbarger, have found "state action" lacking in private 
schools. These courts have ;i::-efused to impose "due process" 
7 See Barnette, id.; Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
8 The connection to the state that is necessary is the 
result of the holding in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 
U.S. 542 (1875), and in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 
(1883) (where the term "state action" was coined). 
9Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind., 
1970), 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). 
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requirements on private school administrators. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY 
The Problem 
The problem that was investigated was the application 
of constitutional rights to ··'due process" rights for non-
public school students. The argument was developed that 
private school students are entitled to the same 
constitutional rights and protections as their public school 
counterparts. In auguring constitutional rights for private 
school students, the argument sought to fit within the 
constructs of constitutional law and jurisprudence, yet 
overcome the prevailing notion of "state action." 
This study took an approach that varied from dominant 
legal opinion. Most legal practitioners, as evidenced by 
the approach taken in documented cases, believe that there 
is insufficient "state action" to muster the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process protections to private school 
students. Several doctoral dissertations have concluded the 
same . 10 
10See, e.g., Tieken, Al, "The Application of Statutory 
and Constitutional Due Process Rights to Nonpublic 
Elementary and Secondary School Students and Teachers," 
Ed.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1981, and 
Shaughnessy, Mary A., "Student and Teacher Rights in the 
Private School: Legal Considerations for the Private School 
Administrator," Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 
5 
This study constructed a new legal argument to earn 
constitutional ''due process" rights for non-public school 
students. Its various chapters discuss different aspects of 
the legal argument, each one pointing to the same conclusion 
of the legality and educatio"nal importance of these rights 
for private school children. Each chapter will show a 
constitutional connection between non-public school students 
and "due process" rights. Traditionally, this connection 
was believed to be non-existent. 
The Supreme Court has identified two types of "due 
process," known as "procedural" and "substantive" due 
process. "Procedural due process" refers to the procedure 
to follow; once the proper procedure is followed, the 
requirement has been fulfilled. "Substantive due process" 
refers to the constitutional protection of "fundamental" 
rights that are stated explicitly or implicitly in the 
Constitution. They may also be part of the culture and 
heritage of the American people. "Substantive due process" 
provides that these rights may not be diminished without a 
compelling justification. 
This study analyzing the "due process" rights for non-
1984. Additionally, these authors analyzed the law ·and 
underlying theories from a different perspective entirely. 
6 
public school students included a determination of whether 
these students are entitled to "procedural" or "substantive" 
due process, which will vary, depending on the approach 
taken. If private school students are entitled to the same 
"due process" rights as public school students, then they 
may enjoy only "procedural due process. 1111 One goal of 
this study, however, was to describe the value of providing 
"substantive due process" for both groups of children. 
Definition of Terms 
For the purposes of this study, the following 
definitions were used: 
Private School: 
Administrators: 
any school which is not part of the 
public school system of the state or 
school district in which it is located. 
It may be maintained by private 
individuals or organizations. It may 
also be referred to as "non-public." 
anyone responsible for the governance of 
the school's students and teachers. 
They are often ref erred to by such 
titles as, Principal, Vice Principal, 
Headmaster, Headmistress, Head. 
11See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
7 
Substantive Due Process: "the constitutional guaranty that 
no person shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of life, liberty, or property; the 
essence of substantive due process is 
protecti.c5n from arbitrary unreasonable 
action," (Black's Law Dictionary 1281 
(1979)), or that "all legislation be in 
furtherance of a legitimate governmental 
objective." (Gifis's Law Dictionary 146 
(1984)). Substantive due process refers 
to what is done, as distinguished from 
how it is done (procedural due process) 
Procedural Due Process: how the process of depriving someone 
of life, liberty or property is 
Due Process: 
carried out; how it is done. The 
minimal requirements of constitutional 
due process are (i) notice of charges, 
(ii) an opportunity to be heard, and 
(iii) an impartial tribunal. 
itself has no fixed meaning. Justice 
Frankfurter wrote that due process is 
compounded of history, reason, and the 
past course of judicial decisions. It 
is a delicate process of adjustment 
involving the exercise of judgment by 
those whom the Constitution entrusted 
with the unfolding of the process. 12 
Procedural Fairness: is anotlfer term for "due process." 
"Fundamental" Right: is a right that is explicitly or 
implicitly guaranteed in the federal or 
state constitution. 
Strict Scrutiny: is a test of constitutional validity of 
a statute. If a "fundamental" right is 
affected then the state must show that 
there is a compelling state interest 
that validates affecting the 
"fundamental" right and that no less 
intrusive means are available to 
accomplish the same goal. 
Property Right: is a generic term which refers to any 
type of right to specific personal 
property, tangible or intangible. 
Liberty Right: is a right protected by the "Due 
Process" clauses of the Fifth and 
12see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 
341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
8 
State Action: 
Statute: 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution, including interests 
created by legislation. 
9 
an action that can be properly construed 
as that of the state. State action will 
be found in such cases as when there is 
meaningful state participation in a 
particular activity, the state is 
entwined with the regulation of private 
conduct, or there has been a delegation 
of what was traditionally a state 
function to a private person or 
institution. 
an act of the legislature, adopted by 
prescribed means such that it becomes 
the law. Statutes are enacted in 
general to promote the public good and 
welfare. (Gifis, supra p.6, at 453). 
Public/Private Distinction: A legal distinction to maintain 
the difference between public 
institutions and private individuals. 
The distinction was drawn in response to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, after the 
Natural Law: 
Positive Law: 
10 
slaves were freed, to assure the 
population that the government would not 
limit or control purely private 
behavior. The distinction is related to 
the "stat'e action" doctrine. 
includes certain principles of justice 
which have prevailed since time 
immemorial. They are the first 
principles of reason, with their origin 
in nature itself. Even God cannot 
change the natural laws. The 
responsibility to live by natural laws 
creates "natural rights" for the people. 
is man-made law for the purpose of 
creating an orderly civilized society. 
It is expected to reflect natural law as 
much as possible. When man follows 
positive law he may be on the highest 
level of perfection according to those 
who believe that the state is the 
highest level of perfection, or he may 
be headed to disaster if the positive 
law does not have a significant 
Research Methodology 
11 
component of natural law absorbed in it. 
The traditional tools of scholarly research were used 
as well as those specific to legal research. The primary 
methodology and terminology used were, with the exception of 
the chapter on Natural Law, specific to legal research and 
analysis. 
Volumes of International Dissertation Abstracts were 
reviewed manually, as were The Education Index and Index to 
Legal Periodicals. 
All volumes of West's Education Reporter were examined 
and cases reported were examined for possible relevance. 
The Journal of Law and Education was particularly useful, as 
were various publications of National Organization on Legal 
Problems of Education. 
Court cases were reviewed from West's National Reporter 
System; Shepard's Citations were useful to follow the 
history of a case. 
The chapter on Natural Law called for more traditional 
educational sources in the disciplines of philosophy, 
history, and law. 
Overview of Remaining Chapters 
Chapter II provides an historical background of the 
12 
notion of Natural Law. It will be shown that Natural Law 
remains a part of the American legal system to this day. 
"Due Process" is one of the natural rights that issues from 
Natural Law, so that the constitutional requirement of 
"state action" is not a relevant concern. 
Chapter III accepts the notion of "state action," but 
tries to show that there is significant jurisprudence 
regarding other constitutionally recognized rights as well. 
These constitutional rights have a direct bearing on 
education. These rights are important enough that, taken 
individually or collectively, they bring with them a 
requirement for "due process" before the right to education 
is limited, regardless of the presence of "state action." 
Chapter IV deals with the often-debated question of 
education as a "fundamental right." The United States 
Supreme Court decided in 1973, by a 5 - 4 vote, that 
education is not a federally recognized "fundamental 
right, 1113 but there have been significant developments 
since that time. Most important has been the recognition by 
an impressive number of state supreme courts of education's 
"fundamental" nature. This is especially meaningful because 
13 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
13 
education is the single most important function of the 
state, such that "fundamentality" may be best shown, and 
education best served, on the state level. The particular 
significance for this study of a showing of constitutional 
... 
"fundamentality" is that the limitation of education for 
disciplinary reasons will then carry with it a requirement 
for "due process." This is because constitutionally 
"fundamental" rights may not be abridged without standing up 
to "strict scrutiny," which would call for, at a minimum, 
procedural fairnesses. 
The next chapter, Chapter v, discusses the issue of 
private schools that serve a "public function." This means 
that, although a close enough nexus between the school and 
the state may not be found, and a finding of "state action" 
not forthcoming, the private school may be seen as having 
the same mission as a public school and accomplishing the 
same academic and behavioral goals. Thus, the private 
school may be seen as taking on the character and 
requirements of the public school. Accordingly, the private 
school would be required to offer constitutionally mandated 
"due process" to its students even without a finding of 
"state action." 
Chapter VI deals directly with the ''state acticin" 
doctrine. It suggests that the doctrine should be 
reinterpreted, with its positive qualities maintained. 
14 
There are even those who suggest doing away with the 
doctrine entirely, preferring to look at the merits of the 
two sides rather than their public or private character. The 
result, for this study, of these changes in the "state 
action" doctrine would be that private school students would 
be entitled to "due process" before suffering disciplinary 
action. 
Chapter VII provides a summary of the reasoning and 
theories pointing to the provision by private school 
administrators of constitutional procedural fairness to 
their students. Specific issues and questions to research 
are provided for further study. 
CHAPTER II 
NATURAL LAW AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
This chapter will present an historical survey of 
Natural Law, beginning with the early genesis of this 
concept. It will show that natural law has a well-respected 
background, spanning the millennia from antiquity until the 
modern age. Natural law has maintained this respect because 
its notions of right and propriety are those that are 
usually accepted. This respect has been articulated in the 
decisions of various courts. Natural law is a legal 
doctrine that carries with it certain legal requirements, 
including the provision of the due process of law. This 
study will argue that "due process" is a requirement of 
natural law, applicable to all people and institutions. 
Indeed, "due process" is applicable to young people as well. 
It is a right to which students are entitled, regardless of 
tbe governance of their school. The existence of "state 
action" has no bearing on the provision of the student right 
to fundamental fairness from the perspective of natural law. 
The theory of natural law posits that there are certain 
principles of justice which are entitled to prevail because 
of their own excellence. "Natural law, abiding and 
permanent, has existed from the dawn of humanity as an 
15 
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instinct of the understanding and knowledge of the first 
principles of reason. 111 Thus, for example, Sophocles (496-
406 B.C.) has the heroine of Antigone justify her 
overstepping of the king's law by appealing to a higher law: 
"The unchangeable, unwritten .. code of heaven;/ this is not of 
today and yesterday,/ but this lives forever, having origin/ 
whence no man knows ... " 2 
According to natural law proponents, law has its basis 
in nature. Humankind has an inborn capacity to know right 
and wrong, and law at its very essence rests not upon 
the arbitrary will of a ruler or upon the decree of a 
multitude, but upon reason, i.e., upon humankind's use of 
reason to identify and codify innate ideas. These ideas 
cannot be abrogated by man, for their author is the "Divine" 
itself. 3 
1Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, 
trans. E. I. Watkin (NY: Sheed and Ward, 1962), 101. 
2Sophocles, II Antigone 450 - 60. 
3 Cicero, Laws, I, xvi, trans. C. W. Keyes, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1948), 345 - 47. 
17 
THE EARLY CONCEPTS OF NATURAL LAW 
In the early periods of civilization, mores and laws 
were undifferentiated from religious norms, 4 and all mores 
and laws, therefore, were seen as stemming from God. The 
·~ 
social orders under which people lived, which were based on 
society's mores, could not be changed unless God, perhaps 
through a prophet, had ordered them changed. Human 
ordinances that did not reflect natural law lacked moral 
substance and were not considered legally binding. 
The idea of "natural" law is best understood when it is 
contrasted to another, human, law. Once humans moved away 
from their narrow view of law as entirely God-given, then 
they could begin to distinguish between the various types of 
law. Humans went beyond their narrow view when they used 
critical reason to look back over history and note the 
profound changes that had occurred in the realm of law and 
mores. 
As man became aware of the diversity of legal and moral 
institutions of his people in the course of its history, 
especially in comparison to earlier generations, he was 
finally able to discern the distinction between divine and 
4Heinrich A. Rommen, The Natural Law, trans. Thomas R. 
Hanley (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), 3-9. 
18 
human law. Man concluded that much of law was man-made or 
human law, appropriate to particular situations and 
societies. A notion of divine law remained, however, 
especially as a criterion for the moral value of man-made 
·~ 
laws. This distinction has remained to this day. 5 
Early man learned that the standards by which his 
society's laws were to be judged were found in an eternal 
immutable law. This law contains certain principles of 
right and justice which are entitled to prevail "of their 
own intrinsic excellence ... Such principles are made by no 
human hands; indeed, if they did not antedate deity itself, 
they still so express its nature as to bind and control 
it ... they are eternal and immutable." 6 In relation to such 
principles, human laws are" ... merely a record or 
transcript, and their enactment an act not of will or power, 
but one of discovery and declaration. 7 
As humankind developed, so did the notions of natural 
law. The classical Greek philosophers drew a distinction 
6Edward S. Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of 
American Constitutional Law," Corwin on the Constitution, 
ed. Richard Loss, 2 vols. (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1981), 1:81. 
19 
between two conceptions of the natural law which have 
survived to this day. One conception sees a natural law 
that focuses on the individual citizen. This citizen freely 
enters into a contract with the state for social and 
utilitarian purposes. The s·tate itself and its laws are 
artificial and arbitrary, of no intrinsic necessity. The 
other conception sees the state as the path to reach the 
highest ideals. The citizen is to subordinate himself to 
the state and its laws. The state's laws, firmly based on 
nature and natural justice, help the citizen reach his 
authentic self. Because it is a human value for a person to 
try to reach a state of perfection, the person is morally 
bound to follow the state's laws. The notion of God as 
supreme Lawgiver is ultimately connected with this latter 
conception. Both of these tendencies are already plainly 
visible in the first Sophists and in Heraclitus, the 
forerunner of Plato. 
Heraclitus of Ephesus (cir. 536 - 470 B.C.), in holding 
the later conception, opined that there is a fundamental and 
universal law, not chance, that rules over the world and 
establishes order. Man's nature, as well as his ethical 
goal, is to subordinate his individual and social lives to 
the general law of the universe. This is the primordial 
20 
norm of moral being and conduct. Heraclitus believed that 
all human laws are nurtured by the divine law. Indeed, the 
laws of men are but attempts to realize the divine law and 
legislate accordingly, sharing in the eternal intellect . 
. " With Heraclitus, the idea of a natural law for the first 
time emerged as a natural unchangeable law from which all 
human laws draw their binding force. 8 
The Sophists (Greece, Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.), 
were proponents of the former conception. They believed 
that the relationship between the individual and the 
government was created by a social compact. This compact 
was for utilitarian purposes, with no value intrinsic to the 
state's laws and statutes themselves. These laws and 
statutes were accepted by the populace so as to avoid 
injury. For the perception was that, before these laws were 
legislated and the agreements entered into, man behaved 
haphazardly and lawlessly. Now, law was entirely man-made, 
"Positive," Law. This brought the Sophists to a crisis, 
wherein their laws seemed to lack any quality of natural 
morality. They attempted to resolve this crisis by showing 
that there was due consideration for "natural law." Thus, 
for example, they believed that "might is right," and that 
8 See Rommen, The Natural Law, 5-7. 
this is a natural law. Witness the animal kingdom and 
warring countries, where the stronger animal or country 
overcomes the enemy. This, they believed, was a natural 
occurrence and proof for a natural law of ''might is 
right." 9 
Regarding the role of the state, the Sophists started 
from the freedom of the individual who had to be liberated 
from the political bonds of the state. Plato (427 - 347 
B.C.), in contrast, saw the state and its laws as the 
indispensable means for realizing the highest ideals of 
humanity. This followed Plato's notion that there are 
certain abstract forms or ideas that represent the true 
quality of the doctrine. It is humankind's responsibility 
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to copy the idealized heavenly version of the idea on Earth. 
Thus, Plato believed that the laws of this world are 
entitled to exist only to the extent that they recapitulate 
the eternal idea. Man, as craftsman and artist, is to copy 
these heavenly ideas. This is especially the case in the 
area of law. Humanly-made law may be judged good or bad 
based on the extent to which it copies the law of heaven. 
Positive law is legitimate to the extent that it reflects 
9These ideas of the Sophists are discussed in George H. 
Sabine, A History of Political Theory, (NY: Henry Holt and 
Co., 1937), 25-34. 
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natural law. 
Legitimate positive law has its moral basis in natural 
law. Accordingly, one who follows such a body of positive 
law would be moral and just. Thus, the state and its laws 
provide the foundation for the idealized state of man. The 
state, as great pedagogue of man, helped man realize his 
perfected form. Plato was optimistic that a person would 
use natural law to define and delimit positive law. He 
cherished positive law and the state for its potential to 
lead man toward the highest ideals. The Sophists, on the 
other hand, were pessimistic about man's use of positive 
law, fearing that he would use it for his own corrupt 
purposes. They disdained positive law and the state that 
supported it. 10 
Aristotle (384 - 322 B.C.), agreeing with Plato that 
positive law wishes to reflect natural law, introduced the 
principle of equity. Human law, because of life's intricate 
diversities, could not fill all cases. Thus, human judges 
were to fill in those gaps with equitable solutions. Equity 
required that the judge decide the case in accordance with 
justice, as contained in the natural law. 
10Plato's views on natural law are presented in Rommen, 
The Natural Law, 11 - 16. 
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Both Aristotle and Plato said noticeably little about 
the content of natural law. Their main contributions were 
to define the legal legitimacy of positive (human) law based 
on the closeness of its connection with natural law, and the 
moral imperative to realize this closeness . 11 
The Stoics (Greece, c. 350 - 250 B.C.) were 
individualists, like the Sophists, but they assimilated some 
of the teachings of Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle. Most 
significantly, the Stoics emphasized how to determine the 
content of the natural law. They believed that man could 
have clear perceptions and make correct judgements through 
rational insights into his essential nature. Man had simply 
to prevent himself from succumbing to the excesses of his 
passions to identify the natural law, for they believed that 
reason and nature were one. Man may discover the content of 
natural law when he lives in harmony with himself, with 
rational thought. 12 This is the meaning of Cicero's 
11Id. 16 - 20. 
12Now we may understand Cicero's speech regarding 
natural law: "This, therefore, is a law ... not written, but 
born with us, which we have not learnt or received by 
tradition, or read, but which we have taken and sucked in 
and imbibed from nature herself; a law which we were not 
taught, but to which we were made, which we were not trained 
in, but which is ingrained in us." Cited by Rommen, The 
Natural Law, 23, n. 10. Later, the content of the law of 
nature included rules touching such areas as marriage and 
statement, 
[W]e can perceive the difference between good laws 
and bad by ref erring them to no other standard 
than Nature ... For since an intelligence common to 
us all makes things known to us and formulates 
them in our minds, honourable actions are ascribed 
by us to virtue, and dishonourable actions to 
vice; and only a madman would conclude that these 
judgments are ... not fixed by Nature. 13 
Thus far, we have seen that the basic elements of the 
doctrine of natural law already existed in antiquity. The 
issues at the beginning of the Common Era, and still the 
24 
issues of today, included such themes as: Law is Will (human 
will and passion initiate the legislation of laws) versus 
Law is Reason (human reason is used to identify the laws of 
nature that are innately present); Law is Truth (truth and 
morality existed before the state was formed, and transcend 
the state) versus Law is Authority (a function of the state, 
the state's legislation of laws creates and defines 
morality). Additionally, the doctrine of an original state 
of nature also appeared early, especially among the Sophists 
family, good faith, adjustment or weighing of interests, the 
original freedom and equality of all men, and the right to 
self-defense. Id., 28. 
13Cicero, Laws, I, xvi. Cicero (106 - 43 B.C.) was the 
interpreter and transmitter of the Stoic doctrine of natural 
law. 
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and the Stoics. 14 
The alternative to natural law is human or positive 
law. As we saw above, positive law can be a consequence of 
the doctrine of will or passion. Positive law views law as 
. " 
the codification of man's passions. It sometimes renounces 
the efforts to know the essences of things and their 
hierarchy of values. There are no imperatives, no concern 
for higher values. Positive law may reflect or include 
natural law, which would give positive law a moral standing. 
But as positive law moves further away from any natural law 
14As for the concept of a Christian natural law that 
was developing at around this time, Rommen cites a German 
author, Johannes Messner, who writes that there was little 
difference between the existing understanding of natural law 
and the "Christian" understanding of natural law. Messner 
writes: "[w]hen we speak of a 'Christian' natural law, that 
does not mean that the natural law knowable by us through 
reason alone is replaced or amplified by one derived from 
supernatural revelation, but that our knowledge of its 
existence, its essence and its content is confirmed and 
clarified through the guidance of reason by faith." Rommen, 
The Natural Law, 34 - 35, n. 1. Thus, the Church continued 
to espouse the use of reason to determine the content of 
natural law, but it was the Church that was to be accepted 
as the infallible expounder of natural law. Also, the 
addition of faith into natural law put God as facilitator of 
the understanding of reason and natural law in society. It 
is God: supreme reason, unchangeable being and omnipotent 
will who inscribes rational nature in the hearts of man. 
See Id., 34-39. 
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basis it loses its moral rectitude and claim to 
legitimacy. 15 
15See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 
(Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1980), 351-352, who 
writes that this is a "subordinate theorem" of the theory of 
natural law. 
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THE CONTENT OF NATURAL LAW 
Natural law had systematically developed as a concept, 
but its content was still unclear. This was to change with 
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 74), who presented a description 
of the content of natural law. 
This is the first precept of law, that good is to 
be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. 
All other precepts of the natural law are based 
upon this; so that all the things which the 
practical reason naturally apprehends as man's 
good belong to the precepts of the natural law 
under the form of things to be done or avoided. 16 
"Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided." This is 
the maxim by which St. Thomas became known as a major 
proponent of natural law. St. Thomas also relied on man's 
reason to determine the specific content of the natural law. 
If his previous statement was not sufficiently clear, St. 
Thomas continued, in the same section of his Summa, with a 
more practical statement. 
a.2. 
[M]an has a natural inclination to know the truth 
about God, and to live in society; and in this 
respect, whatever pertains to this inclination 
belongs to the natural law: e.g., to shun 
ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one 
has to live, and other such things regarding the 
above inclination. 17 
16St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, Ia, IIae, q.94 
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Here, St. Thomas expressed his belief that man can 
identify the specific content of the natural law by being in 
touch with his natural inclinations. Thus, for example, the 
preservation of life and the avoidance of obstacles are part 
of the natural law. Aquinas ''would also include the 
education of offspring ("to shun ignorance") in this group. 
Educating their young is something which even the animal 
kingdom does naturally! Other specific ingredients of the 
natural law include the precepts of the Decalogue. 18 
Later, Hugo Grotius (Holland, 1583 - 1645) was to be 
hailed as "the father of natural law theory," a title 
undeserved. 19 Grotius did make an important contribution 
to the natural law theory in the area of international law. 
It was Grotius who pointed to the moral necessity of natural 
law even while at war. 20 In addition, Grotius spoke about 
using human judgment to determine that which falls under the 
rubric of natural law. His salient point was that reason 
determines the content of natural law, but necessity must be 
18This is because the Decalogue contains the very 
intention of God the Lawgiver. Summa, Id., q. 100, a.8. 
19Rommen, The Natural Law, 70-74. Earlier authorities, 
such as Aquinas, seem more deserving of this venerable 
title. 
20 Id. 
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part of the equation: There is a moral necessity to follow 
the natural law. One is either required to do what reason 
declares to be good, or one is prohibited from doing what 
reason declares to be evil. 21 In addition, Grotius taught 
that bad acts are evil, not b'ecause they are intrinsically 
at variance with God's essence, but because they are 
forbidden by God. 22 This view of good and evil looked at 
the further question of why God so decreed as beyond human 
reason. 
John Locke (England, 1632 - 1704) taught that the 
objective of natural law theory was to establish as 
inalienable the rights of the individual. Once the state 
has been created, these inalienable rights do not vanish, 
but are preserved to serve as an ultimate criterion for 
judging the acts of the government. Locke seemed to put 
ideals in their proper perspective: The rights of life, 
liberty, and property make the law, the law does not create 
them. The rights of the individual are prior, and in them 
21 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 44, quoting 
Grotius's De Jure Belli ac Pacis I, c. i, sec. 10, paras. 1, 
2. 
22Rommen, The Natural Law 72. 
originates whatever (governmental) order exists. 23 It was 
here that the natural law doctrine was transformed from a 
theory·concerning duties exclusively, to a theory framed 
also in terms of rights. 
23 Id., 88-91. See also Corwin on the Constitution 
1:119-121. 
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WHY DOES HUMAN LAW INCORPORATE NATURAL LAW? 
Until now, we have surveyed the classical background of 
the theory of natural law. This is an important step in 
preparation for the inclusion of this doctrine in the 
philosophical underpinnings that were to make up the nascent 
American jurisprudence. Natural law is also important of 
its own merit, and proudly carries its moral imperative in 
every institution of our society. By way of summary of our 
odyssey through the teachings of the great philosophers who 
supported and developed the notion of natural law, we may 
ask ourselves a question which must arise from our study: 
Why was natural law formalized and codified within the 
corpus of positive law? In other words, we may ask why 
human law sought to incorporate natural law as part of its 
legislated laws and statutes. 
We shall propose five answers to this question of why 
natural law was included in subsequently legislated positive 
law. 
(i) To provide a connection to God: As we saw above, 
the natural law was perceived as the law of Paradise. One 
gains a taste of Paradise, a communion with the divine, when 
one follows these natural law statutes. Man found a way to 
formalize and guaranty a touch of heaven as he follows the 
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mundane laws of this world. 
(ii) Positive law that subsumes the natural law also 
guarantees morality. A legislature that sought to assure 
that its citizenry would live moral lives would require, by 
statute, that morality be followed. Also, people whose 
consciences dictated to them that they should live moral 
lives would find it easier if they could simply fulfill the 
dictates of the positive law. 
(iii) To give meaning to social institutions: Man is a 
social being. He seeks to create social institutions for 
himself and his fellows. The institutions need guidance on 
what policies to set and what missions to fulfill. 
Incorporating the natural law and, by extension, natural 
rights into the social institutions will vouchsafe these 
moral policies and goals. 
(iv) To provide a connection to secular values: One of 
the basic principles of natural law is "agreements must be 
kept. " 24 In every society one finds certain agreements 
that are made between people and between institutions and 
their constituencies. The creation of a legal structure 
that incorporates the requirement that agreements be kept, 
24 See Thomas Hobbes (England, 1588 - 1679), Leviathan 
(1651) . Hobbes was an early proponent of the Positive 
School. 
33 
as well as other principles of natural law, will make 
certain that these fundamentals of society are fulfilled. 
(v) To provide a connection to the self: We learned 
that the fulfillment of natural law helps people realize 
" their natural states, states uncorrupted by the vicissitudes 
of daily life. It is, indeed, a noble yet onerous and 
perplexing accomplishment to realize one's natural and pure 
state. It is also an accomplishment to be respected and 
emulated. Some people search for ways to accomplish this 
goal. By following the positive law which is inclusive of 
natural law, and we are obliged to fulfill the positive law 
in any event, we are led through the thicket to that 
original state of purity and grace. 
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THE IMMUTABILITY OF NATURAL LAW 
It is important and worthwhile to incorporate natural 
law into human or positive law. This natural law was seen 
as discernible by humankind so that they might incorporate 
it into their legal system. Natural law was seen as 
immutable, not changing. In fact, God had put certain laws 
into nature, and even He could not change certain natural 
laws and rights that all people shared and cherished. 
Grotius believed in this so strongly that he said that even 
God Himself, having put this law into nature, "could not 
make twice two anything but four. " 25 
If natural law does not change, then several Bible 
stories raise serious questions regarding this doctrine of 
immutability. For example, scholars asked how God could ask 
Abraham to offer his son Isaac on an altar26 and how God 
could command Hosea to marry a women who would be 
promiscuous as his wife. 27 
Various answers were suggested, but none was truly 
effective. It is, indeed, very difficult to explain why God 
veered away from His own laws. Alexander of Hales (d. 1245), 
25 Corwin on the Constitution 1:118. 
26 See Genesis 22. 
27 See Hosea 1 . 
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following the Stoic tradition, explained that we must 
distinguish between the natural law before the original sin 
and the natural law after the original sin. The Stoics 
believed that, had man not sinned, the second Tablet of the 
Decalogue (i.e., the last seven of the Ten Commandments) 
would have been unnecessary. It was only after man was in a 
fallen state, and human and property relations were not 
well-respected, that man needed the protection of these 
Commandments. 28 Thus, the question is, perhaps, resolved. 
The commandments that God apparently abrogated in His own 
case (against murder and adultery) were post-sin 
commandments, implemented for man, but not incumbent upon 
God. 29 
For some, the question was not yet resolved because the 
goal was to find an ethical explanation for actions of the 
Biblical God that apparently were contrary the natural 
order. Alexander of Hales was forced to resort to the 
doctrine of primacy of God's will. God transcends all laws. 
One cannot possibly ask questions about God's behavior based 
28 See Remmen, The Natural Law 42-44. 
29This was because God maintained His pre-sin perfect 
status, to speak in human terms. 
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on His laws, for God's laws do not apply to Him. 30 They 
are, rather, for people to follow. When people follow God's 
laws they reach perfection. God, who is already perfect, is 
not required to follow these laws. Again, the answer 
. 
remained unsatisfying to some who were searching 
specifically for an ethical explanation. 
St. Thomas Aquinas held that the notions of justice 
contained in the Decalogue are eternal and unchangeable. At 
the same time, their specific application to a specific 
problem may change from time to time. Sometimes this change 
is by divine authority alone, such as in matters pertaining 
to divine institutions such as marriage or life and death. 
Sometimes this change may be done by human authority, in 
such areas that are part of human jurisdiction. 31 When God 
appears to dispense with His natural law, He is acting not 
as Lawgiver, but as Lord and Master, with dominion over 
human life. Thus, He may instruct His prophets, Abraham and 
Hosea, to suspend the prohibitions of murder and adultery 
respectively, in favor of opposite commands. Because human 
life and the institution of marriage are God's jurisdiction, 
30Rommen, The Natural Law 44. 
31St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.100, 
a.3. 
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God is "free" to change the applicability of His laws 
previously stated. This was St. Thomas Aquinas's response 
to the question of immutability of natural law raised by the 
particular Bible stories. God the Sovereign could do what 
,, 
God the Lawgiver could not, and without rescinding the 
natural law. 
To sum up our discussion of the question regarding 
divine dispensation of natural law, let us look through the 
practical eyes of the educational administrator. At times, 
an administrator may be tempted to suspend the provision of 
rights to a student, much as God apparently suspended His 
natural law when "needed." The review of God's dispensation 
with natural law yields three comments to indicate that the 
administrator may not suspend natural law and natural 
rights. 32 i) We are living in an era after the original 
sin. The second tablet of the Decalogue, and all of God's 
justice legislated after the original sin, apply to us 
today. Natural law must be followed at all times, without 
abrogation. ii) God legislated His laws to help humankind 
reach perfection. God may change His laws, for His inherent 
32 It goes without saying that the administrator should 
not use the natural law itself, God's word from heaven to us 
on Earth, as identified by man's rational thought, to 
justify his actions viz., the suspension of natural law. 
God surely does not want to be his partner in sin! 
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perfection puts Him beyond the need for these laws. 
Humankind, however, has no claim or right to change what is 
in God's domain for this would detract from our path to 
perfection. Thus, we are not entitled to learn from God's 
example; we may not abrogate natural law. iii) God may 
change His laws when He sees fit. This is because He is 
God, and retains the quality of Sovereign, in addition to 
Lawgiver. Humankind does not possess this quality of 
Sovereign, 
God's laws. 
such that they are not in a position to change 
Natural law must be upheld at all times. Note 
that in all cases the conclusion is the same. Whatever the 
underlying explanation, the administrator, as humankind, is 
obligated to follow the natural law. 
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NATURAL RIGHTS LEGISLATED INTO LAW: LORD COKE'S INFLUENCE 
We have reviewed the conception of classical antiquity 
that a law of nature is discoverable by human reason. This 
reason, when uninfluenced by passion, forms the ultimate 
source and explanation for positive law. Thus, legislators 
were challenged to use their intuition and reason to 
legislate laws that corresponded to the natural law at all 
times. The closeness of this correspondence was the measure 
of successful legislation. 
Natural law is considered to have made its entree into 
legislation with the Magna Charta, in 1215. 33 Magna Charta 
Chapter 39 recognized the fundamental right of each person 
to certain rights, per legem terrae, according to the law of 
the land. Magna Charta does not provide a definition for 
the phrase "according to the law of the land," but this 
phrase has been interpreted as a requirement for procedural 
fairness in the administration of justice. 34 Specifically 
the procedures included offering the criminal: (i) judgment 
before execution; (ii) a judgment of peers; and, (iii) that 
no free man be punished except in accordance with the law of 
33Charles G. Haines, The Revival of Natural Law 
Concepts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), 166. 
34Id. I 104. 
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England - - the law of the land. 35 
England continued to refer to the Magna Charta for many 
years. One of the more important uses of this "Great 
Charter" was by Lord Edward Coke in The Case of the College 
of Physicians, commonly called Dr. Bonham's Case. 36 Lord 
Coke presided at this trial as Chief Justice of the Common 
Pleas. 37 His salient point, destined to be debated for 
many years, was that any law that goes against the common 
law, or natural law, 38 goes against the Magna Charta's 
36Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 114a (C.P. 1610). Dr. 
Bonham was judged by the (English) Royal College of 
Physicians to be deficient in his knowledge of medicine and 
told that he could not practice medicine in London until 
approval by the Royal College. In addition, Dr. Bonham was 
fined, with half the fine going to the king, and the other 
half going to the Royal College. Lord Coke said that the 
fact that the Royal College's receipt of part of the monies 
made them not only judges, but also parties in any cases 
that came before them. Lord Coke then invoked the common 
law maxim that no man can be a judge in his own case. His 
decision was that common law controls judgments, and that 
any judgment that goes against the common law cannot be 
fulfilled and is immediately void. 
37Coke claimed the concurrence of Justices Warburton 
and Daniel, and also the extra-judicial support of Sir 
Thomas Fleming, Chief Justice of the King's Bench. 8 Co. 
117a, 121a. 
38English common law is to be understood as natural 
law. 11 [T]he early common lawyers treat the common law 
itself as the embodiment of the jus naturale in the guise of 
'reason' . 11 Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Statutes and their 
Interpretation in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century, 
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requirement of justice according to "the law of the land" 
and must be considered void. 39 Of course, the kings were 
not pleased with such a ruling; future judges (who were 
employed at the behest of the kings) found it difficult to 
insist on following Lord Coke's ruling. 40 We find, 
nonetheless, in Blackstone's Commentaries, when he discusses 
"The King's Duties," that, "The principal duty of the king 
is to govern his people according to law. "41 Blackstone 
explains the reason for the king's following the law: "for 
the law maketh the king. "42 This means that the king holds 
his position only because the law grants it to him. He 
must, therefore, never put himself above the law. To 
Cambridge, 1922, p. xxiii, cited by Haines, The Revival of 
Natural Law Concepts 28. 
39Daniel Webster cites Lord Coke (at Co. Ins. 46) as 
interpreting the Magna Charta's "law of the land" as the 
modern day "due course and process of law." Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 581 (1819). It should be 
noted that although Webster quotes the Magna Charta's 
Chapter "29," it should be corrected to Chapter "39." See 
The Guide to American Law Appendix (St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co., 1985), 11:250-51 for translated text of 
Magna Charta. 
40 See Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and 
Judicial Review, 40 Harvard Law Review 30, 52, 59 (1927) 
41Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, Vol. 1, ed. Thomas MuCooley (Chicago: Callaghan and 
Co., 1899) Book I, Chapter 6, Section 234. 
42Id. 
ascertain that the king and all subjects understood the 
proper priorities, Blackstone continues 
that the laws of England are the birthright of the 
people thereof: and all the kings and queens who 
shall ascend the throne of this realm ought to 
administer the government of the same according to 
the said laws; and all their officers and 
ministers ought to serve them respectively 
according to the same: and therefore all the laws 
and statutes of this realm, for securing the .. . 
rights and liberties of the people thereof ... are 
ratified and confirmed accordingly. 43 
42 
We have seen that the government is required to follow 
the natural law. This is a law that preceded the government 
and granted it its power. Acts that defy the natural law 
should be considered void. As we have seen, the natural law 
includes procedural fairness. Thus, it is understood that 
the various extensions of the government must provide 
procedural fairness. Further, individuals must also provide 
procedural fairness. For, although our Constitution speaks 
explicitly about the state, 44 that is only in relation to 
the state's governmental responsibilities. These 
responsibilities reflected the natural law that was in place 
for many years -- not to the exclusion of the individual, 
43 Id. 
44 Consti tu ti on, amend. XIV § 1: " [N] or shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law." (Emphasis added.) 
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but rather to the inclusion of the state. All persons and 
institutions must assure that procedural fairnesses are 
followed at all times. This is a law of nature, not a 
recent requirement of society's institutions. 
The tradition of natural law made its way to the 
American shores in the seventeenth century. In the early 
years of colonization, with statutes and laws frequently 
lacking, judges had little else to guide them in the handing 
down of decisions save their English common law foundation 
and the precepts of natural justice and law. 45 As positive 
legal precepts were developed, these precepts got their 
validity from their conformity to the ideal body of perfect 
laws demonstrable by reason and part of the common law. 46 
There is an earlier case on record where positive law 
was found to be void when it conflicted with fundamental 
45Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts, 52. 
46Roscoe Pound, "The Theory of Judicial Decision," 36 
Harvard Law Review 802 (1923). Also, Plucknett, 40 Harvard 
Law Review at 60, writes that the settlers brought their 
English tradition with them as a start to the development of 
a new legal system. There are records of the Colonists 
ordering copies of Coke's works from England. Also, the 
Colonists had set out in parallel columns their own laws and 
the "fundamental and common lawes and customes of England" 
to show that they were keeping as closely as possible to the 
system of the parent country. 1 Hutchinson Papers (Prince 
Soc. 1865) 197-247, cited by Plucknett, Id. 
44 
law, 47 but the notion took hold two generations later 
around the Stamp Act of 1765. The Massachusetts State House 
in Boston has preserved a statement by Lieutenant-Governor 
Hutchinson from September, 1765. Hutchinson said, " ... our 
friends to liberty take the advantage of a maxim they find 
in Lord Coke that an Act of Parliament against Magna Charta 
or the peculiar rights of Englishmen is ipso facto void. " 48 
Further, Hutchinson specifically called the Stamp Act an 
"Act of Parliament which deprives the people of their 
natural rights" 49 and, the "Act of Parliament is against 
Magna Charta and the natural rights of Englishmen, and 
therefore according to Lord Coke null and void. 1150 
The popularity of the concepts of natural law and 
natural rights increased with the American Revolution. 
Positive law could not be mustered to legitimize revolution, 
for human law -- especially that legislated by the ruling 
47Giddings v. Browne, cited in 2 Hutchinson Papers 
(Prince Soc. 1865) 1-15. Plucknett assures us, "It is a 
cardinal fact that to the eighteenth-century American the 
doctrine of a fundamental common law was familiar, and 
regarded as quite consistent with the common law scheme of 
things." 40 Harvard Law Review at 70. 
48 26 MS. Archives of Massachusetts, ff. 153-54. Quoted 
by Plucknett 40 Harvard Law Review at 61. 
so Id. 
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party -- obviously prohibited such acts. Some of the great 
leaders of the American Revolution referred to the natural 
rights doctrine extensively. 51 They used the doctrine to 
support the right of rebellion against the arbitrary 
exercise of governmental powers. 
51 For example, Haines, The Revival of Natural Law 
Concepts, 54, quotes John Adams (that there are "rights 
antecedent to all earthly government --Rights, that cannot 
be repealed or restrained by human laws --Rights, derived 
from the great Legislator of the Universe." Works, ed. 
C.F. Adams (Boston, 1865), III,449.) and Journals of the 
Continental Congress (Washington: Ford Edition, 1904), I: 
67) (where it was asserted that colonial rights were based 
on "the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the 
English Constitution and the several charters or compacts") 
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NATURAL LAW INCORPORATED INTO THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
The Declaration of Independence of the United States 
finally formalized the acceptance of the natural law 
doctrine as part of the American heritage. It was natural 
justice to which Jefferson referred when he wrote that men 
are "endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable 
rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit 
of Happiness. 1152 This Declaration soon made Coke's 
doctrine unnecessary. 53 Common rights or common law is a 
vague concept. Once the Declaration of Independence stated 
the United States' commitment to natural rights, with 
specific assurances soon to follow by the Federal 
Constitution, Coke's doctrine, and its check upon 
legislative action, was overshadowed. 
At the time of the American Revolution, "natural rights 
were on their way to becoming national rights. " 54 
Nonetheless, the specific assurances of the Federal 
Constitution were slow in coming. A brief review of the 
history of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment 
is useful. 
52 The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776). 
53 Plucknett, 40 Harv. L.R. 30, at 68. 
54 Corwin on the Constitution, 1:133. 
When the United States Constitution was drawn up in 
1787 it lacked any statement regarding the rights of the 
citizens and safeguards against any undue governmental 
interference. After the Revolutionary War there was great 
popular demand to define the rights and limits of the new 
government in the form of a bill of rights. While several 
states had composed their own bills of rights, none was 
included in the U.S. Constitution. Ratification of the 
Constitution by the states lagged until promises were made 
that a Bill of Rights would be added in the form of 
amendments to the Constitution. 
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When the first Congress met in 1789, James Madison 
presented a bill of rights. Twelve various amendments were 
proposed, ten of which were accepted. These ten amendments 
became the Bill of Rights in 1791. Professor Corwin details 
what had happened over the course of history: "From [Coke's] 
version of Magna Charta, through the English Declaration and 
Bill of Rights of 1688 and 1689, to the Bill of Rights of 
our early American Constitutions the line of descent is 
direct. " 55 The amendment that is particularly relevant for 
this study is the Fifth Amendment which provides that no 
person shall "be deprived of life liberty or property 
55 Id., 117. 
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without the due process of law." 
The Bill of Rights accomplished its goals of defining 
the rights of the people and safeguarding against undue 
governmental interference. It related, however, to the 
federal government only; it offered no protection against 
the same interference by the states. This problem was 
overcome after the Civil War, when, in 1868, the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution was passed. 56 
This amendment directed the Federal government to protect 
the citizens of the states against arbitrary actions of the 
state governments. 
56 U. S. Const. amend. XIV, §1 states: " ... No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law ... " 
49 
EARLY JUDICIAL OPINION REGARDING THE PRESENCE AND POWER OF 
THE NATURAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES LAW 
Earlier in this chapter, the distinction was drawn 
between natural law and positive law. Natural law comes 
from man's reason as he tries to determine the ideal law and 
life that God prefers for humankind. Positive law is on a 
much lower plane, being of man's invention, though natural 
law requires positive law to be based on the natural law 
doctrine. An understanding of the direction that positive 
law has taken in America is important for this study. A 
review of the development of positive law will indicate the 
underlying philosophy of American legal philosophers and 
legislators. We will also see that institutions and their 
officers who were thought to be beyond the reach of the 
United States Constitution are still very much within its 
grasp. 
Once the Fifth Amendment was in place it became 
necessary to define its constitutional guaranty of the "due 
process of law.'' It would not take long for legal opinion 
to provide that definition. In accordance with the natural 
rights that he believed were the birthright of all, Daniel 
Webster demanded "a law which hears before it condemns, 
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after 
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trial." 57 
As to the implied right and responsibility of the 
judicial branch when the natural rights of an individual 
were invaded, Justice Green did not require any explicit 
statements. He used the due process guaranty to affirm his 
judicial right to override the legislation. He wrote, "Some 
acts, although not expressly forbidden, may be against the 
plain and obvious dictates of reason. 'The common law,' 
says Lord Coke [8 Coke, 118], 'adjudgeth a statute so far 
void. 1158 
Subsequently, Justice Field, in his dissent in The 
Slaughter House Cases, 59 continued this tradition when he 
expressed his view of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice 
Field held that it was the intention of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to "protect the citizens of the United States 
against the deprivation of the common rights by state 
legislation." 60 When he needed to define these common 
57Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 581 
(1819) . 
58Bank of State v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599, 603 (1831) 
(This early case was decided in the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee.) 
59 The Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 (1872) 
(Field, J., dissenting). 
60 Id., at 89. 
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rights, the Justice applied the "theories of the Declaration 
of Independence and eighteenth-century natural rights. 1161 
At one of the first opportunities to explain his views 
of the nature of "fundamental" rights, Justice Field did so. 
He believed wholeheartedly that the Declaration of 
Independence simply declared the rights that the people were 
entitled to by virtue of their very birth. Justice Field 
provided a commentary on the words of the Declaration: 
"We hold these truths to be self-evident" -- that 
is, so plain that their truth is recognized upon 
their mere statement -- "that all men are endowed" 
-- not by edicts of Emperors, or decrees of 
Parliament, or acts of Congress, but "by their 
Creator with certain inalienable rights" that 
is, rights which cannot be bartered away or given 
away, or taken away except in punishment of crime 
-- "and that among these are life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness, and to secure these" --
not grant them, but secure them -- "governments 
are instituted among men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed. 1162 
Even as Justice Field discussed "inalienable rights," 
he believed that the Fourteenth Amendment did not have the 
power to interfere with the state's power to do what it 
61 Id., at 95. Also, see Id., at 104: "The common law 
of England is the basis of the jurisprudence of the United 
States. It was brought to this country by the colonists ... 
and was established here." 
62Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885). 
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believed it needed to do. 63 With time, the prevailing 
opinion of the Court was reversed. The minority opinions 
became the majority opinion, perhaps in the wake of the 
passing of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Monongahela 
Navigation Co. v. United States, Justice Brewer stated that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect "those 
rights of person and property which by the Declaration of 
Independence were affirmed to be inalienable rights. " 64 
And Justice Harlan wrote, "the power of the legislature in 
these matters in not unlimited. " 65 
What was becoming more and more evident and accepted 
was the notion that the Creator endowed each person with 
certain rights which neither an individual nor a government 
may curtail. Among these rights, "due process" or 
procedural fairness was certainly to be counted. Thus, it 
is clear that no school administrator should deprive a 
student of an education, or for that matter of almost 
anything, without first explaining why and listening to a 
rebuttal. 
63 Id . , at 31- 3 2 . 
64Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 
312, 324 (1892). 
65Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 268, 278 (1898). 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS THAT PERPETUATE THE NATURAL RIGHTS 
DOCTRINE 
53 
We have seen that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the U.S. Constitution guarantee due process to all 
citizens because of its inherent importance. Due process, 
or procedural fairness, is a natural right to which all are 
entitled. The doctrine of natural rights and universal 
entitlement has continued throughout American history into 
the twentieth century. We shall review several Supreme 
Court decisions of this century that include the natural 
rights doctrine, thereby indicating that the doctrine is 
still very useful and relevant. 
Over the years, the Court has confronted the term "due 
process of law." In Twining v. New JerseyE 6 , the Court 
said that few phrases of the law are so elusive of exact 
definition. At the same time, the Court has declined to 
give a comprehensive definition of "due process of law," 
preferring that its full meaning be ascertained gradually by 
"inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of 
cases as they arise. 1167 
The Twining Court also discussed certain general 
66 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
67 Id., at 100. 
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principles which help in reaching the proper conclusions 
regarding due process. These principles grow out of the 
proposition universally accepted by American courts on the 
authority of Coke, "that the words 'due process of law' are 
equivalent in meaning to the words 'law of the land' 
contained in that chapter of Magna Charta which provides 
that 'no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised, 
or outlawed, or exiled, or any wise destroyed; nor shall we 
go upon him, nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment 
of his peers or by the law of the land.' 1168 Thus, Twining 
returns our focus to Lord Coke and the time-honored notion 
of "law of the land." Most significant, and still in use 
today, is the dictum that we use a "process of inclusion and 
exclusion" to ascertain the exact parameters of the doctrine 
of due process. 
In seeking to further clarify the doctrine of "due 
process of law," the Twining Court sends us back to the 
"settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the 
common and statute law of England before the emigration of 
our ancestors ... and having been acted on by them after the 
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settlement of this country." 69 
While the Court has purposely kept unclear the concept 
of due process of law, it has also continued to recognize 
the role of natural justice. Holden v. Hardy, 70 cited in 
Twining, 71 states, "This court has never attempted to 
define with precision the words 'due process of law.' It is 
sufficient to say that there are certain immutable 
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free 
government which no member of the Union may disregard." 72 
In further recognition of the view that natural law 
preceded positive law, and that the government's role is to 
reflect natural law in its legislation, the Court has said, 
"· .. in a free representative government, nothing is more 
fundamental than the right of the people, through their 
appointed servants, to govern themselves in accordance with 
69 Id. Twining, at 101, indicates that this definition 
of due process (reviewing the historical usages in England 
and on these shores) was actually articulated earlier, by 
Justice Curtis, in Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land and 
Improvement Company, 18 How. 272, 280 (1856). Justice 
Matthews recommends the same test in Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884). 
70 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
71 Twining, 211 U.S. at 102. 
72 Holden, 169 U.S. at 389. 
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their own will ... 1173 
Although it was not the majority decision, some 
Justices of the Supreme Court ruled in Adamson v. 
California74 that the entire Bill of Rights is incorporated 
in the Fourteenth Amendment. 75 This means, according to 
them, that none of the rights listed in the first ten 
amendments may be restricted without the due process of law. 
Specific reference was made to the right to due process 
stated in the Fifth Amendment, noting its inherent natural 
importance. 
Additionally, judges were urged to be mindful of the 
"historic meaning" of due process, 76 though the Justices 
refused once again to define the notion completely. Justice 
Frankfurter remained ambiguous when he stated that the 
standards of justice to be used by judges "are not 
authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they were 
prescriptions in a pharmacopeia. The judicial judgment in 
applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits 
73 Twining, 211 U.S. at 106. 
74Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1946). 
75 Id., at 68. 
76 Id., at 67. 
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of accepted notions of justice. 1111 
An important difference of approach was discussed by 
the Adamson court. Justice Murphy agreed with Justice Black 
that the entire Bill of Rights should be carried intact into 
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the same 
time, however, Justice Murphy was not willing to limit the 
due process clause to the Bill of Rights exclusively. He 
believed that the Bill of Rights is a "floor" to the rights 
to which Americans are entitled. Others on the Court 
believed that the Bill of Rights was the "ceiling'' of rights 
that may be incorporated in the due process clause. 78 In 
either event, there remains little question that every 
American is entitled to due process before his rights are 
curtailed. Again the Supreme Court recognized the natural 
rights to which we remain entitled and that the Due Process 
Clause guarantees. 
In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 79 
Justice Frankfurter repeated his recognition of the right to 
77 Id., at 68. 
78Kenneth L. Karst, "Invidious Discrimination: Justice 
Douglas and the Return of the 'Natural Law - Due Process' 
Formula," 16 University of California at Los Angeles Law 
Review 716, 726 (1969). 
79Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 
U.S. 123 (1951). 
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be heard as a right "basic to our society. 1180 He also 
stated that "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret one-
sided determinations of facts decisive of rights. 1181 
Justice Frankfurter then raised the issue of communal trust 
of the judicial process. He discussed the importance of 
generating the feeling in a democratic society that justice 
is being done, 82 quoting from Daniel Webster, that 11 In a 
government like ours, entirely popular, care should be taken 
in every part of the system, not only to do right, but to 
80Id., at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
81 Id., at 170. 
Lest one suggest that the prevailing winds in England 
favoring the notion of natural law had changed, Justice 
Frankfurter cited various English cases as well. Board of 
Education v. Rice, [1911] A.C. 179 is the leading case that 
emphasized the importance of an opportunity to be heard. 
There, Lord Loreburn said, "I need not add that ... [the Board 
of Education] must act in good faith and fairly listen to 
both sides, for that is a duty lying upon everyone who 
decides anything ... always giving a fair opportunity to those 
who are parties in the controversy for correcting or 
contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their 
view." Id., at 82. The Committee on Ministers' Powers 
reported in 1936 that while in administrative determination, 
a minister 11 ••• ought not to depart from or offend against 
'natural justice.' 11 Three principles of natural justice 
were stated to be that "a man may not be a judge in his own 
case," that "no party ought to be condemned unheard," and 
that "a party is entitled to know the reason for the 
decision." Report of Committee on Ministers' Powers, Cmd. 
4060, pp. 75-80. McGrath, at 170, n. 17. 
82 Id . , at 172 . 
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satisfy the community that right is done. " 83 Frankfurter 
also quoted an opinion of the Lord Chief Justice of England 
who wrote in a similar vein, "Time and again this court has 
said that justice must not only be done, but must manifestly 
be seen to be done. " 84 
A similar line of reasoning applies in the case of a 
disciplinary hearing in a non-public school. First, justice 
must be done. This can only be accomplished, as Justice 
Frankfurter reminds us, by assuring the student's natural 
right to hear the charges against him and rebut those 
charges. Second, the student, and his guardian parents, 
should perceive that justice is being done. A school that 
wants and expects its students to trust its educational and 
disciplinary system must provide a system that offers the 
student every opportunity to exonerate himself. This is 
especially true when the student risks the stigma of 
expulsion and the specter of limited education. 
Justice Douglas's dissent in Poe v. Ullman85 adds his 
83 Id., n. 19, quoting Daniel Webster, 5 The Writings 
and Speeches of Daniel Webster 163. 
84Rex v. Bodmin JJ [1947] 1 K.B. 321, 325. See 
McGrath, 341 U.S. at 172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
85 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515 (1961) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) . This case dealt the significance of an accused 
criminal who "pleaded the Fifth Amendment" in a state court. 
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name to the list of those who would use the Fourteenth 
Amendment to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights. This is 
because of his belief that the original intent of the 
Framers of the Constitution was to enshrine certain rights 
in the Constitution. The rights to be enshrined were those 
that have been deeply etched in the foundations of America's 
freedomsB 6 and experience has indicated were indispensable 
to a free society.B7 These rights have also gained content 
from the emanations of other specific guarantees.BB All of 
this constitutes Justice Douglas's view of what is to be 
included under the rubric of "due process of law." Justice 
Douglas also remarks that "[t]his has indeed been the view 
of a full court of nine Justices, though the members who 
make up the court unfortunately did not sit at the same 
Since the Fifth Amendment is a federal, not state, right, 
the question was raised whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporated the Fifth to protect against self-incrimination 
in a state court. 
B6 See Justice William J. Brennan Jr., "The Bill of 
Rights and the States," 36 New York University Law Review 
761, 776 (1961). 
B7 Poe V. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 516. 
BBid. at 517, citing N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
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time. 1189 
Justice Harlan wrote his own dissenting opinion. 90 He 
once again points to the origin of due process: Magna 
Charta's "per legem terrae." This doctrine was added to the 
Constitution to embrace those rights "which are 
fundamental; which belong ... to the citizens of all free 
governments, 91 for the "purposes of securing which men 
enter into society." 92 
Justice Harlan also opined that the fact that the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution provided for due process, and 
this Amendment is subsumed by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
there must be some discrete meaning to each guaranty of due 
process. He felt that due process is a discrete concept 
that subsists as an independent guaranty of life, liberty, 
and procedural fairness, more general and inclusive than the 
89 Id. Justice Douglas lists the nine as: Justices 
Bradley, Swayne, Field, Clifford, and Harlan. Also, Brewer, 
Black, Murphy, Rutledge, and himself. Poe v. Ullman, Id. n. 
8 . 
90 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 522 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) . 
91 Id. at 541, citing Corfield v. Coryell, Fed. Cas. No. 
3,230. 
92 See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385, 388 (1798). 
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specific prohibitions of the Bill of Rights. 93 At the same 
time, Harlan maintained the Court's hesitation to reduce due 
process to a formula. He preferred to interpret the Court's 
decisions as the continuing balancing of demands for respect 
for the individual and for the liberties and demands of 
organized society. 94 A tradition was beginning to develop 
which indicated that due process fit on a continuum of 
freedom from all arbitrary impositions and purposeless 
restraints. 95 
We see clearly that many Supreme Court justices have, 
over the years, pointed to an American tradition for the 
proffering of due process. Moreover, every institution that 
is in a superior position over a subordinate individual 
would seem to fall under the rubric of this offering. 
Natural justice requires that the institution should make 
sure that procedural fairnesses are followed to prevent the 
denigration of the subordinate. This seems to be the 
acceptable way for balancing the competing demands for self-
expression, especially in a private school. On the one 
hand, the school should be free to exist and be run 
93 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 541. 
94 Id. at 542. 
95 Id. at 543. 
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according to the private will of its governors. On the 
other hand, the student also deserves an opportunity for 
self-expression. If the two values collide, the conflict 
can be resolved through open, two-sided communication. 
Allowing specifically for due process in a non-public school 
serves as a guaranty that the disciplinary action is, 
indeed, not arbitrary or capricious. 
Griswold v. Connecticut96 raised the question of the 
fundamental privacy of the marital relationship. This 
relationship was not recognized by the Bill of Rights 
explicitly. Justice Goldberg, writing in concurrence, 
stated that the "liberty" rights guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause are "not confined to the specific terms of 
the Bill of Rights. 1197 Justice Goldberg believed that 
"this Court has never held that the Bill of Rights or the 
Fourteenth Amendment protect only those rights that the 
Constitution specifically mentions by name. 98 
One of the significant points of Griswold is its study 
96 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The 
case discussed the state's right to limit the use of 
contraception by married couples. 
97 Id. at 486. 
98Id. n. 1. 
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of the Ninth Amendment. 99 The conclusion is drawn that the 
language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the 
Framers of the Constitution believed that there are 
additional "fundamental" rights, protected from governmental 
infringement, which exist alongside those "fundamental" 
rights specifically mentioned in the first eight 
amendments . 100 Although the Constitution does not state 
explicitly what these rights may be, perhaps it is 
tradition, experience, or the requirements of a free society 
that may bring other rights to the fore. 101 Whatever these 
rights may be, and however they are accurately defined, the 
due process clause is said to include them. Justice Black, 
in dissent, 102 provides the reader with a long list of 
cases where the Due Process Clause was used to protect 
against any abridgement of natural justice . 103 He 
99 U.S. Constitution amend. IX, ratified in 1791, 
states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people." 
100Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488. 
101See Poe, 3 67 U.S. at 517 (Douglas, J. , dissenting) . 
102 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511 (Black, J., dissenting) 
103These include, for example: The Court may forbid 
state action which "shocks the conscience," in Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), or goes against the 
"decencies of civilized conduct," Id. at 173, or has "some 
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concludes with the suggestion that the "clearest, frankest, 
and brief est explanation of how this due process approach 
works is ... that this Court is to invoke the Due Process 
Clause to strike down state procedures or laws which it can 
'not tolerate.' 11104 It is this writer's belief that 
suspension from a non-public school is certainly within the 
"catchwords and catch phrases" 105 used by the Supreme 
Court. Denial of such a time-honored and universal practice 
as due process should shock our collective conscience. We 
should protest the disciplinary action that would occur 
without the provision by the school administrators of the 
"fundamental" right of due process. 
We have seen that the doctrine of natural rights and 
justice is still very much alive in our judicial 
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental," in 
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) or cannot 
be involved in the "denial of fundamental fairness, shocking 
to the universal sense of justice," in Adkins v. Children's 
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923). See Griswold, 381 U.S. 
at 512, n.4 (Black, J., dissenting). 
104Griswold, Id., citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618, 631 (1964). 
105Id. at 511, n. 4. 
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culture. 106 This doctrine assures the realization of this 
study's goal of finding the private school student's right 
to Due Process. The Due Process Clause has been shown to 
serve as the constitutional assurance for fundamental 
fairness that must legally be provided to these students at 
all times. When a private school student would come before 
a court claiming disciplinary expulsion without due process, 
the court would be required to reverse the expulsion. 
Because of the doctrine of natural law, the court must 
insist on the provision of due process to all, by all. 
Thus far, this study has looked at "due process" rights 
as the right to procedural fairness. Each student has a 
natural right to an impartial hearing and an opportunity for 
rebuttal before being punished. These fairnesses have 
become known as "procedural due process." Since the 1905 
decision of Lochner v. New York, 107 the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized the category of "substantive 
due process." This category protects all rights stated 
106Justice Stevens, dissenting in Meachum v. Fano, 427 
U.S. 215, 229 (1975) (Stevens, J., dissenting), reminded us 
of our commitment to the notion "that all men were endowed 
by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal 
inalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due 
Process Clause protects ... " See Id. at 230. 
107Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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explicitly, or implicitly, by the Constitution against being 
diminished without a compelling reason. 
Where do the protections of the two types of "due 
process" fit in the doctrine of natural law? In this 
writer's judgment, the historical development of natural 
law, from Magna Charta to Lord Coke to the Declaration of 
Independence to specific judicial decisions point to the 
natural right of fundamental fairness. Every student is 
entitled to a hearing in front of objective judges, with the 
opportunity for rebuttal and perhaps the testimony of 
witnesses before disciplinary action is imposed upon them. 
These fundamental fairnesses comprise "procedural due 
process." 
At the same time, "substantive due process" is also 
part of natural law. The same doctrine of natural law that 
allows for nullification of legislation that is contrary to 
natural justice finds expression in the constitutional 
protections of "substantive due process." Daniel Webster 
quotes Lord Coke that a law that goes against one's natural 
rights is immediately void; Blackstone writes that even the 
King of England must follow the existing law. This 
overriding power of natural law is included in the modern 
day notion of "substantive due process." The requirement to 
show a compelling reason to allow the limitation of one's 
natural ("fundamental") rights is the Constitution's 
equivalent to Lord Coke and Blackstone. Thus, both 
contemporary aspects of due process, "procedural" and 
"substantive," include the requirements of natural law. 
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As school administrators implementing a discipline 
program, it is more common to face issues of "procedural due 
process." An administrator who refuses to follow the proper 
procedures has severely limited the student's natural right. 
The consequence of this limitation should be nullification 
of the administrator's decision. Couple the student's 
natural right to procedural fairness with the natural right 
to education, to be discussed in the next section of this 
chapter, and nullification of the disciplinary action is 
clearly warranted. 
As administrators facing the possibility of a student's 
long-term suspension or expulsion, the larger issue of 
natural rights to due process in general and education in 
particular are invoked. Then "substantive due process" is 
appropriate to show why the needs of the school, and perhaps 
the student, are fulfilled only with the student's removal 
from the school responsible for providing the "fundamental" 
benefit of education. 
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THE NATURAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
There remains the natural right to education that must 
be reviewed. The Due Process Clause, as the "protector" of 
natural rights should also protect the student's 
"fundamental" right to education. 
Education is a universal value . 108 All human 
societies educate their young in matters practical (e.g., 
avoidance of dangers) and also speculative or theoretical 
(e.g., religion). St. Thomas Aquinas taught that there are 
several "first" principles and general precepts of natural 
law. After "human life," he lists the coupling of man and 
woman and the education of the young . 109 Aquinas is quite 
clear that education is a natural right of the young. If we 
couple this natural right to know with Aristotle's teaching, 
that all people have a desire to know, 110 then it becomes 
clear that education should be protected, by the tenets of 
due process and natural law, from limitation. 
Further, Aristotle said that the best thing for a 
108John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford, 
England: Clarendon Press, 1984), 83. 
109St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica I-II q. 94, a. 
2c. Aquinas also lists "to shun ignorance" as part of 
natural inclinations. Id. 
110Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 1: 980a22. 
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person to know is the highest good in the whole of nature; 
this is God. 111 The reader will immediately sense the 
problem: Children have a natural interest to learn, society 
wants them to learn its ways, and these ways include 
knowledge of God. If the school accomplishes its most 
desirable goals, it will be teaching about God to actively 
involved students who are absorbing the teachings and 
implementing them in society. 
There is no problem with this multiple accomplishment 
in a private sectarian school. The realization of these 
goals is often the very reason parents enroll their children 
in this type of school. They will be pleased to see their 
children learning about God and living by His word in 
society. But there is a major problem in the public non-
sectarian sector! Thomas Jefferson spoke of the "wall of 
separation" that must separate between church and state, 
religion and the government . 112 The public schools cannot 
constitutionally teach the very educational goals and 
natural rights of Aristotle and Aquinas. 
Accordingly, if a private school takes disciplinary 
111Id., I, 2:982b7-8. 
112cited in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 
16 (1947) I citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 u.s.· 145, 
164 (1878), citing 8 Thomas Jefferson's Works 113. 
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action against a student and the student leaves in favor of 
a public school, then the education the student will receive 
has changed dramatically. As a public school student he 
will be deprived of his natural rights to learn about God 
and live a religious lifestyle. Deprivation of such natural 
rights should not be done without procedural fairness. 
The Pierce court held that the religious rearing of 
their children is a "fundamental" right of parents. 113 For 
a private school to deprive the parents of this opportunity, 
and for students to lose their enriched education, may 
warrant more than simple procedural fairness. The school 
should seriously consider showing that the student has 
"earned" this expulsion and that all other, less traumatic, 
solutions were futile. 
Certainly, a public school student could study 
religious teachings in the privacy of home, thus obviating 
the spiritual distress of expulsion from a religious school. 
This is, however, not necessarily the case. The home may 
not be the best place for this study. As Plato taught, the 
polis (state) is the "great pedagogue." It is, therefore, 
the state's function to educate the child, not the 
113 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
parent's . 114 According to Aristotle, 115 it is the polis 
that must ultimately provide whatever is necessary for the 
full and complete development of the person. 116 It is the 
school, as the professional extension of society for the 
education of its young, that is responsible to teach, not 
the home . 117 
The school, as an extension of society, non-sectarian 
or sectarian, must teach its society's values. 118 In 
addition to the knowledge component that the school must 
114Plato, Polis VIII, I: 1337a23-32. 
115Cited in Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, at 
closing note on VI.6, p. 160. 
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116This is the underlying reasoning of the doctrine of 
parens patriae, where the state may use its authority and 
guardianship of the child to assure that he is properly 
educated. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) 
and Gardner v. Hall, 26 A.2d 799 (1942). 
117Aristotle' s notion of the state's ultimate 
responsibility to prepare the child for adult citizenhood 
need not be seen as contradictory to the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925), that the parents have a natural right to 
rear their child as they please. Pierce is a free exercise 
of religion decision, indicating that parents may select the 
school they prefer. But the children must get educated, as 
the state has an interest in educated citizens who can 
participate in our form of democracy and be self-reliant and 
self-sufficient participants in society. This was also the 
state's argument in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 
and was accepted by the Court at 221. 
118absent a contradictory value, as discussed above, 
such as the separation of Church and State. 
73 
impart, it must also teach such social values as mutual 
respect. Since the best teaching is by example, procedural 
fairness should be followed so that the student who is being 
disciplined and his schoolmates learn about respect. The 
lesson to the students will be clear: Even a student who is 
being punished deserves to be treated with respect! 
There is a further consideration for the school before 
its personnel expel a student. The school is acting on 
behalf of the student's political or religious governing 
board. One of the objectives in the founding of this 
communal institution was for its members to realize the 
highest ideals of the "good life." A student whose behavior 
contradicts those ideals, or who prevents others from 
realizing their's, is often censured. The board is usually 
given the right to perform this censure, according to 
certain guidelines and procedures. The censuring should be 
done at the level of the "highest ideals. 11119 This 
undoubtedly includes the providing of the "higher order" 
119This is especially the case if the censured child is 
being excluded from membership or participation in the 
group. Abraham Maslow has written extensively (beginning in 
the 1950's, with Motivation and Personality, New York: 
Harper and Row, 1954) about the natural need that people 
feel for belongingness to a group. To affect that natural 
and basic need of belonging to a group without the 
protection of procedural fairnesses cannot be countenanced. 
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right of due process to the affected student. 
This chapter surveyed over two thousand years of 
thinking on the subject of natural law and rights. From the 
earliest of time, man believed that there are certain laws 
of nature that must be upheld at all times. Man does not 
create these laws, but discovers God's laws in nature. 
This notion remained in effect even after Positive 
(human) Law was codified. The balance between positive and 
natural law was that man is morally bound to follow the 
natural law for the sake of reaching perfection. 
Concurrently, good positive law reflects God's idealized 
version of law and gains legitimacy from its approximation 
to natural law. 
The Magna Charta is seen as the early code of justice 
that led eventually to our United States Constitution. The 
Magna Charta requires certain procedural fairnesses that 
have remained in effect ever since. The Magna Charta also 
taught, with clarification by Lord Coke, that a law that 
violates a natural law is automatically void. 
The content of natural law has remained vague. In 
general, man is to use his power of reason to determine the 
content of natural law. Even in today's jurisprudence, 
where the natural law is often reflected in the modern "due 
process," the Supreme Court has purposely not given a 
specific delineation of what due process rights entail. 
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This chapter also reviewed the importance of including 
natural law in the codification and implementation of 
positive law. It looked at ways to interpret the apparent 
changes in natural law that God commanded. 
It was determined that natural law is still very much a 
part of the American legal heritage. This began with the 
"inalienable rights" clause of the Declaration of 
Independence and has continued well into our century. 
Various Supreme Court decisions have renewed America's 
commitment to the notion of an ideal law and world which is 
ours to discover. 
Special analysis was suggested, showing that the right 
to education itself is a natural right. This brought us 
squarely to the contention that disciplinary action in a 
private school requires procedural fairness before it will 
be legitimized or accepted by a court of law. In essence, 
both due process and natural law are natural rights of our 
personhood. If they must be diminished, natural law 
requires that basic procedural fairness, such as a hearing 
and opportunity for rebuttal, be forthcoming. It was also 
suggested that where the door of education is completely 
closed to students, a higher level of "due process" should 
be required. This level, similar to "substantive due 
process," would require the school to show that no better 
option was available to it save expulsion. 
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As for the claim that the United States Constitution 
requires that due process be provided only if there is 
"state action," it was shown that natural law supersedes 
these constitutional requirements. Thus, the constitutional 
rights of "due process," that are derived from natural law, 
apply to public and private school students alike. When the 
Constitution was formalized, it included natural law in its 
precepts -- not to the exclusion of the individual, but to 
the inclusion of the state. 
CHAPTER III 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN CASES OF DEPRIVATION OF 
PROPERTY AND LIBERTY RIGHTS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that 
public school students have a constitutional right to due 
process of law. 1 This decision is based on the language of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution: 
" ... [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law." Public 
schools are considered extensions of the state and, thus, 
must provide all of the usual constitutional safeguards. 2 
Public school students "do not shed their rights at the 
schoolhouse door." 3 
What is the law regarding the constitutional rights of 
private school students? This question has never been 
addressed by the Supreme Court. Lower courts, however, have 
typically found that constitutional rights do not apply to 
1 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
2 Id. at 572. 
3 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 
U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
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non-public school students. 4 This is because of the 
particular wording of the Fourteenth Amendment: " ... Nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." 5 
This chapter will address the question of whether 
constitutional rights that have been accorded public school 
students are applicable to non-public school students. The 
decisions in the public school cases as well as various 
private school cases will be reviewed. In addition, 
alternate ways of looking at the same legal background will 
be proposed in an attempt to secure constitutional rights 
for private school students. 
As background for these decisions, we shall review the 
doctrine of "due process" in the United States Constitution. 
This study's chapter on Natural Law describes the 
historical, social and moral aspects of "due process." This 
chapter deals with its place as a protector of the 
"property" and "liberty" rights of education. 
The concept of "due process of law" appears in the Bill 
of Rights, specifically in the Fifth Amendment to the United 
4The original decision, followed by many state courts, 
is Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), 
445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). 
5 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Emphasis added. 
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States Constitution. There we find, "nor [shall any person] 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law." As explained in the chapter on Natural 
Rights, the Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal 
Government. However, the phrase "due process of law" was 
later made applicable to state governments by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Section One, which states: "Nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law." 
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"DUE PROCESS OF LAW" A DEFINITION 
An accurate and exact definition of "Due Process of Law" has 
never been provided by the United States Supreme Court. The 
phrase has been studied, with ongoing attempts at 
determining a clear definition of its meaning. It is clear 
that "due process of law" is related to a fundamental 
fairness that must be provided before the government 
deprives someone of his property or liberty. The Supreme 
Court has generally held that "due process" requires that 
notice and the right to a fair hearing be provided before 
the deprivation. 6 The Court has preferred to leave "due 
process" without a fixed meaning, and allow it to expand 
with jurisprudential attitudes of fundamental fairness. 7 
Furthermore, what fairness must be accorded is not 
specifically mandated. Instead, "considerations of what 
procedures due process may require under any given set of 
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise 
nature of the government function involved as well as the 
private interest that has been affected by governmental 
action. 0 Justice Frankfurter recognized the historical and 
6 See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). 
7 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) 
0 See Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) 
legal importance of due process, and explained why it has 
not been defined with precision. 
The requirement of "due process" is not a 
fair weather or timid assurance. It must be 
respected in periods of calm and in times of 
trouble; it protects aliens as well as citizens. 
But "due process," unlike some legal rules, is not 
a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place and circumstances. 
Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis 
respect enforced by law for that feeling of just 
treatment which has been evolved through centuries 
of Anglo-American constitutional history and 
civilization, "due process" cannot be imprisoned 
within the treacherous limits of any formula. 
Representing a profound attitude of fairness 
between man and man, and more particularly between 
the individual and government, "due process" is 
compounded of history, reason, the past course of 
decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of 
the democratic faith which we profess. Due 
process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not 
a yardstick. It is a delicate process of 
adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of 
judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted 
with the unfolding of the process. 9 
The Justices of the Supreme Court are telling us to 
define the Due Process Clause by what it does, not by what 
it is. This is why Justice Frankfurter also wrote, "Due 
process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of 
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respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted in 
the tradition and conscience of the nation as to be ranked 
9 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 
U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added) . 
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as implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 1110 
Justice Frankfurter wrote his comments in the context 
of Chief Justice Taft's historical note. Chief Justice Taft 
wrote, "The legislative power of a State can only be exerted 
in subordination to the fundamental principles of right and 
justice which the guaranty of due process in the Fourteenth 
Amendment is intended to preserve ... 1111 
Chief Justice Taft was relating to the primary concern 
of the people at the time that the national government was 
being formed. This concern was that the nascent national 
government would be unconstrained by common-law principles. 
The people feared that the federal government might impinge 
upon liberties in ways that private entities could not, 
simply by invoking sovereign immunity. Thus, the Bill of 
Rights was added to the Constitution to formalize what was 
already common policy for all, including individual persons. 
If we, purposely, do not have a clear definition of Due 
Process of Law, we do, at least have an historical context. 
This context provides us with some detail of the notion's 
importance and applicability. When the federal government 
was required to provide "due process," as stated in 
10Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 ( 1952) . 
11 Truax v. Lorrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 329 (1921) 
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Amendment V, then we know that this had also been incumbent 
upon all private individuals as well. For the Bill of 
Rights did not create new rights. Rather, it codified the 
rights that had been extant. Thus, Due Process of Law, 
although a constitutional requirement, was also a person-to-
person requirement of equal importance. 12 An historic 
vision of constitutional rights would require non-
governmental schools to provide the same "fundamental" 
rights guaranteed by the governmental schools. 
We know what the Due Process Clause does. It protects 
essential freedoms and liberties. It may not be clear which 
rights actually merit a place in the hierarchy of essential 
freedoms and liberties included in the ''Due Process" Clause, 
but few would disagree that a person is entitled to notice 
and an opportunity to be heard. 13 We also know that the 
Due Process Clause protects "fundamental" rights from 
encroachment, though there may be disagreements regarding 
which rights may claim "fundamentality." All agree, 
however, that the rights included in the first eight 
Amendments to the United States Constitution are 
12 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S. at 
163. 
130' Brien, 3 Journal of Law and Education 175, 188 
(1974) . 
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11 fundamental. 1114 
14Adamson v. California, 232 U.S. 46 (1947). 
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"DUE PROCESS" AND "FUNDAMENTAL" RIGHTS 
Experience has taught us that constitutional rights 
evolve. The United States Supreme Court has defined rights 
that were not included in the original wording of the 
Constitution, nor were they necessarily part of the Framers' 
original intent. In recent years, the Supreme Court has 
identified and defined what may be considered new rights in 
such areas as privacy, 15 desegregation, 16 women's 
rights, 17 and the right to travel. 18 
There are certain rights that were always understood as 
the basic rights of our society. These rights, often 
referred to as "fundamental" rights, were shared by each and 
every resident of the land. The Court did not rely on the 
common law alone to provide protection for these values 
considered "fundamental." Rather, it read these 
"fundamental" rights into the Constitution. Where it was 
once thought that certain rights were protected from 
invasion by sources such as the common law, and in no other 
need of safeguarding, it became clear that those socially 
15Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
16Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
17Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
18 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
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important rights needed better protection. The Court 
provided that protection when it judged certain rights to be 
"fundamental." 
"Due process" provides this higher level of protection. 
The ''state action" doctrine has been used to "allow" abuses 
of certain rights by insulating individuals from the 
requirements of "due process." These abuses weaken 
important rights. To buttress the protection that due 
process rights provide, the "state action" requirement 
should be removed. This would preserve the original intent 
of the Framers who were careful to include the "due process" 
protections in the Bill of Rights. 
"Due process" carries a glorious and well-respected 
past. All residents of the United States are entitled to 
the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the "Due Process" 
clause. Thus, we find, "[Due Process] is a rule founded on 
the first principle of natural justice, older than written 
constitutions, that a citizen shall not be deprived of his 
life, liberty, or property without an opportunity to be 
heard in defense of his rights. 1119 Surely, private school 
children should be accorded the fairness guaranteed by the 
19Stewart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 190, 30 Am. Re·p. 289 
(1878) . 
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Constitution itself if not its history and subsequent 
adjudication. Although the case history may not be 
available to prove all children's right to due process 
before sustaining disciplinary action in school, the 
Fourteenth Amendment should be seen as flexible enough to 
accommodate such a possibility. 
It is true that the literal language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would make it seem that providing "due process" 
rights is the obligation of the state only, to the exclusion 
of private parties. This is the common interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause. 20 However, in United States v. 
Guest we find dicta by six justices that Congress can 
legislate to apply the Fourteenth Amendment restrictions to 
private parties as well. 21 In accordance with the Guest 
dicta, legal reasoning will be suggested to extend "due 
process" rights to non-public school students. 
2011 Nor shall any state deprive any person of 
liberty or property without the due process of law." U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
21Guest, 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring). 
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STUDENTS' "DUE PROCESS" RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Public schools are considered an arm of the state, with 
very specific requirements applying to them. The theory 
behind these requirements will be reviewed for its 
applicability to non-public schools. 
As stated earlier, the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution guarantees due process of law if 
governmental action interferes with the life, liberty, or 
property of an individual. This guaranty of due process was 
extended to juveniles in 1967 when the Supreme Court 
recognized that minors have the same constitutional rights 
as adults. 22 
An earlier case, in a lower court, may have been the 
harbinger of these rights. In Dixon v. Alabama State Board 
of Education, a case involving college students who had been 
disciplined for participation in a sit-in protest, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
declared: 
The question presented by the pleadings and evidence, 
and decisive of this appeal, is whether due process 
requires notice and some opportunity for hearing before 
students at a tax supported college are expelled for 
misconduct. We answer that question in the 
22 In re Gault, 3 8 7 U. S . 1 ( 19 6 7) . 
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affirmative ... 23 
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that college 
students attending a state university were entitled to the 
constitutional rights of due process before they could be 
expelled. The court also discussed what procedure should be 
expected from the schools in the provision of "due 
process. 1124 
It was not until 1975 that the United States Supreme 
Court decided a case of due process rights for pre college-
aged students. Goss v. Lopez25 is the landmark case in the 
area of student discipline and expulsions, holding that 
public school students are entitled to "due process" before 
being suspended for ten days or less. Goss v. Lopez 
involved students from Columbus, Ohio, who were suspended 
from their public high schools for up to ten days without a 
hearing. The students brought a class action suit against 
their school officials seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the Ohio statute permitting such suspensions was 
unconstitutional. A three-judge District Court agreed with 
23Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 
150, 151 (5th Cir. 1961) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1962). 
24Id. at 159. 
25Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
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the students, declaring that they were denied due process of 
law when they were suspended without a hearing. The Supreme 
Court upheld the District Court's finding, and held that (i) 
Public school students have property and liberty interests 
that qualify for protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment26 and (ii) Due Process requires, in connection 
with a suspension of ten days or less, that students be 
given oral or written notice of the charges against them. 
If they deny these charges, they must be given an 
explanation of the evidence against them and an opportunity 
to present their side. 27 Generally the notice and hearing 
should precede the suspension. If this is not feasible, as 
in a case where the student needs to be removed from the 
school premises immediately, then the hearing should be held 
as soon as practicable. 28 
The Goss case, then, guarantees due process rights for 
public school students. The courts have not yet recognized 
the same rights and procedures for private school students. 
Below, we shall review aspects of this Supreme Court 
decision in depth to see where the nuances of public and 
26 Id. at 574. 
27 Id. at 581. 
28Id. at 582-3. 
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private education may interface. 
As we have seen, the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the 
state to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without the due process of law. An important Supreme Court 
decision gave meaning to "liberty" and "property." The 
Court stated in Board of Regents v. Roth, 29 that property 
interests "are not created by the Constitution. Rather, 
they are created and their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law -- rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support 
claims of entitlement to these benefits." 30 "Property" is 
protected by the Constitution, but the definition of this 
"property" comes from existing laws and statutes. 
Public education is an excellent example of a 
"property" right protected by the United States 
Constitution. The constitution of every state guarantees 
free public education to its children. Public education 
thereby, after the Roth decision, became a "property" right 
of the children. When a school seeks to suspend a child 
from participation in this "property" right, the school, in 
29Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
30 Id. at 577. 
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accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment, must provide the 
child with procedural fairness, or the "due process of 
law. " 31 Because of this property right, the Goss Court 
ruled that, " ... [O]n the basis of state law, [these high 
school students] plainly had legitimate claims of 
entitlement to a public education. 1132 And, these claims 
could not be withdrawn "on claims of misconduct absent 
fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the 
misconduct had occurred. "33 
The Court viewed education as a "property" right of the 
students. When a school imposes disciplinary action to 
limit that property right, it must provide fundamental 
fairness. The Goss Court's decision outlined the content of 
these procedures. 34 Had the Court decided that education 
31A broader reading of Goss would indicate that if a 
state deprives a citizen of the level of education to which 
state law has entitled that citizen, then the state must 
provide notice and a hearing to explain the deprivation. See 
Allan W. Hubsch, "Education and Self-Government: The Right 
to Education Under State Law. 18 Journal of Law and 
Education 93, 110 (1989). 
32 Goss, 419 U.S. at 573. 
33 Id. at 574. 
34For suspensions from school of ten days or less, the 
Goss Court required that the public school provide the 
student with: "Oral or written notice of the charges against 
him, and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence 
the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side 
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is a "fundamental" right of children, then the errant 
student would have been entitled to much more. If the San 
Antonio v. Rodriguez35 decision had been that education was 
a constitutionally protected "fundamental" right, then the 
Court would require the school to present a compelling 
reason why a student should be suspended. 36 This 
"fundamental" right is a more serious constitutional right, 
and better protected from abridgement. Goss was decided 
after Rodriguez, and the Court was consistent in approach. 
of the story." Goss, 419 U.S. at 581. 
35San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
36The procedure of finding a compelling reason to 
justify the abridgement of a "fundamental" right is called, 
in constitutional terms, "substantive due process." 
The Fifth Circuit used this procedure in Debra P. v. 
Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, reh'g denied, 654 F.2d 1079 (5th 
Cir., 1981), when it required the state to provide 
substantive justification for its deprivation of due 
process. "The due process violation potentially goes deeper 
than deprivation of property rights without adequate notice. 
When it encroaches upon concepts of justice lying at the 
basis of our civil and political institutions, the state is 
obligated to avoid action which is arbitrary and capricious, 
does not achieve or even frustrates a legitimate state 
interest, or is fundamentally unfair." Ibid., 644 F.2d at 
404. The court's requirement was based on the connection 
between education and "our civil and political 
institutions." 
Thus, even if education may not be found to be a 
fundamental right under the equal protection clause, it is a 
fundamental interest under the substantive protections of 
the due process clause. See Hubsch, Supra note 163, at 113. 
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According to Rodriguez, education is a "property" right, not 
a "fundamental" right, so the only protection it needs is 
"procedural due process. "37 
In addition to concluding that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment protects public school students 
from the arbitrary deprivation of the property right to an 
education, the Goss Court also held that it forbids the 
arbitrary deprivation of a student's liberty rights. 38 The 
Court cited Wisconsin v. Constantineau: 39 "'When a 
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at 
stake because of what the government is doing to him, 140 
the minimal requirements of the Clause must be 
satisfied. " 41 The Goss Court found that the "Liberty" 
right of a person to maintain his good reputation was at 
stake when charges are brought that would cause his 
suspension from school. This "Liberty" right, like a 
37 In these cases, "procedural due process" guarantees 
only that a fair hearing will be provided the student before 
the disciplinary action is affected. 
38
" ••• [N] or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; ... " 
(Emphasis added.) 
39 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
40 Id. at 437. 
41 Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
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property right, may not be withdrawn without fundamentally 
fair procedures. The Court declared that "If sustained and 
recorded, 42 those charges could seriously damage the 
students' standing with their fellow pupils and their 
teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for 
higher education and employment. " 43 Thus, public school 
students are entitled to due process based on their liberty 
rights as well as their property rights. They have a 
property right to education, created by the state; they have 
a liberty right to a good reputation and to a lack of social 
stigma. 44 
A further reason for the Goss Court extending due 
process rights to these students is that students maintain 
their rights as persons even within the classroom and school 
building. As decided in Tinker v. Des Moines School 
District, 45 students do not "shed their constitutional 
42Regarding the consequence of inclusion in the 
student's permanent record and his loss of a "liberty" 
right, see Note, "Developments -- Academic Freedom" 81 
Harvard Law Review 1045, 1153-54 (1968). 
43 Goss, 419 U.S. at 575. 
44Regarding the social stigma attached to the 
expulsion, see Note, Supra note 42, at 1138. 
45 Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). 
96 
rights" at the schoolhouse door. 46 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court has required public school districts to follow 
all constitutional guidelines, recognizing schools to be 
creations of the state: "The Fourteenth Amendment, as now 
applied to the States, protects the citizen against the 
State itself and all of its creatures -- Boards of Education 
not excepted. " 47 
46 Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
506) 
47 Id. (quoting West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
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THE APPLICATION OF THE GOSS DECISION IN THE PRIVATE SCHOOL 
Much of the judicial reasoning in public school cases 
applies to private school students as well. Justice White, 
in writing on behalf of the majority in Goss, deals with the 
importance of openness in the disciplinary hearings. 
Providing a hearing and an opportunity for students to 
defend themselves are critical, because it is so difficult 
to ascertain the truth without these hearings. 
"Disciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost good faith, 
frequently act on the reports and advice of others; and the 
controlling facts and the nature of the conduct under 
challenge are often disputed. The risk of error is not at 
all trivial, and it should be guarded against ... " 48 
Quoting Justice Frankfurter in Anti-Fascist Committee 
v. McGrath, 49 Justice White reminds us that "Fairness can 
rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of 
facts decisive of rights ... " 5° Further, Frankfurter 
stated, "Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-
righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. 
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth 
48 Id. at 580. 
49Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S .. 123. 
50 Id. at 170. 
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than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of 
the case against him and opportunity to meet it. " 51 
Justice White was referring to public schools in his 
Goss opinion. What he wrote regarding public schools 
applies equally to private schools. Private school 
administrators will want to ascertain the true facts. They 
may always work in good faith, but this will not remove the 
possibility of error. The procedures that have helped 
public school administrators find the truth and punish 
accordingly will undoubtedly succeed in the private sector 
as well. 
Further, Justice White believes that the extent to 
which the Court requires the provision of due process rights 
to students is " ... [I]f anything, less than a fair-minded 
school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid 
unfair suspensions. 1152 
Here, again, Justice White was speaking of public 
schools. Justice White may be seen, however, to have chosen 
an ambiguous expression, "a fair-minded school principal," 
to extend his remarks to all schools and principals. 
51Goss, 419 U.S. at 580 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Committee, Id., at 171-172). 
52 Id. at 583. 
Although Justice White never discussed private schools 
explicitly, it appears that he would ask, if not demand, of 
private school principals to be "fair-minded" and "impose 
[procedural fairness] upon [themselves] in order to avoid 
unfair suspensions. 1153 
There is an additional educational effect that may be 
accomplished when all schools provide procedural fairness. 
Many private schools boast of their teaching of democratic 
ideals and American values. An excellent way to teach a 
concept is to show students how it is expressed in real 
life. The school personnel, regardless of the school's 
governmental status, will undoubtedly want to employ due 
process procedures and avoid unfair suspensions. In this 
way, the school will have inculcated within its students on~ 
of the central ideas of American democracy: due process. 
While Justice Powell wrote on behalf of the dissent in 
Goss 54 because he believed that courts should not involve 
themselves in the daily operations of the schools, he 
nonetheless spoke to the importance of education in our 
society: 
Education in any meaningful sense includes the 
s3Id. 
54 (Goss v. Lopez was a 5-4 decision.) 
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inculcation of an understanding in each pupil of the 
necessity of rules and obedience thereto. This 
understanding is no less important than learning to 
read and write. One who does not comprehend the 
meaning and necessity of discipline is handicapped not 
merely in his education but throughout his subsequent 
life. In an age when the home and church play a 
diminishing role in shaping the character and value 
judgements of the young, a heavier responsibility falls 
upon the schools ... 
The lesson of discipline is not merely a 
matter of the student's self-interest in the 
shaping of his own character and personality; it 
provides an early understanding of the relevance 
of the social compact of respect for the rights of 
others. The classroom is the laboratory in which 
this lesson of life is best learned. Mr. Justice 
Black summed it up: 
"School discipline, like parental discipline, is 
an integral and important part of training our children 
to be good citizens -- to be better citizens." Tinker, 
393 U.S., at 524 (dissenting opinion) . 55 
As educators, Justice Powell contends, it is the 
administrators responsibility to teach discipline and 
responsibility-taking. This includes the responsibility to 
determine the truth when rules are broken. Carefully 
outlined procedures to determine the truth of an accusation 
against a student are basic to any disciplinary system; 
their exclusion would simply represent poor education. 
Without studying about -- if not experiencing -- due 
process, students lose the important lessons of citizenship: 
to be responsible for one's actions, to trust the 
55 Goss, 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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administrators that they will ascertain who was guilty and 
to what extent, and that students will have a chance to 
defend themselves. The loss of such important a lesson in 
citizenship is difficult to replace. The lessons of 
citizenship are important, regardless of the venue of 
education. Apparently, Justice Powell would have private 
school administrators provide due process procedures as part 
of their curriculum on "taking responsibility." 
After Goss, it became established that students 
attending American public schools are entitled to due 
process before sustaining the punishments of a suspension of 
ten days or less. (The Court also said that suspensions of 
longer duration or outright expulsions would warrant further 
constitutional protections56 .) We have reviewed the 
reasoning of Goss and found it to apply equally to private 
schools. The conclusion to draw is that private school 
students are entitled to the same procedural fairness as 
their public school counterparts. 
The Goss court found education itself to be both a 
"property" right57 and a "liberty" right 58 of public school 
56 Id. at 584. 
57 Id. at 573. 
58 Id. at 574-75. 
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students. Goss relied on Board of Regents v. Roth59 to 
conclude that the state statutes regarding compulsory 
education and each child's entitlement to free education 
make education a property right. These statutes and 
entitlements apply to all children. Some children happen to 
fulfill the compulsory education requirement by attending 
private schools. 60 Thus, we may say that private schools 
are in the position of offering their students the 
fulfillment of their state-guaranteed right to an education. 
Logic should dictate that this state-guaranteed requirement 
and attendant right should not be removed or hindered 
without first providing due process. 
59Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). 
60The right of students to attend private schools was 
resolved by the Supreme Court long ago, in Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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PROVIDING "DUE PROCESS" AS A QUID PRO QUO 
At least one writer makes a further argument for "due 
process" rights for private school students based on the 
state's requirement that children be educated. Because this 
requirement establishes a right to education, 61 then, 
arguably, the state must also provide a quid pro quo62 of 
quality education and fundamental fairness before this 
education is limited. It would be unsightly to require a 
child to attend an educational program, only to provide him 
with a poor quality program. Of course, the program may be 
judged poor on academic standards or administrative 
procedures. To deprive the student of this compulsory (if 
not quality) education without due process would be 
unacceptable. 63 If the private school happens to be the 
venue of this statutory fulfillment, then it, mindful of the 
quid pro quo, should provide due process before a student's 
61As seen above in Goss, 419 U.S. 565, and Roth, 408 
U.S. 564. 
62
" [S] omething for something ... that which the party 
is promised in return for something he promises, gives, 
or does ... " Steven H. Gifis, Law Dictionary, p. 381, 
Woodbury, NY: Barron's Educational Series (1984). 
63 Charles M. Masner, 21 Washburn Law Journal 555, 568-
571 (1982). 
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expulsion or suspension. 64 
64Id. at 577-78. 
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THE STATE'S PARENS PATRIAE ROLE IN EDUCATION 
Yet another reason applies for recognizing private 
school students' due process rights. The state is 
responsible to ensure that its children are educated. This 
is part of the state's role of parens patriae, where the 
state is considered the ultimate guardian of children. 65 
The state considers a child not as absolute property of a 
parent, but rather a "trust" reposed in a parent by the 
state. 66 Indeed, it is this reasoning which facilitates 
state regulations of private schools. 67 Even as the right 
to private education was recognized, in lieu of state 
supported and administered schools, the state continues to 
remain partially responsible for children's education in 
private schools. If the state is responsible for education, 
and education (as described in Goss) includes the values of 
citizenship and discipline, then the state should ensure 
that an expanded notion of due process education is applied 
to private schools. Thus, when a student brings a suit 
against a private school for expulsion without a hearing, 
65 West Virginia v. Pfizer, 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (1971). 
66Gardner v. Hall, 26 A. 2d 799, 809 (1942). 
67Cynthia Wittmer West, "The State and Sectarian 
Education: Regulation to Deregulation," 1980 Duke Law 
Journal 812. 
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the court may reasonably require such a hearing as an aspect 
of the quality education for which states are legally 
responsible. 
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IMPOSING "DUE PROCESS" TO PROTECT THE PARENT'S RIGHT 
TO DIRECT THE CHILD'S EDUCATION 
There is yet another approach to assuring due process 
rights for private school students. This approach is based 
on the decisions in Pierce v. Society of Sisters68 and 
Board of Regents v. Roth. 69 The Pierce decision focused on 
parents' "fundamental" right to rear their child according 
to the tenets of their faith. Private schools are an 
acceptable alternative in the parents' fulfillment of the 
compulsory education statutes. Roth said that a statute 
(such as compulsory education) could create a 
constitutionally recognized property right. Taken together, 
these cases say that parents has a property right to rear 
their child as appropriate, and to send this child to a 
private school. Moreover, it is a personal liberty of 
parents to send their child to the school of their 
choice. 70 Even if students have no inherent right to 
attend a certain school, their parents may have a 
"fundamental" right to send them to that school. This right 
68 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) . 
69 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
70Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1397 (N.D. 
Ind., 1970) . 
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is based on the parents' "fundamental" right to rear their 
child as they feel appropriate. As noted above, in the 
discussion of "substantive due process," "fundamental" 
rights cannot be abridged without Due Process. Thus, if the 
private school wishes to curtail this important right of 
parental prerogative and privacy, it must first establish 
that its decision is valid, by following due process 
procedures. The school must provide these procedures before 
it limits the parents' "fundamental" right. 
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"DUE PROCESS" AND THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO CONTINUANCE 
IN THE PRIVATE SCHOOL 
Another aspect of students' "property right" to an 
education comes from contract law. The nature of the 
relationship between private schools and their students has 
traditionally been defined as "contractual. 1111 Schools 
present their students with certain publications and 
guidelines before they register for enrollment. Once they 
register, they are seen as accepting the terms of 
enrollment, which are described in schools' handbooks and 
other publications. Accordingly, the courts will generally 
uphold the terms of the contract of enrollment. 
This contract of enrollment, which defines the extent 
of the legal relationship between schools and students, may 
create certain rights for students. This principle was 
recognized in an early case, decided by a state court. In 
Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 72 the court found 
that "when one is admitted to a college, there is an implied 
understanding that he shall not be arbitrarily dismissed 
71 See John B. Stetson University v. Hunt, 102 So. 637 
(1924) and Samson v. Trustees of Columbia University, 167 
N.Y.S. 202 (1917). 
72 Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 
120 N.W. 589 (1909). 
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therefrom." 73 Further, the Booker court stated, "There is 
no good reason why the law should not recognize, as growing 
out of these relations, a right of realtors resting in 
contract to be continued as students. " 74 Booker 
establishes certain rights, of continued enrollment, for the 
student who has maintained proper tuition payments and 
academic good standing. Once the student has earned these 
rights, they should not be limited without the benefit of 
due process. 
Indeed, Ewing v. Board of Regents of University of 
Michigan relied on Booker and concluded that a student has a 
"property interest" in his continuance in his academic 
prograrn. 75 Thus, a contractual understanding of continued 
education in the private school rose to a constitutional 
right, for property interests are mentioned in the United 
States Constitution. Relying once again on Roth, the United 
States Supreme Court found that "property interests, which 
may give rise to constitutional protections, are created and 
defined by existing rules or understandings which stern from 
73 Id., 156 Mich. at 99, 120 N.W. at 594. 
74 Id., 156 Mich. at 100, 120 N.W. at 589. 
75 Ewing v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan, 
742 F.2d 913, 915 (1984). 
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independent sources, such as state law." 76 The Court has 
also held that these property interests can arise from 
explicit contractual provisions or "other agreements implied 
from promiser's words or conduct in light of the surrounding 
circumstances." 77 
We have seen that, as long as students remain "in good 
standing" at the school, they have a constitutionally 
protected property right to continued education. This right 
is an outgrowth of the implied provision of continuance in 
the contracts of enrollment. This contractual right, 
recognized by state law, creates a federal property right. 
As such, it is clear that this right should not be curtailed 
without first providing some justification for its 
curtailment. Procedural fairness should be forthcoming. 
This chapter reviewed the right to "due process" of 
public school students who face disciplinary action. The 
goal was to see if private school students are entitled to 
the same constitutional procedures of fairness, even without 
a finding, in the private school, of "state action." 
76Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 577 (1972). 
77Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972). 
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Goss, 70 the leading case in public education, found 
that public school students are entitled to "due process" 
rights. This is because public schools are considered 
extensions of the state, and have the requisite "state 
action. " 79 Bright, 00 the leading case in non-public 
education, found that private school students are not 
entitled to "due process" for a failure to show "state 
action." 
This chapter undertook the formidable task of 
overcoming the lack of "state action." Seven approaches 
were presented to neutralize the claim that private schools 
lack "state action," and, consequently, have no 
constitutional protections for their students' rights to 
"due process." These seven approaches include: 
(i) The importance of "due process" in the American 
tradition. Sources were brought to show the inherent 
importance of "due process" as well as its instrumental use 
for protecting other constitutional values and rights. 
78 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
79Thus, the public schools fulfill the literal 
requirement of U.S. Const. amend. XIV§ 1: "· .. nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law ... " Emphasis added. 
00Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 
1970), 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). 
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The "Due Process" Clause was shown to be a protector of 
rights that are themselves incorporated in the Constitution. 
Justice Frankfurter wrote that, "Due Process of Law is a 
summarized Constitutional guarantee of respect for those 
personal immunities which are so rooted in the tradition and 
conscience of the nation as to be ranked as implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty. 1181 
The right to "due process" has been viewed by some to 
be "fundamental." This is a term of constitutional analysis 
used when referring to a right so basic to our society that 
it must almost always be provided. If a "fundamental" right 
must be limited, then it must be shown that there was an 
overriding and important reason. U.S. v. Guest suggests 
that Congress should apply "due process" rights to private 
parties as well. 82 This would require all people and 
private institutions to provide "due process" rights at all 
times. 
(ii) The private school student's constitutional 
interest in education (as per Goss). Even if the students' 
private education itself is not protected by constitutional 
protections for lack of "state action," education is still a 
81Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 ( 1952) . 
82 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
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fulfillment of "liberty'' and "property" rights. These 
rights are constitutionally protected from limitation, and 
should not suffer any change without procedural fairness. 
Following these fairnesses will help to make certain that 
the administrator's decision was correct and proper. They 
will teach the student a basic procedure in this country, 
which teaches good citizenship as well. 
Roth83 indicates that property rights (which are 
constitutionally protected) can be created by non-
constitutional sources, such as state statutes. Statutes in 
every state create a student's property right to education. 
It should be irrelevant that the student happens to pursue 
his state mandated education in a private school, as his 
property right is protected. 
(iii) Students' "liberty" right in education is also 
protected. This constitutionally recognized right preserves 
the student's good name and reputation. Because 
disciplinary action at school often tarnishes a student's 
reputation, the student is entitled to procedural fairness 
before the action is implemented. 
(iv) The state always maintains an interest in the 
child's education. This is by virtue of the state's role of 
83Roth, 408 U.S. 564. 
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parens patriae. It is this role that allows for state 
regulation of private schools. The point is that the same 
allowance for state regulation to ensure quality academics 
should also be brought as an ensurance by the state that 
there is quality governance. This quality might be 
measured, in part, by the existence of procedural fairness 
rules in the school. 
(v) The quid pro quo of education. This approach says 
that if a state is requiring a student to attend a school, 
then the school must provide certain procedural fairness in 
return. The compulsory education statute carries with it an 
implied statement that the child fulfilling the statute will 
be provided a quality program in return. Quality includes 
elementary administrative fairness, regardless of the amount 
of "state action" in the private school where the student 
happens to fulfill the statute. 
(vi) The parents' property right. The parents have a 
property right to send their child to a private religious 
school. 84 If the child is expelled from school, then the 
parents have lost their ability to fulfill their property 
right to send their child to the specific school. This 
property right of the parents should not be diminished 
84See Pierce, 268 U.S. 510. 
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without "due process." 
(vii) The property right to have contracts fulfilled. 
This property right looks at the contract of enrollment 
agreed upon by the school and the student. If the contract 
calls for "due process" rights, then these rights must be 
fulfilled. Ewing8 5 concluded that students have a property 
right in their continuance in their academic programs. This 
right is unrelated to "state action" and the school; it 
focuses on the contractual relationship between the parties. 
As every property right, it may be removed only after 
procedural fairnesses have been followed. 
In conclusion, it is reasonable and appropriate to 
apply constitutional protections to a private school 
student's right of attendance. Although the prima facie 
belief was that, in the absence of "state action," 
procedural fairness did not apply, we have seen that there 
are many other constitutionally-related reasons why these 
fairnesses should be brought to bear. 
05 Ewing v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan, 
742 F.2d 913 (1984). 
CHAPTER IV 
A STUDENT'S "FUNDAMENTAL" RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION AND THE 
FULFILLMENT OF "DUE PROCESS" REQUIREMENTS 
This chapter will address the question of whether 
education may be considered a "fundamental" right of every 
student. If we may show that the right to an education is 
considered a "fundamental interest" in a constitutional 
sense, then a court will require "strict scrutiny" whenever 
this right is diminished or abolished. 1 Of course, 
education is not explicitly included in the United States 
Constitution as a "fundamental" right. However, in Shapiro 
v. Thompson, 2 the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that the "fundamental" rights doctrine extends strict equal 
protection review to rights not necessarily found in the 
letter of the Constitution. Because "fundamental" status 
may be extended to rights not explicitly stated in the 
1 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631, 634 
(1969). Earlier, Justice Douglas wrote in Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1969), "We 
have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and 
li:perties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, 
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be 
closely scrutinized and carefully confined." It must be 
noted that the Equal Protection Clause is the second clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, immediately following the Due 
Process Clause of the same Amendment. 
2 Shapiro v. Thompson, Id. 
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Constitution, we must determine whether education may enter 
this charmed circle of "fundamental rights." 
A finding that the right to an education is 
"fundamental" means that "substantive due process" rights 
would apply. "Substantive due process" protects liberties 
and values explicitly or implicitly included in the 
Constitution and long a part of the American heritage. This 
protection would subject the school to "strict scrutiny" of 
its actions. A long-term suspension or expulsion could only 
be justified if the school had a compelling and overriding 
reason for such a serious limitation on the "fundamental" 
right to an education. The mere reasonableness of a 
school's decision would not be sufficient justification for 
serious disciplinary action. Also, a simple showing that 
the school had followed procedural fairness (also called 
"procedural due process") would not justify the limitation 
of the "fundamental" right to education. Understandably, 
the strict scrutiny of the court will include a review that 
whatever procedures were followed by the administration were 
open and fair. 
A finding of "fundamentality" for education requires 
that "substantive due process" norms be followed. This is a 
very strong statement about the importance of education and 
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its protection. It is unrelated to the public or private 
school a student attends. A finding of "fundamentality" 
will achieve "due process" rights for private (and indeed 
public) school students without a finding of "state action." 
Under the court's additional scrutiny, "state action" will 
be an insignificant factor as the school tries to explain 
its compelling reasons for limiting the student's 
"fundamental" right to education. 
Our study of the "fundamental" right to education will 
review the majority and minority opinions of two United 
States Supreme Court decisions related to this topic. It 
will also cite numerous state court decisions that have come 
down in favor of the "fundamentality" of education on a 
state level. The state level is more appropriate for 
decisions regarding education because education is a state, 
not Federal, responsibility. The chapter concludes with a 
survey of judicial opinion explicitly including education as 
a "fundamental" right of students, with all the 
constitutional privileges and protections pertaining 
thereto. 
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THE LANDMARK SAN ANTONIO V. RODRIGUEZ DECISION 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
education is not a "fundamental" right. This decision was 
reached in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez. 3 This case tested the constitutional validity 
of unequal funding of school districts within the state of 
Texas, and found that this funding plan was constitutionally 
valid. One of the issues the Rodriguez Court discussed in 
its landmark decision was education as a "fundamental" 
right. The Court concluded that education was not a 
"fundamental" right of the student, though the final vote of 
five justices to four indicates that the justices were 
almost evenly divided on the question. As a non-
"fundamental" interest, any scheme that limits the education 
of some children must only pass the lenient standard of 
rationality. 4 This means that the education of some 
children may be limited (e.g., a student expelled) by the 
state by the mere showing of rationality and non-capricious 
decisions. It also means that any laws and statutes in the 
area of education need not pass any strict standard of review. 
3 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
4 Id. at 98. 
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The majority opinion in this decision was based in part 
on administrative considerations. One factor prompting the 
Court to deny the "fundamental" status of education was the 
perception that local property tax finance systems would not 
pass muster under "strict" scrutiny. 5 The Justices feared 
that classifying education as "fundamental" would lead to 
invalidation across the country of all interdistrict 
disparities in per pupil expenditures. Requiring "strict 
scrutiny" of per-pupil expenditures might also invalidate 
virtually all systems of local budget control. Of course, 
this budgetary argument does not deal with the substantive 
question of education as a "fundamental" right. Instead, it 
seems to indicate that the Court might have been prepared to 
recognize this "fundamentality," were it not for the vexing 
problem of interdistrict disparities. 
The Rodriguez decision, focused on interdistrict 
budgetary disparities, related to the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 One might think that 
the Equal Protection Clause is unrelated to the Due Process 
Clause. This is not the case. Two important points are 
5 Id. at 16, 17 and n.41. 
6 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 states: " [N]or [shall 
any state] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws ... " 
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explained at the end of Chapter V: (i) The analysis that 
applies to one clause of an amendment applies to other 
clauses of the same amendment. Both "due process" and 
"equal protection" are clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
(ii) Once someone attempts to diminish a constitutional 
right, special protections must be mustered to nullify the 
attempts. The protection against limitation of one 
constitutional right will be applied equally to other 
constitutional rights. Jurisprudentially, there is no 
significant difference between Equal Protection and Due 
Process analyses. This is discussed further in the section 
on analysis of Rodriguez. 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL'S IMPORTANT DISSENT 
Our road to the "fundamentality" of education would 
seem to have reached a dead end with the Supreme Court's 
decision in Rodriguez. Justice Marshall's dissent7 shows 
us an alternate path which raises other important issues 
deserving of our renewed attention. The majority had 
claimed that "fundamental" rights must be stated explicitly 
in the Constitution. They wrote, "fundamental interests, 
which call for strict scrutiny of the challenged 
classification, encompass only established rights which we 
are somehow bound to recognize from the text of the 
Constitution itself." 8 Justice Marshall fervently 
disagreed with this contention. He cites the Court's 
findings of "fundamental interests" in cases regarding 
interstate travel, 9 procreation, 10 and the right to vote in 
a state election. 11 In all of these cases, the rights 
delimited were not stated explicitly in the Constitution, 
yet the Supreme Court found them to be "fundamental" 
7Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
0 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99. 
9 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634. 
10 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
11Reyn.o1ds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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interests nonetheless. Justice Marshall concludes from 
these disparate cases that the question of finding a 
"fundamental" interest is not a textual one per se'. 
Rather, the question must be resolved based on the quality 
of the issue. He wrote 
The task in every case should be to determine the 
extent to which Constitutionally guaranteed rights 
are dependent on interests not mentioned in the 
Constitution. As the nexus between the specific 
Constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional 
interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional 
interests becomes more "fundamental" and the 
degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the 
interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis 
must be adjusted accordingly . 12 
Further, Justice Marshall bids us to pay close 
attention to cases where "discrimination against important 
individual interests with Constitutional implications and 
against particularly disadvantaged or powerless classes is 
involved. " 13 Such an approach seemed to be, according to 
Justice Marshall, "a part of the guarantees of our 
Constitution and of the historic experiences with oppression 
and discrimination against discrete, powerless minorities 
12Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 102-103 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) . 
13 Id . at 10 9 . 
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which underlie that document. 1114 
The constitutional importance of education forced 
Justice Marshall to see education as a "fundamental" 
interest of the student. "[T]he fundamental importance of 
education is amply indicated by the prior decisions of this 
Court, by the unique status accorded public education by our 
society, and by the close relationship between education and 
some of our most basic Constitutional values." 15 
As support for his claim that education is a 
"fundamental" right in our American society, Justice 
Marshall cites what he calls "this Court~s most famous 
statement on the subject:" 
Today, education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments. 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed 
forces. It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument 
in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his 
14Id. It would appear to this author that a student 
relative to the school may be compared to a powerless 
minority relative to the government. Hence, the same 
requirement and consideration should apply. 
15Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 111. 
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environment ... 16 
Further, the Court has recognized that "[p]roviding 
public schools ranks at the very apex of the functions of a 
state." 17 Indeed, "[n]o other state function is so 
uniformly recognized as an essential element of our 
society's well-being. 111s 
Justice Marshall's opinion was clearly in line with 
Justice Frank Murphy's dissenting opinion in Adamson v. 
California. 19 Justice Murphy opined that other 
"fundamental" rights, in addition to the specific guarantees 
of the Constitution, must also be protected. For Justice 
Murphy, the Bill of Rights was just a constitutional 
floor. 20 
Subsequently, Justice William 0. Douglas adopted 
Justice Murphy's view in Poe v. Ullman, 21 in his dissenting 
opinion. Justice Douglas wrote, "Though I believe that 'due 
16Id. at 111-112, quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
17Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). 
1 sRodriguez, 411 U.S. at 112. 
19Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 123 (1947) 
(Murphy, J., dissenting) 
20 Id. at 124. 
21 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
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process' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment includes all of 
the eight amendments, I do not think it is restricted or 
confined to them ... "Liberty" is a conception that 
sometimes gains content from the emanations of other 
specific guarantees ... or from experience with the 
requirements of a free society. " 22 Justice Douglas 
buttressed his argument in a footnote, quoting from a 
lecture delivered by Justice Owen J. Roberts, "Due process 
follows the advancing standards of a free society as to what 
is deemed reasonable and right. " 23 
We have seen that there is judicial justification for 
extending "due process" rights beyond the specifically 
stated rights of the Constitution. In great measure, 
however, Justice Marshall preferred to base his opinion 
(that education is a "fundamental" interest) on the 
instrumental importance of education. The Yoder court had 
clearly articulated the importance of education regardless 
of its venue, public or private school. Education is so 
essential that the Yoder Court had said "some degree of 
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate 
effectively and intelligently in our open political 
22 Id. at 516-17 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
23 Id. at 518 , n . 9 . 
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system ... ," and that "education prepares individuals to be 
self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in 
society. 1124 
Thus, we find a "substantial relationship which 
education bears to guarantees of our Constitution. 1125 
Justice Marshall found that education is necessary for a 
child to participate fully in the "marketplace of ideas" 26 
and fully exercise his First Amendment rights of free speech 
and association. 27 Indeed, it is education that opens up 
the child to the cultural experiences that are central to 
being an American. Education is "the dominant factor 
affecting political consciousness and participation." 28 
24 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221. 
25Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 112. 
26Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967) . 
27Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 113. 
28Id. at 113. 
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AN ANALYSIS OF RODRIGUEZ 
A theoretical response to Justice Marshall's arguments 
is that he pointed only to the importance of a minimum of 
public education. Perhaps Justice Marshall viewed education 
as "fundamental" only until it is provided according to 
whatever minimal level is proffered at a public school. 
Justice Marshall, however, does not accept minimalist 
levels. In an important footnote, Justice Marshall deals 
with the Court's suggestion that the children are getting 
sufficient education (in minimally funded public schools) 
for them to enjoy the benefits of constitutional rights. 
This would remove any requirements for stricter scrutiny in 
education. He writes, "There is ... no limit to the amount 
of free speech, or political participation that the 
Constitution guarantees. It is thus of little benefit to 
an individual ... to have "enough" education if those around 
him have more than "enough. 1129 
Certain cases, such as Rodriguez, may appear relevant 
29 Id. at 113, note 72 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Note 
that Justice Marshall seems to be including education as a 
member of the first amendment family of values. This 
inclusion would again warrant strict scrutiny before the 
right to education is limited. See Frank I. Goodman, "De 
Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical 
Analysis," 60 California Law Review 275, 350-51 (March, 
1972) . 
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only to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and not the Due Process Clause. These cases 
include situations where there is either unequal funding 
between school districts or some other disparity between 
groups. They are, however, not necessarily to be viewed 
only as questions affecting this Equal Protection Clause. 
This was discussed earlier in this chapter, in the section 
on the San Antonio v. Rodriguez decision. 
We may also view Equal Protection cases as questions 
affecting the Due Process Clause. Firstly, as education 
becomes a "liberty" or "property" right, 30 its abridgement 
may impinge on the Due Process Clause of the Amendment. 31 
Secondly, the Due Process Clause deals with the denial of 
rights, while the Equal Protection Clause deals with the 
discrimination that prevents the realization of a right. 
Those who are denied the right to an education due to 
administrative fiat do not suffer from the fact that others 
30See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) 
The "liberty" and "property" rights to education were 
discussed in Chapter III above. 
31
"Due process and equal protection grounds are also 
interchangeable in situations ... where denial of some 
public benefit places collateral burdens on an independently 
protected constitutional liberty." Frank I. Goodman, "De 
Facto School Segregation," 60 California Law Review 275, 
355, n. 273 (1972). 
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receive it; it is the deprivation, not the discrimination, 
which carries the sting. "32 Thus, it is really the Due 
Process Clause, not the Equal Protection Clause, that is at 
issue. An analysis that wins education rights for the poor 
or disadvantaged, such as Justice Marshall suggested, may be 
considered part of a Due Process analysis. 
Moreover, we should not allow administrative decisions 
to stand in the way of principled thought. If education has 
a place within the charmed circle of "fundamental" rights, 
as apparently some were willing to concede in concept, 33 
then it must be included. Side issues, such as 
implementation or budgetary considerations, must be pushed 
aside in favor of the proper and principled conclusions. 
This is a logical conclusion as well as an extension of the 
substantive "due process" requirement for a compelling 
reason to limit a "fundamental" right. 
If the Court were to accept Justice Marshall's opinion 
today that education is a "fundamental" right of every 
school child, 34 it would thereby grant "substantive due 
32 Id. at 359. 
33Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16, 17 and n.41. 
34 (mindful that the original decision was based on a 5 
to 4 vote of the Justices) 
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process" rights to all children, regardless of their school 
of attendance. This is because, as a "fundamental" 
interest, Shapiro v. Thompson35 and other cases require the 
courts to review the limiting of this interest with "strict 
scrutiny." This means that public and private schools 
alike, may not significantly suspend or expel a student 
without first offering a compelling reason why the student's 
rights should be limited. Absent such an offer, there must 
be serious doubt whether any school, public or private, may 
expel a student. 
Another reason discussed in the legal literature for 
considering education to be a "fundamental interest" is 
today's vision of what should be acceptable in a utopian 
view of the United States. We want everyone to be educated, 
to participate in our cultural values, and to be gainfully 
employed. Thus, we find commentators who refer to the 
unlisted "fundamental" rights: "[s]ome classifications 
although far from irrational [are] nonetheless 
unconstitutional because they produce inequities that are 
unacceptable in this generation's idealization of 
35 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634. 
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America. 1136 It is education that will overcome these 
inequities, thus, education should be considered 
"fundamental." 
This approach to "fundamentality" is, obviously, not 
limited to the specific wording of the Constitution, nor is 
it overly concerned with the Framers' intent. Rather, this 
approach looks to modern day interpretation of the 
Constitution to give it contemporary meaning and relevance. 
Considering the growing attention to the inherent and 
instrumental importance of education, we should use recent 
judicial decisions -- combined with the need to breathe new 
life and vision into the Constitution -- to protect 
education as a "fundamental right." 
36Kenneth L. Karst and Howard W. Horowitz, "Reitman v. 
Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection." 1967 
Supreme Court Review 39. 
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THE NEW ERA OF "HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY" AFTER PLYLER V. DOE 
As noted above, the United States Supreme Court found 
that education is not a "fundamental" right under the 
federal Constitution. 37 Since that decision, however, 
another case, Plyler v. Doe was decided. Some commentators 
believe that the Plyler decision marked the end of the 
Rodriguez holding. 
Plyler v. Doe38 was another five-to-four decision of 
the United States Supreme Court. The case involved the 
children of illegal aliens in this country who claimed they 
were entitled to free public education. The State of Texas 
claimed that they were not required to provide free 
education to illegal residents. The Court decided that the 
Fourteenth Amendment forbids the State of Texas to "deny the 
undocumented school-age children the free public education 
that it provides to children who are citizens of the United 
States or who are legally admitted aliens. "39 For, " [i] f 
the state is to deny a discrete group of innocent children 
the free public education that it offers to other children 
residing within its borders, the denial must be justified by 
37Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 
38 P1y1er v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
39 Id. at 205. 
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a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. 
No such showing was made here. 1140 In addition, the Court 
said, "[d]enial of education to some isolated group of 
children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 1141 
Justice Marshall, this time in the majority, wrote a 
concurring opinion referring to his dissent in San Antonio 
v. Rodriguez. He wrote quite explicitly, "I continue to 
believe that an individual's interest in education is 
fundamental ... " 42 
Justice Marshall's main point in his concurrence was 
that the Plyler decision finally adopted a "sliding scale" 
test for unconstitutionality under the Equal Protection 
Clause. This was the same "sliding scale" that he had 
suggested in San Antonio v. Rodriguez43 and Dandridge v. 
Williams. 44 The sliding scale looked at three levels or 
40 Id. at 230. 
41 Id. at 222. 
42 Id. at 230. 
43Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-110, 124-30. 
44Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). One commentator has 
distinguished the issues raised in Dandridge from the issue 
of education. Dandridge deals with "economics and social 
welfare," which may be governed by conventional equal 
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"tiers" of scrutiny by courts studying suspect 
classifications. These three tiers include (1) "strict 
scrutiny" for state action burdening "fundamental" rights; 
(2) "heightened scrutiny" for quasi-suspect classifications; 
and (3) "rationality" for all the rest. 45 
The Plyler Court used the middle-tier test for the 
first time in a case regarding education. It used 
"heightened scrutiny" because of the nature of the 
classification, alien children, but also because of the 
interest affected by the classification. This interest is, 
clearly, education. Thus, we see that the right to an 
education deserves "heightened scrutiny." In addition, the 
fact that must be noted: Rodriguez (the decision that 
protection standards. Education, on the other hand, deals 
with knowledge -- not nourishment of the body, but of the 
mind -- and should follow a higher standard of equity. See 
Goodman, supra note 247, at 347-350. 
45 It was actually Craig v. Boren, 419 U.S. 190 (1976), 
that introduced a middle tier classification under the equal 
protection clause. "Strict scrutiny" applied to suspect 
statutory classifications and state action burdening 
fundamental rights. "Heightened scrutiny" applied to quasi-
suspect state classifications. "Rationality" applied to all 
the rest. Plyler purported to apply the middle-tier test 
because of the nature of the classification and the interest 
affected by the classification. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 
(Marshall, J., concurring). The "state action" requirement 
may be fulfilled either through the "public function" theory 
or through a new understanding of the "state action" 
requirement. These are discussed infra, in Chapters V and 
VI, respectively. 
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education is not a "fundamental" right) was mentioned in 
each of the five opinions filed in Plyler, "although 
everyone except Justice Marshall came to bury it, not to 
praise it. " 46 
Specifically, the Plyler Court conceded that education 
was not a "fundamental" right, "[b]ut neither is it merely 
some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other 
forms of social welfare legislation. " 47 Indeed, in 
creating a middle tier (of "heightened scrutiny," situated 
between "strict scrutiny" and "mere reasonableness") Plyler 
accomplished what Rodriguez had not. For Rodriguez gave us 
only two tiers of judicial review of state action, and 
refused to allow education into the upper tier of "strict 
scrutiny." Now that Plyler has created a middle tier, and 
included education in this level of "heightened scrutiny," 
we have made an important stride forward for education 
rights. Because education has been recognized as deserving 
of "heightened scrutiny" the decision of Rodriguez "is now a 
constitutional relic whose only significance is its holding; 
46Dennis J. Hutchinson, "More Substantive Equal 
Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe," 1982 The Supreme 
Court Review 170. 
47 Plyler 457 U.S. at 221. 
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as a doctrine, it is irrelevant." 48 
The Plyler decision discussed the original intent of 
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision 
quoted Senator Howard, the floor manager of the Amendment in 
the United States Senate. Senator Howard said that the 
Fourteenth Amendment, "if adopted by the states, [will] 
forever disable every one of them from passing laws 
trenching upon those "fundamental" rights and privileges 
which pertain to citizens of the United States ... " 49 
Plyler then decided that illegal aliens' children are 
entitled to an education, based on the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This must, at a minimum, hint at the Court's belief that 
education is some kind of a "fundamental" right, protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. For, if not, why discuss the 
"original intent" of the Amendment drafters, and then 
conclude that the Amendment pertains? 
Education, even if not a "fundamental" right, is surely 
of "heightened" interest to the student. Indeed, one 
commentator concluded from the Plyler decision that 
48Hutchinson, supra note 262, at 192. 
49 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215. 
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education is "almost a fundamental right. 1150 The Plyler 
Court's decision states, "Education has a fundamental role 
in maintaining the fabric of our society." 51 Accordingly, 
if the student's claim to an education, even that offered by 
a private school, is limited by suspension or expulsion, he 
is entitled to the protections of "substantive due process." 
Considering the inherent good of knowledge, as well as the 
instrumental value of education for the student and society 
at large, these protections are important to provide before 
a constitutionally-recognized "fundamental" right is 
diminished. 
50Ronna G. Schneider, "The 1982 State Action Trilogy, " 
60 Notre Dame Law Review 1150, 1155 (1985). (Emphasis 
added.) 
51Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. 
140 
EDUCATION AS A "FUNDAMENTAL" RIGHT IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Were one to try to resolve the question of education as 
a "fundamental" right, he would be forced to concede that 
the decision in San Antonio v. Rodriguez52 has never 
formally been reversed by the Supreme Court. This, despite 
the theoretical arguments presented above. The Rodriguez 
Court concluded that education is not a "fundamental" right 
of students. Thus, litigants have been better advised to 
seek redress for denials of education benefits elsewhere, 
without reliance on a claim of "fundamentality." 
Specifically, litigants have relied extensively on education 
clauses in state constitutions. 
For the purpose of this study, we shall review some 
relevant education law decisions of several states. While 
the Supreme Court has not reversed Rodriguez, so as to 
consider education rights as "fundamental," the courts of 
several states have been more understanding. These courts 
have concluded that their state constitutions do include 
education as a "fundamental" right. Accordingly, we may 
judge education to be in a unique category of "fundamental" 
right within various states, while not on a Federal level. 
As "fundamental," state education rights deserve close or 
52Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 
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"heightened" scrutiny before they are abridged within the 
state. 53 In this way, we have garnered support for 
students who seek fundamental fairness before being expelled 
or suspended from even their non-public schools. 
Moreover, if more states view education rights as 
"fundamental," then the chances increase dramatically that 
the Federal courts will begin to see education in the same 
way. The states' decisions may cause the United States 
Supreme Court to rethink its Rodriguez decision. 
Ultimately, it may be of little consequence that the 
Federal court does not view education as a "fundamental" 
right of the United States Constitution. Education is a 
state responsibility and right. 54 Indeed, the existence of 
strong state rights to education provided a persuasive 
reason for the Supreme Court's denial of federal guarantees 
to education. 55 Further, every state constitution contains 
an education clause. 56 As a state responsibility, it is 
53The notion of "heightened scrutiny" for education, as 
discussed above, is developed at length in Rodriguez, Id., 
based on Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618. 
54Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. 
55 Id. at 45-54. 
56
"Developments - - State Constitutions," 95 Harvard Law 
Review 1324, 1446 (1982). 
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the individual state which must decide the "fundamentality" 
of each right it proffers. Those states that consider 
education to be a "fundamental" right require "substantive 
due process" rights for all students; those states that do 
not yet consider education to be a "fundamental" right might 
require only "procedural due process rights." At a minimum, 
"procedural due process" rights should be applicable in all 
states before a school suspension of less than ten days. 57 
This is due to the inherent and instrumental importance of 
education, as discussed above. 
We shall cite various states where education was judged 
by the local judiciary to be a "fundamental" right of 
students. These decisions were reached after San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 
1973 and indicate the various states' interpretation of 
their own constitutions. Specifically, because these 
decisions indicate that education is a "fundamental" 
interest, strict scrutiny and procedural fairness (due 
process) must be followed before education may be limited. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court issued a landmark 
57This was the Supreme Court's decision in the public 
school case of Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
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decision in Horton v. Meskill. 58 There, the court held 
that education is a "fundamental" right under the 
Connecticut state constitution. 59 And, "any infringement 
of ... [it] must be strictly scrutinized. 1160 To buttress 
their holding, the Connecticut court also found that 
education was sufficiently important to society to be 
classed as a "fundamental" right even without referring to 
the text of its state constitution. 61 Judge Bogdanski, in 
his concurring opinion, articulated the "fundamentality" of 
education: 
I would add further that the right of our 
children to an education is a matter of right not 
only because our state constitution declares it as 
such, but because education is the very essence 
and foundation of a civilized culture: it is the 
cohesive element that binds the fabric of society 
together. In a real sense, it is as necessary to 
a civilized society as food or shelter are to an 
individual. It is our fundamental legacy to the 
youth of our state to enable them to acquire 
knowledge and possess the ability to reason: for 
it is the ability to reason that separates man 
from all other forms of life. 62 
The Connecticut Supreme Court recognized that it was 
58Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). 
59 Id. at 372-73. 
60 Id. at 373. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 377. 
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breaking with the United States Supreme Court in its Horton 
v. Meskill decision. Too, the state supreme court 
considered the United States Supreme Court decisions 
defining "fundamental" rights "to be afforded respectful 
consideration. " 63 This case, however was different. For 
the U.S. Supreme Court decisions were to be considered by 
the Connecticut courts "only when they provide no less 
individual protection than is guaranteed by Connecticut 
law. n64 
In the State of Missouri, the Missouri Supreme Court 
decided Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville School 
District. 65 Here, the school district was charging a small 
registration fee for students. The school district 
justified the charge for economic reasons, claiming that it 
was a negligible amount for each individual family. The 
court rejected the district's claim, relying on the United 
States Supreme Court decision that poll taxes 
unconstitutionally infringe upon the "fundamental" right to 
63 Id. at 359. 
65 Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville School District, 
548 S. W. 2d 554 (Mo. 1977) (en bane) . 
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vote. 66 The Missouri court found that, even though the 
district's system waived payments for the poor, it operated 
like a poll tax. Further, because education, like voting, 
was "fundamental" under the state constitution, 67 the same 
analysis as in Harper applied. No one could now be charged 
a registration fee. More importantly, education had been 
made an integral part of voting, thereby gaining for 
education the status of a "fundamental" right. 
In New Jersey, the state's Supreme Court found that 
rights to a free education were explicit in the state 
cons ti tution68 and a "fundamental" right. 69 This Levine 
decision, reached in 1980, was based on education being a 
predicate to democratic government. 70 Subsequently, the 
66 Id. at 562-63, quoting Harper v. Virginia State Board 
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 n.2 (1966). 
67Education is an integral part of the right to vote. 
A citizen cannot be expected to make meaningful choices in 
the voting booth if he has not made himself aware of the 
issues. He makes himself aware of the issues by reading the 
literature prepared by the candidates and the media. 
Hence, literacy and critical thinking are seen as 
instrumental in the fulfillment of the fundamental right of 
voting. Other courts have also accepted this reasoning, as 
discussed below. 
68 Levine v. New Jersey Dep' t of Ins ts. and Agencies, 
418 A.2d 229, 241-42 (1980). 
69 Id. at 242. 
70 Id. at 237. 
146 
New Jersey Supreme Court heard Robinson v. Cahill. 71 This 
case was the first post-Rodriguez decision to overturn a 
state's system of financing public education. 
The issues of the Robinson case, regarding the inter-
district unequal state's support of its schools, were 
similar to those of Rodriguez, and the Robinson court was 
fully aware of its departure from the Rodriguez precedent. 
The Robinson decision was based on the court's 
interpretation of its state constitution which promised 
"equal educational opportunity" 72 and it upheld the 
plaintiffs' objections to property tax finance. 73 
Regarding "equal educational opportunity," which is an 
extension of the constitutional assurance of "equal 
71Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, supplemented, 306 
A.2d 65, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), and modified on 
reh'g, 351 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975). 
72The New Jersey State Constitution's wording of "equal 
educational opportunity" raised the question of "equal 
protection." ("Equal protection" is a Federal law and the 
subject of the second clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.) 
New Jersey has its own "equal protection" clause in its 
state constitution. The judges felt that the state may be 
more demanding than the Federal courts in interpreting its 
own "equal protection" clause. These judges recognized that 
the U.S. Supreme Court has other considerations to weigh, 
such as the unnecessarily harsh effect its decisions may 
have on all fifty states, some of which were in no need of a 
major change in law and policy. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 282. 
73 Id . at 2 9 5 - 9 8 . 
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protection," the Robinson court made a reference to Natural 
Law in a significant footnote: 
The concept of equal protection antedates the 
Fourteenth Amendment. It is implicit in a 
democratic form of government. The Declaration of 
Independence proclaimed that "All men are created 
equal," which must mean equality at the hands of 
government. There inheres in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment a guarantee of equal 
protection. 74 
The Robinson court also argued that the United States 
Supreme Court's textually oriented approach to finding 
"fundamental" rights, as used in San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez, 75 was not useful as a matter of federal law. 
They wrote: 
But we have not found helpful the concept of a 
"fundamental" right. No one has successfully 
defined the term for this purpose. Even the 
proposition discussed in Rodriguez, that a right 
is "fundamental" if it is explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed in the Constitution is immediately 
vulnerable ... And if a right is somehow found to be 
"fundamental," there remains the question as to 
what state interest is "compelling" and there, 
too, we find little, if any, light ... Ultimately, a 
court must weigh the nature of the restraint or 
the denial against the apparent public 
justification. 76 
This Robinson dictum points to the non-usefulness of 
74 Id. at 277, n.1, quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 641-42. 
75Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 
76Robinson, 303 A. 2d at 282. 
the Rodriguez text-based test of "fundamentality, 11 and 
prefers an individualized decision by the court in each 
case. This dictum has been applied by courts in Oregon, 77 
Ohio, 78 Idaho, 79 and Georgia. 00 In all cases, the 
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question at bar was the legality of the school finance plan 
between districts within the respective states. 
Interestingly, all of these states have similar 
requirements regarding education in their respective state 
constitutions. New Jersey requires a "thorough and 
efficient system of public schooling; 1101 Oregon requires a 
"uniform and general system of common schools;" 82 Ohio 
requires a "thorough and efficient system of common 
schools; 1103 Idaho requires a "uniform system of private 
77 0lsen v. State ex rel. Johnson, 554 P.2d 139, 144-45 
(1976) . 
70Board of Education v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 818-19 
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980). 
79 Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 644-45 (1975), 
quoting Robinson, 303 A.2d at 282. 
00McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 166-67 (1981), 
quoting Robinson, 303 A.2d at 284. 
01Robinson, 303 A. 2d at 276. 
82 0lsen, 554 p. 2d at 140. 
83 Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 816. 
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schools; " 94 and Georgia requires that the state government 
provide an "adequate education. " 05 In all of these cases, 
the respective courts chose to follow the recommendation of 
Robinson. 
We find, for example, that the Olsen decision was not 
at peace with Rodriguez, because it apparently felt, in line 
with Serrano, 96 that education should be considered a 
"fundamental" right. At the same time, the Olsen court did 
not want to go against the subsequent United States Supreme 
Court decision in Rodriguez, which apparently reversed 
Serrano, deciding that education was not a "fundamental" 
right. Instead, Olsen elected to cite Robinson and resolve 
the matter with an alternate line of reasoning. 
Thus, we find several courts who have decided cases in 
direct opposition to Rodriguez, finding that education may 
be considered a "fundamental" right within their state. 
Further, we have other courts who have expressed serious 
doubts about the holding in Rodriguez (that education is not 
to be considered a "fundamental" right). The implication 
for this study is that, in recent years, after Rodriguez, 
94 Thompson, 537 P.2d at 636. 
95McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 157. 
06 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971). 
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education has made great strides toward being considered a 
"fundamental" right. The Rodriguez knot appears more and 
more to be corning undone. 
151 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS FAVORING 
THE "FUNDAMENTAL" STATUS OF EDUCATION 
There is important and explicit judicial opinion in 
opposition to Rodriguez. This is helpful in our goal of 
overcoming the Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision and 
showing education to be a "fundamental" right. In Ohio, 
Justice Locher of the state Supreme Court, writing in 
dissent, found that his state should consider educational 
opportunity as a "fundamental" interest. This is because of 
(i) the wording of the Ohio Constitution;B7 (ii) the nexus 
to the right to participate in the electoral process and the 
rights of free speech and association; and (iii) as the 
foundation to success and realization of the American 
dream. BB As a "fundamental" interest, education deserved 
strict scrutiny before it is affected.B9 
In Mississippi, the state Supreme Court found that, 
although there is no Federally created "fundamental" right 
to education, there is such a right within the state. They 
wrote that the "right to a minimally adequate public 
B7 "The general assembly ... will secure a thorough and 
efficient system of common schools ... " Ohio Const. art. VI. 
BB Walter, 390 N. E. 2d at 827. 
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education created and entailed by the laws of this state is 
one we can only label fundamental. 1190 
A number of state courts have criticized Rodriguez91 
because of its holding regarding the "fundamentality" 
question. These courts did not necessarily look at their 
own state constitutions. Instead, they commented on what 
they perceived as flawed reasoning by the United States 
Supreme Court. These courts believe that the connection 
between education and political participation is sufficient 
to render education a "fundamental" right. They reasoned 
that one cannot fulfill his civic responsibility as a voter 
without an education. A voter is responsible to read and 
study the issues in an election before casting his ballot. 
Accordingly, education is necessary to assure a learned and 
well-read voting public who fulfill their constitutional 
rights to the fullest. 
The California Supreme Court, for example, has argued 
"that the Rodriguez majority had considerable difficulty 
accommodating its new [textually oriented] approach to 
certain of its prior decisions, especially in the area of 
9
°Clinton Mun. Sep. School District v. Byrd, 477 So.2d 
23 7 (Miss. 1985) . 
91Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 
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fundamental rights." 92 This Serrano court held that 
"education is a unique influence on a child's development as 
a citizen and his participation in political and community 
life. " 93 The conclusion was, therefore, forced, that "the 
distinctive and priceless function of education in our 
society warrants, indeed compels, our treatment of it as a 
"fundamental interest." 94 Accordingly, the State of 
California would continue to apply strict scrutiny to laws 
impinging "on those individual rights and liberties which 
lie at the core of our free and representative form of 
government. " 95 
Similarly, a West Virginia court has written, "[O]ur 
research ... indicates an embarrassing abundance of 
authority and reason by which the [Rodriguez] majority might 
have decided that education is a fundamental right of every 
American. " 96 
92 Serrano, 557 P.2d 929, 951 n.44 (1976). 
93 Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1256. 
94 Id. at 1258. 
95 Id. 557 P.2d at 952. 
96 Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 863 n.5 (W. Va. 
1979) . 
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In an Opinion of the Justices, 97 the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court never mentioned the state constitution's 
education clause. It did incorporate Justice Marshall's 
dissent into its analysis of state law, 98 ruling against 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez. Specifically, the decision was 
that, although Rodriguez might authorize a failure to 
provide the minimal education necessary to facilitate the 
rights of suffrage and free speech, the state constitution 
clearly would not. 99 
Judges in Colorado also spoke against San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez. The issue of interdistrict financial inequities 
was raised again, and decided like Rodriguez. Nonetheless, 
Justices Dubof sky and Lohr100 agreed, in dissent, that they 
would "subject all aspects of school financing to an 
enhanced level of scrutiny based on the favored status 
explicitly accorded education in this state. " 101 The case 
concluded with a finding that the rights to vote and 
97 0pinion of the Justices, 387 A.2d 333 (1978). 
98 Id. at 335-36. 
99 Id. at 335. 
100Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P. 2d 
1005, 1032 (en bane., 1982), (Lohr, J., dissenting) 
101Id. at 1030 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting). 
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petition the government, both guaranteed in the state 
constitution, generated a "fundamental" state constitutional 
right to equal educational opportunity . 102 As a 
"fundamental" right, education was entitled to "heightened 
scrutiny." This decision was independent of Rodriguez and 
based on the Colorado court's ability to interpret equal 
protection rights under the Colorado constitution 
differently from the United States Supreme Court's analysis 
under the United States Constitution . 103 Under Colorado's 
heightened scrutiny, the state's school finance scheme would 
fail. 104 
The State of Washington recognized the importance of 
education for "promoting a free society, intelligent and 
effective participation in an open political system, and 
preparation for the exercise of First Amendment rights." 105 
The Washington state court analyzed education to be a 
constitutional right, arising from the constitutionally 
imposed duty of the state to educate its youth, and 
102Id. 
103 Id. 
104
Id. n. 1. 
105Seattle School District No. 1 of King County v. State 
of Washington, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (1978). 
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requiring heightened scrutiny before this education may be 
abridged. 106 
The State of Wyoming has also found that education for 
its children is a matter of "fundamental" interest. As 
such, education has earned the category of "strict scrutiny" 
by the courts before it may be limited to the child living 
in Wyoming. 107 
The education clause in the state constitution of 
Montana presents an interesting study of judicial 
interpretation. We may also use judicial opinion as 
expressed in Montana to better understand the core issues 
involved in determining whether the right to an education is 
to be viewed as "fundamental" in a particular state. 
The Montana state Constitution states 
It is the goal of the people to establish a system 
of education which will develop the full 
educational potential of each person. Equality of 
educational opportunity is guaranteed to each 
person of the state .... The legislature shall 
provide a basic system of free quality public 
elementary and secondary schools. 10 s 
Montana's Constitution clearly requires the state to 
106Id. at 91. 
101 washakie County School District No. One v. Herschler, 
606 P.2d 310, 333 (1980). 
10sMT Const. art. X, § 1 (1972). 
provide each citizen with quality education. This 
requirement is based, in part, on the time-honored McNair 
decision, 109 which defined education as "the totality of 
the qualities acquired through individual instruction and 
social training, which further happiness, efficiency and 
[the] capacity for social service. 11110 Al though the court 
fell short of recognizing the right to education as 
"fundamental", it did call for a quality education to be 
provided for all children, "one which meets contemporary 
needs and produces capable, well-informed citizens. 11111 
Similarly, Montana's Constitution also guarantees 
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"equality of educational opportunity." This guarantee may 
be seen as an extension of the state's equal protection 
clause. 112 
The question of whether Montana guaranteed education as 
a "fundamental" right was raised in State ex rel. Bartmess 
v. Board of Trustees. 113 As part of their analysis of the 
109McNair v. School District No. 1, 288 P. 188 (1930). 
110Id. at 190. 
111 Id. 
112MT Const. art. II, § 4 (1972). 
113State ex rel. Bartmess v. Board of Trustees, 726 P. 2d 
801 (1986). 
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case, the Montana Supreme Court found two possible reasons 
why a right might be considered "fundamental." In Montana, 
a right is "fundamental" (i) if it is found within Montana's 
Declaration of Rights, or (ii) if it is a right without 
which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have 
little meaning. 114 The court concluded that "various 
aspects of education under our Montana Constitution could be 
considered "fundamental, 11115 but the court did not identify 
these aspects. The Bartmess court was quite aware of the 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez116 decision, but read the language 
of its own Montana state constitution as indicating a 
different result. 117 The relevant words of Montana's 
Constitution are the state's requirement to provide for the 
realization of "the full educational potential of each 
person. " 118 This court was willing to differ with the 
United States Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision and adopt 
114Id. at 802. 
115Id. at 804. 
116San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
(Education is not a "fundamental" right under the United 
States Constitution.) 
117Bartmess, 726 P.2d at 804. (The right to certain 
aspects of education are fundamental.) 
118MT Const. art. II, § 1 (1972). 
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its own analysis of education, if "independent state grounds 
exist for developing expanded rights under our state 
constitution. 11119 
At least one commentator would have Montana take that 
leap into rendering all of education a "fundamental 
right. 11120 This is because of the explicit wording in the 
state constitution mentioned above. In addition, education 
is necessary "for individuals to exercise other 
constitutionally guaranteed rights ... such as the fundamental 
right to vote. 11121 Further, Montana's wording is no 
different than the Wisconsin Constitution's wording, where 
education was found to be a "fundamental" right. 122 Also, 
the Montana framers' intent (which is still readily analyzed 
because of the recency of the Montana state constitution) 
119Bartmess, 726 P. 2d at 806 (Morrison, J., concurring) 
120Lori Anne Harper, "Classroom v. Courtroom: Is the 
Right to Education Fundamental?" 51 Montana Law Review 509 
(1990) . 
121Id. at 522. 
122 In Wisconsin, the language of the state constitution 
("equal opportunity for education") was interpreted by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court to mean that education is a 
fundamental right in that state. See Buse v. Smith, 247 
N.W.2d 141 (1976). The language in the Montana constitution 
("equality of educational opportunity") is similar enough to 
also be considered an indication of the fundamentality of 
the education right. See Harper, 51 Montana Law Review at 
522. 
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indicates clearly that they wanted education to be 
considered a "fundamental" right. The Constitutional 
Convention Transcripts include: "Education occupies a place 
of cardinal importance in the public realm ... Because of the 
overriding importance of education, this committee 
recognizes the awesome task of providing the appropriate 
Constitutional provisions necessary to protect and nurture 
the public educational system. 11123 All of this would seem 
to indicate that education may be considered a "fundamental" 
right in Montana. If it is not considered a "fundamental" 
right, then it must certainly be considered worthy of 
middle-tier scrutiny, as clearly articulated in 
Bartmess. 124 
This chapter studied the question of "fundamentality" 
of a child's right to education. If the education right can 
be considered "fundamental," then any limitation of it would 
be subjected to the "strict scrutiny" of the courts. In 
disciplinary cases of expulsion or suspension, the court's 
123Harper, Id. at 522, quoting II Montana Constitutional 
Convention Transcripts 721 (1972) . 
124
"We conclude that the only standard of constitutional 
review which allows a careful balancing of these competing 
interests [relating to the fundamentality of extra-
curricular activities] is the middle-tier analysis." 
Bartmess, 726 P.2d at 804. 
161 
"strict scrutiny" would include ascertaining that the school 
had substantial overriding reasons to limit a constitutional 
right so crucial for success. The school would be required 
to provide "substantive due process." The less important 
"state action" requirement would be set aside in favor of 
the "fundamental" right to education that deserves the 
highest level of protection available. 
The Supreme Court of the United States found that 
education was not a "fundamental" right. 125 Since that 
split decision of five justices to four, many lower courts 
and legal scholars have tended to side with Justice 
Marshall's dissent. They have found in favor of granting 
"fundamental" status to education. These courts often took 
note of the Rodriguez decision, but chose to disagree with 
it. Their reasons focus on the instrumentality and societal 
importance of education. Some have tried to counter the 
Court's arguments with their own constitutional text-based 
legal reasoning. 
In the subsequent decision of Plyler v. Doe, 126 the 
Supreme Court seemed to moderate its previous position 
regarding the "fundamentality" of education. Plyler held 
125Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 
126 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
that education was important enough to society and the 
individual child to warrant the middle-tiered or 
"heightened" scrutiny. This level of judicial scrutiny 
would still require that "substantive due process" be 
fulfilled. 
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We have gathered significant judicial decisions and 
scholarly commentary to put education squarely in the circle 
of "fundamental" rights. These are rights that cannot be 
abrogated without compelling reason. The "fundamental" 
right to education applies to the student, not the school. 
It bespeaks the knowledge and culture necessary to succeed, 
to make the American dream into a reality. It provides the 
background necessary to make informed decisions in the 
voting booth and everyday life. The 11 fundamentality 11 of 
education is a jewel in the crown of American life. The 
constitutional right of "substantive due process" must be 
followed even in private schools where "state action" may 
not be found. 
CHAPTER V 
THE "PUBLIC FUNCTION" THEORY 
AND PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS' RIGHTS 
As noted above, the literal wording of Section I of the 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, 1 suggests that 
the due process requirement applies only to actions of the 
state and not those of individuals. This was the narrow 
interpretation given in United States v. Cruikshank, 2 where 
the Due Process Clause was interpreted in a way that would 
last for over one hundred years. Chief Justice Waite 
stated, "The fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from 
depriving any person life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one 
citizen against another. 113 Eight year later, Justice 
Bradley followed the same reasoning in the Civil Rights 
Cases. 4 There Justice Bradley wrote explicitly: 11 [It] is 
State action of a particular character that is prohibited. 
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject 
1 (Amend. XIV was added to the Constitution in 1868.) 
2 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
3 Id. at 554-55. 
4Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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matter of the amendment." 5 It is here that the term "state 
action" was born. 
The "state action" requirement of the Constitution is 
the Court's way of saying that the Constitution applies only 
to the government. The Constitution limits governmental 
activities and not those of private parties. In general 
terms, this is true, almost by definition. Indeed, most 
people applaud this traditional approach lest the police 
peer into each home and arrest people out of their own 
living rooms. One author described the importance of the 
"state action" doctrine as the constitutional guarantee that 
the Court will not tell me who I may invite to a dinner 
party in my home. 6 The "state action" doctrine says that, 
as long as a private citizen is not acting on behalf of the 
state, he is free to engage in discriminatory or otherwise 
free behaviors at will. 
There is a second approach to the "state action" 
analysis. This approach focuses on the "public" qualities 
of the private enterprise. If there are enough indicia of 
public, specifically state, involvement in a private 
5 Id. at 11. 
6Charles L. Black, Jr. "Foreword: 'State Action,' Equal 
Protection, and California's Proposition 14." 81 Harvard Law 
Review 69 (1967) . 
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enterprise, then this enterprise may be said to be public. 
State involvement may be seen by its financial support or 
its delegation of an important state service. State 
involvement may also be found when a private person or a 
group perform an essential service which might otherwise be 
included in the state's panoply of activities. The private 
performer is seen as providing a "public function." 
Where does the private school fit? Is it a private or 
public institution? On the one hand, the private school is, 
by definition, not a state school. As such, it need not 
follow the same strictures and dictates of the state 
schools. On the other hand, this private school is serving 
the public. It is fulfilling, in alternative fashion, a 
similar educational mission. Attendance by its students at 
the private school fulfills the state's compulsory education 
statute. Does this make the private school similar enough 
to the public school to require its fulfillment of the 
public school mandates? 
If we succeed at showing that private schools are 
similar to public schools, and that this brings private 
schools to the door of constitutional requirements, then we 
have won "due process" rights for private school students. 
Just as public school children are entitled to "due process" 
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before disciplinary action, so would be their private school 
counterparts. 
With the "public function" theory we may circumvent the 
entire issue of "state action." The prevailing judicial 
opinion is that private schools usually lack "state action" 
unless the state has paid for the educational program or had 
input in its implementation. 7 The school may, nonetheless, 
be required to fulfill the same requirements, even without 
"state action," if the school is judged to be a public 
institution. As a public institution it is wholly 
appropriate that society expect the school to follow the 
same guidelines it has set for other public institutions. 
Once the private school is considered a public institution, 
the question of how directly related it is to the state 
should move toward irrelevance. 
This chapter uses judicial decisions and scholarly 
commentary to review the background of the "public function" 
doctrine. The similarities between this background, as 
discussed in the related legal opinions, and private schools 
should point to the appropriateness of this doctrine in 
private schools as well. The "state action" question will 
7 Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 
1970), 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). 
have been eliminated, and "due process" requirements will 
have been made applicable to private school students. 
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Once we apply the "public function" doctrine to private 
schools and require "due process" rights for their students, 
then the question is what procedure should follow. It 
appears that private schools would be required to provide 
the same "due process" to their students as public schools 
provide theirs. This is "procedural due process," requiring 
in suspension cases of ten days or less, "oral or written 
notice of the charges against [the student] , and if [the 
student] denies them, an explanation of the evidence the 
authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of 
the story. " 8 
8 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). 
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JUDICIAL DECISIONS REGARDING THE "PUBLIC FUNCTION" DOCTRINE 
Beginning in the 1940's, the Supreme Court began to 
expand the boundaries of the state action doctrine. In 
Marsh v. Alabama, the Court presented the new concept of 
"public function." 9 Mr. Marsh was accused of trespassing 
in the town of Chickasaw, Alabama, when he distributed 
religious literature in the town without permission. The 
town of Chickasaw was owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding 
Corporation. Gulf claimed that, because the town belonged 
completely to them, Marsh was trespassing on private 
property, and that he had no right to distribute his 
literature. They argued that "the corporation's right to 
control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the 
right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his 
guests. 1110 The Court rejected this argument and found in 
favor of Marsh. 11 Justice Black raised the issue of 
private facilities serving a larger public in his majority 
opinion. He wrote 
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. 
The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his 
property for use by the public in general, the more do 
9Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
10Id. at 506. 
11Id. at 510. 
169 
his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and 
constitutional rights of those who use it. Thus, the 
owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes 
and railroads may not operate them as freely as a 
farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are built 
and operated primarily to benefit the public and since 
their operation is essentially a public function, it is 
subject to state regulation. 12 
Twenty year later, a similar case came before the 
Court. 13 Part of a trust established by Senator Bacon 
established a park in Macon, Georgia. The trust provided 
that the park, Baconsfield, was to be used by whites only. 
Sensitive to the issues of racial discrimination involved in 
fulfillment of this trust, the city resigned as trustee and 
appointed a private trustee instead. Thus, there was now a 
private park with racial restrictions. The Court found that 
the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of discrimination 
applied even in a private park. Justice Douglas, writing 
for the majority, explained that the public function theory 
of Marsh v. Alabama14 was applicable in this case. Justice 
Douglas saw the nature of a park as similar to a fire 
department or police department that traditionally serves 
12 Id. at 506. 
13 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
14Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
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the community. 15 The park is clearly in the public domain 
and must avoid all conduct proscribed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 16 "The predominant character and purpose of 
this park are municipal. " 17 
Interestingly, Justice Harlan, in his dissent, 18 
discusses the obvious conclusions from the Evans decision. 
Justice Harlan believes that Evans forces one to conclude 
that the "public function" notion applies to private 
schools. He stated 
Like parks, the purpose schools serve is important to 
the public. Like parks, private control exists, but 
there is also a very strong tradition of public control 
in this field. Like parks, schools may be available to 
almost anyone of one race or religion but to no others. 
Like parks, there are normally alternatives to those 
shut out but there may also be inconveniences and 
disadvantages caused by the restriction. Like parks, 
the extent of school intimacy varies greatly, depending 
on the size and character of the institution. 19 
Justice Harlan continued, "I find it difficult ... to 
avoid the conclusion that this decision opens the door to 
reversal of these basic constitutional concepts [that the 
15 Evans, 382 U.S. at 301. 
16Id. at 302. 
18Evans, 382 U.S. at 315 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
19 Id. at 321. 
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Fourteenth Amendment does not compel private schools to 
adapt their admission policies to its requirements] ... while 
making of every college entrance rejection letter a 
potential Fourteenth Amendment question. 1120 Justice 
Harlan's opinion was in dissent, and the Court never applied 
his reasoning to private schools. This notwithstanding, 
Justice Harlan's opinion states clearly that elementary and 
secondary schools serve a public function. This public 
function would require the fulfillment of constitutional 
guarantees. 
The 1970's brought two cases before the Supreme Court 
demanding decisions in the area of "public function." Both 
of them have significant implications for the public 
function of private education. The first case, Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 21 seems to have dealt a death blow 
20 Id. at 322. From a perspective of student rights, 
this decision is not very helpful. For the Court did not 
seek to stop the offensive behavior of segregation. 
Instead, it sought to disengage the State from participation 
in the offensive act. For the cause of increased liberty 
rights for all, students as well as park attendees might be 
better served by the Court clarifying the full extent of the 
rights of privacy and freedom. Then, we would know how to 
respond to one of the underlying issues of this study: the 
conflicting values of private institutions and individual 
rights. 
21Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 
(1974). 
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to the public function of private schools, though only in 
its majority opinion. The case involved Catherine Jackson, 
whose electrical service had been curtailed by Metropolitan 
Edison Co. for alleged nonpayment for her electric service. 
Metropolitan Edison held a certificate of public convenience 
from the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission empowering 
it to deliver electricity to a specific service area. 22 
Ms. Jackson now claimed that the company had curtailed her 
service without proper notice and due process. 23 She 
further claimed that Metropolitan Edison was serving a 
"public function" in the delivery of electricity and was, 
therefore, required to follow procedural due process 
requirements. 24 Justice Rehnquist stated that the inquiry 
in this case must be "whether there is a sufficiently close 
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the 
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be 
fairly treated as that of the State itself ." 25 Previously, 
the Court had required only that the activity in question 
22 Id. at 346. 
23Id.at347. 
24 Id. at 348. 
25 Id. at 351, quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 
u. s. 163, 176 (1972). 
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had to be one traditionally performed by a state entity. 
Now, the Jackson Court was requiring that the function must 
be one which not only had been traditionally but also 
exclusively performed by the state. 26 The Jackson Court 27 
judged that there was not a close enough nexus between the 
actions of the state and those of the private utility 
company for a finding of "public function. 1128 
Justice Marshall, writing in dissent, proposed a less 
26 Id. at 353. 
27Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, wrote the 
following dicta regarding the Public Function theory and 
schools: 
It is difficult to imagine a regulated 
activity more essential or more 'clothed with the 
public interest' than the maintenance of schools, 
yet we stated in Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296, 
300 (1966): 
The range of governmental activities is 
broad and varied, and the fact that 
government has engaged in a particular 
activity does not necessarily mean that 
an individual entrepreneur or manager of 
the same kind of undertaking suffers the 
same constitutional inhibitions. While 
a State may not segregate public schools 
so as to exclude one or more religious 
groups, those sects may maintain their 
own parochial educational systems. 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. at 354 n.9. 
This dicta was interpreted as the Supreme Court's rejection 
of the public function theory as applied to education in 
Berrios v. Inter American University, 535 F2d 1330 (CAl 
Puerto Rico 1976) . 
28 Jackson, Id. 419 U. s. at 358-359. 
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rigid standard to find "state action. 1129 He held that 
state approval alone of a challenged conduct might warrant a 
finding of "state action." He wrote that in previous cases 
"the Court suggested that if the State's regulation had in 
any way fostered or encouraged racial discrimination, a 
state action finding might have been justified. 1130 
Further, Justice Marshall wrote 
[I agree] that it requires more than a finding 
that a particular business is 'affected with the public 
interest' before constitutional burdens can be imposed 
on that business. But when the activity in question is 
of such public importance that the state invariably 
either provides the service itself or permits private 
companies to act as state surrogates in providing it, 
much more is involved than just a matter of public 
interest. In those cases, the state has determined 
that if private companies wish to enter the field, they 
will have to surrender many of the prerogatives 
normally associated with private enterprise and behave 
in many ways like a governmental body. 31 
Thus, Justice Marshall notes that if a state has 
identified a service that is important for it to provide and 
a private institution provides it too, then the private 
institution must follow the same requirements as the state. 
This kept alive the notion that private schools serve a 
public function. The state has identified education as an 
29Jackson, 419 U. S. at 369 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
30 Id. at 369 n.2. 
31Id. at 372. 
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important service for it to provide, though it allows 
private schools to act as its surrogate. Were the private 
schools not available, the state would provide educational 
services to these students. It follows, then, that 
according to Justice Marshall, the private schools must 
provide the same rights provided by their public school 
counterparts. 
The second case involving "public function" is Flagg 
Bros. , Inc. v. Brooks. 32 Here, Flagg Brothers, Inc. , a 
warehouseman, proposed to sell Brook's stored goods to 
satisfy a warehouseman's lien. Mrs. Brooks had claimed that 
the sale of her goods was "state action" because it was 
being done under the Uniform Commercial Code and was a power 
"traditionally exclusively reserved to the State. "33 
Further, she claimed that "the resolution of private 
disputes is a traditional function of civil government. 1134 
Justice Rehnquist noted that many functions were 
traditionally performed by governments, but they were not 
necessarily "exclusively reserved to the State. "35 
32 Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
33 Id. at 157. 
34Id. 
35 Id. at 158. 
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Further, the proposed sale by Flagg Bros. was not the only 
means of resolving a purely private dispute, so that the 
exclusivity aspect was missing. 
In Flagg Bros., the Supreme Court failed to use the 
"public function" theory to require a private warehouse to 
fulfill the governmental requirement of "due process." The 
decision in the case notwithstanding, the Court stated, "We 
would be remiss if we did not note that there are a number 
of state ... functions ... which have been administered with a 
greater degree of exclusivity by States... Among these are 
such functions as education ... 1136 Thus, even when findings 
of public function were limited by the Court, education was 
perceived as one of the instances in which a finding of 
"public function" would be appropriate. 
Justice Stevens, writing in the Flagg Bros. dissent, 
disagrees with majority's requirement of "exclusivity" 
before an action is considered a state function. Justice 
Stevens, joined by Justices White and Marshall, held that a 
state function can be found even when a private body 
performs an action not reserved exclusively for the 
state. 37 He contends that this was the conclusion of Evans 
36 Id. at 163. Emphasis added. 
37 Id. at 172-3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
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v. Newton, 38 "and is not even adhered to by the Court in 
this case. 1139 Most importantly for the purpose of this 
study, Justice Stevens cited the majority's dicta regarding 
education. The majority opinion recognized the "wide range 
of functions that are typically considered sovereign 
functions, such as education ... 1140 
Justice Stevens pointed to the fact that education is a 
typical governmental function that is often undertaken by 
private parties. Perhaps the most significant statement of 
Justice Stevens' dissent in Flagg Bros. was, "[I]t is no 
longer possible, if it ever was, to believe that a sharp 
line can be drawn between private and public actions. " 41 
Further, Justice Stevens dissents from the majority opinion 
that ''state action" should be found only when the state has 
ceded one of its exclusive powers to a private party. 42 
Justice Stevens is troubled by this description of "state 
action" because it "does not even attempt to reflect the 
38 Evans, 382 U.S. 296. (A private school serves a 
public function and may not discriminate between groups.) 
39Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 173. 
40 Id. n.10. 
41Id. at 178. 
42Id. 
concerns of the Due Process Clause, for the state-action 
doctrine is, after all, merely one aspect of this broad 
constitutional protection. 1143 There is little doubt that 
178 
Justice Stevens would consider private education as serving 
a public function. If so, all the rights of public school 
students should logically be granted to private school 
students. 
Professor Lawrence Tribe concluded that, under the 
Court's public function test in Flagg Bros., it is a 
"virtual impossibility [to suggest] criteria to determine 
what is and what is not [an] inherently governmental 
[function] . " 44 Professor Jesse Choper takes Professor 
Tribe's statement of confusion this one step further. He 
asks, rhetorically perhaps, whether a private school would 
be considered as serving a public function if it is the only 
school in the community serving the educational needs of the 
community's children. This school is performing a function 
traditionally exclusively reserved to the state. Professor 
Choper suggests that the private school's function of 
providing public education gives this particular private 
43 Id. 
44Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 
(Mineola, NY: Foundation Press) 1979 Supplement 108, n.91. 
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school monopoly power in the community. In this case, the 
school should be held to the constitutional responsibilities 
of the state. 45 We may ask, rhetorically as well, how far 
away a private school in a large community is from serving 
the same function of educating at least some of their 
children. Should not the private school be held to the same 
constitutional requirements as the state? 
45Jesse H. Choper, "Thoughts on State Action: The 
'Government Function' and 'Power Theory' Approaches." 1979 
Washington University Law Quarterly 757, 778. 
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THE "STATE ACTION" TRILOGY AND "PUBLIC FUNCTION" 
The decade of the 1980's brought three important "state 
action" cases before the Supreme Court. This trilogy of 
cases, Blum v. Yaretsky, 46 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 47 and 
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 48 were all decided in the Summer 
of 1982. We shall review each of these cases for their 
relevance to the "public function" aspect of private 
education and their importance for ascribing "due process" 
rights to private school students. 
Blum v. Yaretsky dealt with nursing home patients whose 
stays in these homes were decided by the home without 
offering the patients any notice or opportunity for a 
hearing. Because the stay was paid for by the state (of New 
York) , through its Medicaid system, the patients claimed 
that "state action" was present and, therefore, that they 
should have the opportunity to be heard before any decisions 
were reached, regarding their discharges or transfers. The 
nursing home responded that theirs was a private program, in 
spite of the many state laws that regulated their 
activities. 
46Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). 
47Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) 
48Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) 
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The Supreme Court agreed with the nursing homes, 
finding that state regulations alone do not make a nursing 
home into an arm of the state. 49 The Court relied on the 
Jackson ruling, that "state action" will not be found until 
"there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and 
the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the 
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the 
State itself. 1150 Thus, the patients could not hold the 
state liable for the nursing home's actions. 
The Blum Court also indicated when a state may be held 
responsible for a private decision. Normally, the state 
will be held responsible when it has exercised coercive 
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either 
overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be 
that of the state. 51 As Flagg Bros52 and Jackson53 teach, 
mere approval of or acquiescence to the actions of a private 
party are not sufficient to justify holding the state 
49Blum, 457 U. s. at 1003. 
50 Id. at 1004, quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) 
51 Id. at 1004. 
52 Flagg Bros., 436 U. S. at 164-165. 
53 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357. 
responsible for those actions under the terms of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Further, a finding of "state action" under the "public 
function" doctrine requires that the private entity has 
exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive 
prerogative of the state. 54 Justice Rehnquist found that 
nursing homes do not perform such a function, as neither the 
statutes nor the state constitution mandated the provision 
of medical care. He further stated, "Even if respondents' 
characterization of the State's duties were correct, 
however, it would not follow that decisions made in the day-
to-day administration of a nursing home are the kind of 
decisions traditionally and exclusively made by the 
sovereign for and on behalf of the public. 1155 
The majority opinion would seem to close the door on 
the notion that private school education might be considered 
"state action." Rarely would the state be so "closely 
involved" in or give "significant encouragement" to a day-
to-day decision of a private school that it would be held 
responsible for the decision. Nonetheless, Justice Brennan, 
joined in dissent by Justice Marshall, seemed to leave the 
54See Id. at 353, and Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157-161. 
55Blum, 457 u. S. at 1012. 
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door ajar. He wrote 
In an era of active government intervention to remedy 
social ills, the true character of the State's 
involvement in, and coercive influence over, the 
activities of private parties, often through complex 
and opaque regulatory frameworks, may not always be 
apparent. But if the task that the Fourteenth 
Amendment assigns to the courts is thus rendered more 
burdensome, the courts' obligation to perform that task 
faithfully [is] rendered more, not less 
important ... [I]n deciding whether "state action" is 
present in actions performed directly by persons other 
than government employees, what is required is a 
realistic and delicate appraisal of the State's 
involvement in the total context of the action 
taken. 56 
We might reach a clearer conclusion regarding the 
Court's view of non-public schools from a case dealing more 
directly with this issue. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn57 was the 
second "state action" case of the trilogy decided during the 
Summer 1982 term. Here, certain teachers had been dismissed 
from a private school, allegedly for speaking publicly 
against the school. Although the school was private, it 
received funding from Massachusetts under contract to 
provide Special Education services. 58 The teachers claimed 
that, because of its unique funding situation, the school 
was required to provide them with "due process" as a "state 
56 Id. at 1012 - 1013. 
57Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830. 
58 Id. at 832. 
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actor. 1159 
After examining all of the alleged indicia of "state 
action," Justice Burger concluded that the school was not 
required to provide its teachers with federal constitutional 
guarantees. The Chief Justice emphasized that "state 
action" can be found only when the state "has exercised 
coercive power or has provided such significant 
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice in 
law must be deemed to be that of the State." 60 
Similarly, the Chief Justice found that "the school's 
receipt of public funds does not make the . . . decisions acts 
of the state. " 61 Further, Justice Burger added, "The 
school, like the nursing homes, 62 is not fundamentally 
different from many private corporations whose business 
depends primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges, 
dams, ships, or submarines for the government. Acts of such 
private contractors do not become acts of the government by 
reason of their significant or even total engagement in 
59 Id. at 834. 
60 Id. at 840. 
61Id. 
62 See Blum, 457 U.S. 991. 
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performing public contracts. 1163 
The teachers also claimed that the extensive state 
regulation of their school made the school's actions those 
of the state. Justice Burger, however, rejected this 
argument as well. He wrote, "[H]ere the decisions to 
discharge the petitioners were not compelled or even 
influenced by any state regulation. Indeed, ... the various 
regulators showed relatively little interest in the school's 
personnel matters. " 64 
As for the "public function" argument, that the private 
school was doing the work of the state in its stead, the 
Chief Justice was not impressed. He cited the Jackson65 
criterion that the private party's action was to be the 
exclusive prerogative of the state before a finding of 
public function would be reached. "There can be no doubt 
that the education of maladjusted high school students is a 
public function, but that is only the beginning of the 
inquiry. [While state law] demonstrates that the State 
intends to provide services for such students at public 
expense, that legislative policy choice in no way makes 
63Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841. 
64 Id. at 841-42. 
65Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353. 
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these services the exclusive province of the State." 66 The 
majority opinion did not find private education to be the 
fulfillment of a "public function" and, hence, an act of the 
state. 
Once again, Justice Marshall dissented. He maintained 
that this holding "simply could not be justified. " 67 
Justice Marshall pointed to the heavy state funding of the 
school as well as the regulation of the school by the State 
of Massachusetts Surely, he observed, this was a case of 
very close nexus between the school and the state 
government. 68 Moreover, he wrote, the fact that "the 
school is providing a substitute for public education" 69 
66Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842. 
67Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) . 
68Id. at 849. 
69Justice Marshall, in his dissent, was clearly 
concerned that the state might use private contractors to 
circumvent the laws that applied "only" to the State. This 
was not the first time that there was concern about using 
the private domain to circumvent public statutes. For 
example, in as early a case as Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 
323 (1926), the Court upheld private restrictive covenants 
that prevented the sales of homes by white sellers to black 
buyers. The Court failed to find a Constitutional issue, 
judging these covenants to be private actions, and not 
falling within the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id., at 330. The Corrigan decision was subsequently 
reversed by the Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948). 
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seemed to be "an important indicium of state action. 1110 
Further, he wrote, "I would conclude that the actions 
challenged here were under color of state law, even if I 
believed that the sole basis for state action was the fact 
that the school was providing [statutorily mandated] 
services." 71 
In addition, Justice Marshall objected to the 
comparison of the school to other contractors. "Although 
shipbuilders and dambuilders, like the school, may be 
dependent on government funds, they are not so closely 
supervised by the government. And unlike most private 
contractors, the school is performing a statutory duty of 
the State." 72 Justice Marshall also stated that a finding 
of state action may be justified, even if the state has not 
traditionally and exclusively performed a function. Such a 
finding is justified when "a private entity is performing a 
vital public function and other factors are present which 
show "a close connection with the state. " 73 
Justice Marshall further critiqued the majority's 
70Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 851. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 849. 
188 
decision because it focused on the "empty formalism" of the 
categories of "state action" and "under color of law." 74 
This formalism that Justice Marshall decried is a type of 
legal analysis that starts with legal categories and tries 
to fit facts into these categories. Justice Marshall 
appeared to be advocating a more realistic view of legal 
analysis that would state policy choices clearly and openly, 
rather than masking them in formalistic legal definitions 
and rules. With respect to "state action," it should be 
possible to explore the policy rationales for and against a 
finding of "state action" in each case. In Rendell-Baker v. 
Kohn, Justice Marshall's dissent focused on his view that 
there were enough indicators of "state action" to warrant 
such a finding regardless of how well the facts fit into the 
formalistic category ("coercive power," "significant 
encouragement," "exclusive prerogative of the state") 
Justice Marshall, albeit in dissent, sees private education 
as a "public function." Accordingly, private educators must 
provide their students with the same rights enjoyed by the 
students of public education. Private school students are 
entitled to the full panoply of "due process" rights granted 
to public school students. 
74 Id. at 852. 
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The Rendell-Baker decision related directly to teachers 
of private institution. Regarding the teachers, the Court 
found, in the majority opinion, that the private school was 
not required to provide the usual constitutional safeguards 
that public school teachers enjoy. What would be the case, 
however, if the plaintiffs were students? There is judicial 
opinion to the effect that the "public function" argument is 
much stronger if students were the plaintiffs. "The 'public 
function' concept is strongest ... when asserted by those for 
whose benefit the state has undertaken to perform a service, 
or when the state has lent its coercive powers to a private 
party. " 75 It appears that the ruling of Rendell-Baker, 
relating to faculty at a private school, is not conclusive 
regarding students in the same institution. Students in a 
private school that is publicly funded have a stronger claim 
than their teachers for due process rights. 
Additionally, some see the compulsory education 
statutes as an agent for imposing the state within the 
school. After all, students are required by law to attend 
school; each state has compulsory education statutes. In 
taking disciplinary action, the school is using authority 
over the student, authority that is derived from state law. 
75Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14, 26 (1981). 
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It is clear, then, that the school is a state actor, acting 
under "color of law," and must consider itself limited by 
constitutional constraints. 76 
The third case of the "state action" trilogy was Lugar 
v. Edmondson. 77 Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist and Chief 
Justice Burger, the authors of the majority opinions in Blum 
and Rendell-Baker, were in the dissent in Lugar. 78 This 
case uses the approach to public function that emphasizes 
enough state involvement in private activities to make the 
apparent private action into a public function. The case 
arose when Edmondson sued to collect a debt from Lugar, the 
operator of a truck stop. Ancillary to that action, 
Edmondson sought prejudgment attachment of some of Lugar's 
property for fear that Lugar might sell off this property in 
order to avoid paying his creditors. The attachment was 
76Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 940 (1982) 
77 Lugar v. Edmondson, 457 U.S. 922 (1982). 
78Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell wrote 
separate dissenting opinions in which they said that the 
Court was expanding "state action" beyond its proper 
boundaries. They did not believe that a finding of "state 
action" was valid just because a state official was involved 
in an essentially private action. Id. 457 U.S. at 943 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Powell added that he 
was opposed to ensnaring someone (Edmondson) who believed he 
was acting in strict accordance with the law. Id. 457 U.S. 
at 945-46 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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affected by a state clerk and the county sheriff. Lugar 
continued to own his property, though the property was now 
sequestered. About one month later, a hearing was held to 
determine the propriety of the attachment, only to discover 
that there were no real grounds for it. At this point, 
Lugar sued Edmondson and its president, alleging that the 
attachment deprived him of his property and was done without 
due process of law. This deprivation was clearly done 
"under color of law," similar to "state action." 79 The 
Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, ruled that 
Lugar's claim was justified and the action could be 
attributed to the state. 
Writing for the majority, Justice White delineated a 
two-part test for "fair attribution" of an act to the state. 
First, in order for an act to be considered "state action," 
the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right 
or privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct 
imposed by the state or by a person for whom the state is 
responsible. 80 Second, the party charged with the 
79The similarity between the concepts of "state action" 
and "under color of law" was discussed in United States v. 
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, n.7 (1966), where it was resolved 
that the legal analysis is the same for both concepts. 
80 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 
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deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a 
state actor. 01 This person may be a state official or 
someone else whose actions are chargeable to the state. The 
Court's imposition of this test was necessary, according to 
the Court, so that private parties not "face constitutional 
litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state rule 
governing their interactions with the community surrounding 
them. " 82 
Justice White explained that this two-part test appears 
like one when a state official is involved. However, when a 
private party is involved, the second part of the test 
prevents us from reaching a decision of "state action" even 
when a state statute is involved. Thus, Edmondson's use of 
state officials to sequester Lugar's property warranted a 
decision of "state action." This was not the case in Flagg 
Bros. 03 (where there was no finding of "state action") 
because their lien was executed without the intervention of 
a state official. 
81 Id. at 939. 
02 Id. at 937. 
03 Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. 149. 
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LEGAL THINKING SINCE THE "STATE ACTION" TRILOGY 
The Lugar two-part test is not helpful in our quest to 
ensure student rights in private schools. Its progeny, 
however, may help us accomplish this goal. The Lugar test 
was relied upon in the recent New York case of Albert v. 
Carovano. 84 Here, twelve Hamilton College students were 
suspended for participation in a "sit in" against this 
private college's rules. These rules had been instituted 
pursuant to New York State education law. This law mandated 
that colleges adopt rules for the maintenance of public 
order. Now that the rules were being enforced, the students 
claimed that they were done so "under color of state law" 
and that the state was involved. Since these students were 
involved in a state-required disciplinary action, they 
claimed that they were entitled to due process rights which 
they never received. 
Carovano is noteworthy because of its different 
decisions of the trial and two appellate courts. The United 
States District Court dismissed the case for the students' 
failure to show action "under color of state law." 85 Then, 
84Albert v. Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333 (2d. Cir.), 
modified 839 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd and vacated, 851 
F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1988) (en bane). 
85 Carovano, 824 F. 2d at 1334. 
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the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the 
district court's decision, and remanded the case for a 
determination of facts, 86 citing Coleman v. Wagner 
College. 87 If the facts were to show that the students had 
been deprived of a constitutionally-protected right, then as 
a matter of law, the college had acted "under color of state 
law" and that the students were entitled to "due 
process. " 88 By citing Coleman, the appeals court was 
stating that the first part of the Lugar test was satisfied 
if the district court agreed with the students' claim that 
the New York State law was intended to be and actually was 
applied as "a command to colleges to adopt a particular 
system of regulation of conduct on campuses." 89 
Proceeding to the second part of the Lugar test, the 
court held that the college could fairly be considered a 
state actor under a "state compulsion" theory. 90 The court 
believed that the state's regulations were intended to 
87 Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 
1970) . 
88 Carovano, 824 F. 2d at 1338. 
89 Id. at 1341. 
195 
encourage, if not require colleges to take a strong stand 
against campus unrest. 91 This encouragement, which was 
more than mere approval or acquiescence, seemed enough to 
show that the state was involved in the expulsion 
decision. 92 This encouragement would involve the state in 
the school, and make the private college's activities into a 
public function. This would require that the school afford 
its students the rights of public college students. 
In 1988, on rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals 
reversed itself . 93 The court found that the college's 
suspension of the students did not constitute "state 
action." This reversal was because Blum94 had been decided 
by the United States Supreme Court in the meantime. If the 
Blum court had not found "state action," and there was far 
more state involvement there, then Carovano needed 
reversal. 95 The Court of Appeals did not believe that 
there was coercion by the state to mete out any particular 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 563 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(en bane) . 
94Blum, 457 U.S. 991. 
95Albert v. Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1987), 
vacated, 851 F.2d 561, 570 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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punishment, and the state could not be considered 
responsible for the actions of the college. 96 The private 
Hamilton College was not viewed as serving a public function 
of educating the state's students. 
Judge Oakes dissented because he considered the Lugar 
test to have been fulfilled. 97 The first prong of the 
Lugar test is whether the deprivation is caused by a state 
policy. 98 Judge Oakes felt that the disciplinary policy 
had clearly been narrowly tailored to address school 
discipline, in fulfillment of the New York State mandate. 
The second prong of the Lugar test is whether the defendant 
can be called a state actor. 99 Here, the school was not 
exercising its professional judgement on the best way to 
discipline its students. Rather, it was implementing a 
specific disciplinary program that the state had coerced it 
to adopt. Thus, Judge Oakes argued that the school was 
acting on behalf of the state, as required by Lugar, and 
96 Carovano, 851 F. 2d at 571. 
97 Carovano, 851 F.2d at 574 (Oakes, J., dissenting). 
98 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 
99Id. 
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that Blum should not have been relied upon in this case . 100 
Although the decisions in Rendell-Baker and Blum diminish 
the opportunities for a finding of "state action," the Lugar 
test demonstrates that the Supreme Court may be willing to 
use the doctrine of "public function" to find "state action" 
under certain circumstances. In spite of the various 
decisions against finding "state action," the notion remains 
alive today. 
For the purposes of this study, it should be noted that 
throughout the various Carovano decisions, the courts 
applied different "state action" tests, with little 
agreement about which aspects of the case were important. 
This is not surprising, considering that the Supreme Court 
has failed to agree on a dispositive "state action" test 
even after the 1982 State Action Trilogy. 101 There is 
still much confusion over the nature and scope of the "state 
action" doctrine and what constitutes "state action" in 
100It should be noted that the only question remaining, 
according to Judge Oakes' dissent, was whether there was a 
widespread and reasonable belief that schools were required 
by the State to enforce the particular New York State rule. 
If there was such a belief, then "state action" was 
applicable and a trial on the merits of Carovano would have 
been appropriate. See Carovano, 851 F.2d at 577. 
101Lugar, 457 U.S. 922; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830; and 
Blum, 457 U.S. 991. 
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private schools. The United States Supreme Court has not 
articulated a clear position on the topic. It is hoped that 
the lack of a clear position will not prevent private school 
students from receiving the procedural fairness to which 
they would be entitled if "state action" were found. The 
following of procedural fairness would undoubtedly prevent 
potential serious educational and psychological harm to the 
student. 
Some legal scholars have suggested that various 
specific concrete indicia should be used to determine if the 
private school is acting on behalf of the state. They would 
look at state funding and state regulation of private 
schools to indicate that these schools are closely aligned 
with the state to make them the state's extended arm. The 
position advanced in this study is that, as arms of the 
state, the actions of these schools would be considered the 
private sector's serving a "public function," and a finding 
of "state action" would be in order. Students at these 
schools should be able to demand "due process," just as 
their public school counterparts do. 
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SCHNEIDER'S CRITERIA FOR FINDING A "PUBLIC FUNCTION" 
Professor Ronna Schneider, in discussing the "State 
Action Trilogy," would maintain that the issue is not 
whether state funding and regulation of an otherwise private 
institution constituted a sufficient nexus to render that 
institution's actions state action . 102 Rather, "[T] he 
focus of the inquiry should [be] upon the statutory 
delegation and the precise nature of the task 
delegated. 11103 And, if the state is statutorily required 
to provide a service and it delegates this service to a 
private provider, then an illogical result may result: "The 
more effectively the state distances itself from the 
performance of its statutory obligations, the less likely 
that the intended beneficiary of that obligation will 
receive the constitutional protections the state would have 
been required to give it if the state had provided the 
service directly. 11104 In other words, the state could 
privatize the performance of its duties and relieve itself 
of the responsibility of acting within constitutional 
102Ronna G. Schneider, "The 1982 State Action Trilogy" 
60 Notre Dame Law Review 1150 (1985) . 
103 Id. at 1163. 
104 Id. at 1164. 
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limits. The state should not be allowed to do indirectly 
what would be impermissible if done directly. Similarly, if 
the state action analysis focuses solely on the extent of 
state involvement, the private entity performing the state's 
obligation can also evade the limitations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Thus, an action based on the guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment could not be brought against either the 
state or the private actor. According to Professor 
Schneider, this is unacceptable. Ways must be found that 
recognize the public role and responsibility of private 
institutions. 
Professor Schneider proposes four criteria to establish 
"state action" within private institutions. 105 1) The 
state has a legislative or constitutional mandate to provide 
a particular service; 2) The state delegates to the private 
entity the provision of that service which the state would 
otherwise be obligated to perform itself; 3) The activity is 
one which is traditionally, although not exclusively, 
performed by the state. Schneider believes that only these 
kinds of activities generate a reasonable public expectation 
that constitutional limits should apply. When there is a 
reasonable expectation that constitutional limits should 
105 Id. at 1167. 
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apply, because of the similarity of the private activity to 
that of the state's, then constitutional limits, such as due 
process, should apply. She writes explicitly: "Education is 
an excellent example of this kind of activity. ,,io 6 
The reason Schneider believes that "[e]ducation is an 
excellent example of this kind of activity" is because of 
its fit into her criteria. 1) It is the state that is 
mandated to provide education. 2) A private alternative is 
available, but if the private school alternative does not 
provide it, then the standard public school must do so. 3) 
Statistically, from its very inception, the public school 
has taught the greater majority of the nation's children. 
Schneider's fourth criterion to establish "state 
action" is that the person complaining of the constitutional 
violation must be the intended beneficiary of the delegated 
activity. "State action" (or "public function") exists only 
when the private entity's actions are directed at those whom 
the state intended to benefit from these services. In the 
case of education, "state action" exists when the non-public 
school's actions are directed at the students. Indeed, this 
is part of the "nexus" argument of Rendell-Baker:i 07 that 
io 6 Id. at 1168. Emphasis added. 
i 07Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 843-44. 
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the state's involvement centered on the students, and not on 
the employees of the school. 
The underlying premise of these criteria of "public 
function" is that the state cannot delegate to a private 
entity the obligation to perform certain services or tasks 
without also delegating the responsibility to act within the 
parameters of the Constitution. 108 It is clear that 
private schools fall within the rubric of private entities 
that should follow the parameters of the Constitution. 
Accordingly, in spite of certain "public function" decisions 
by the Court, non-public school students should have the 
same constitutional rights as public school students 
(specifically in the area of fundamental fairness), 
regardless of the school's apparently "private" genesis. 
This providing of constitutional rights recognizes the 
private school's inherently public service to the community. 
Considering that the students fulfill their compulsory 
education requirements in a private school and that public 
schools would be obligated to provide education to these 
students absent the private schools, it is clear that 
private schools fulfill an important educational mission in 
the community. As direct recipients of the private school's 
108Schneider, 60 Notre Dame Law Review at 1170. 
203 
alternative education, students who would otherwise be the 
responsibility of the state, should benefit from the same 
rights as public school students. 
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JUDICIAL DECISIONS REGARDING THE "PUBLIC FUNCTION" DOCTRINE 
AND NON-PUBLIC EDUCATION 
We shall now review various Supreme Court and lower 
courts decisions, as well as legal opinions regarding the 
"Public Function" theory in the area of non-public 
education. 
As stated above, there are two approaches to the 
"public function" analysis. In the first, the analysis 
focuses on whether the private enterprise in question is 
sufficiently public to be considered "state action." "State 
action" may be found when the private enterprise performs 
services that are delegated to it by the state or when these 
services are so essential that in their absence the state 
would perform them. In the second approach, the analysis 
focuses on the nature of the activity. If the activity is 
affected with a public interest, then a finding of "state 
action" is appropriate. 
According to the first approach, we will easily find 
private education as serving a "public function." Every 
state has compulsory education laws. The state has always 
seen education as its major responsibility. Private schools 
provide the same or similar service, thus relinquishing the 
state of its responsibility toward private school students. 
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The provision of public education is clearly an act of the 
state government; private education is clearly the 
fulfillment of a "public function." 
Two important Supreme Court decisions, Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters109 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 110 help us 
understand the Court's view of the centrality of education 
to the states and its delivery to the citizens. Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters recognized the legitimacy of private 
education as an option for parents in the rearing of their 
children. 111 No longer were parents required to send their 
children to the public schools. Parents have a 
"fundamental" right to rear their children as they prefer; 
the choice of schools is one way that parents express that 
preference. Wisconsin v. Yoder112 found that the state is 
justified in requiring a certain level of basic education, 
even as it approved the "fundamental" right of parents to 
select the proper education for their children. 113 As long 
as a basic level of education is provided, the private 
109 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
110Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
111Pierce, 268 U.S. 510. 
112 Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 
113 Id. at 233. 
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schools are considered to have fulfilled the state's 
legitimate requirement for an educated citizenry. Clearly 
the private school is fulfilling a service that is in the 
public's interest. Its educational services proffered 
should be considered a "public function." 
We have seen that the "public function" notion properly 
includes activities by a private body of a kind which must 
be performed by the government if that private body fails to 
perform them. Private education is such an activity. Were 
any private school to close, the public schools would be 
required to provide for the education of the disenfranchised 
students. We have also found that the notion of "public 
function" applies when the action of a private body is 
affected with an important public interest. Education is at 
the apex of the state's responsibilities. As parens 
patriae, the state must assure an educated citizenry. This 
analysis leads us to the conclusion that private education 
is a "public function." As one author concluded, "education 
and justice--the two chief activities of state and local 
governments--would be 'governmental functions' par 
excellence, and justice on campus, a fortiori, would be a 
"governmental function" and therefore subject to 
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constitutional requirements. "114 To limit education, 
because of its great value to the student and society, even 
in a non-public setting, should only be justified when all 
procedural fairnesses were fulfilled. 115 
114Note, "Judicial Review of Expulsions," 72 Yale Law 
Journal 1362, 1385, n.126 (1963). 
115Id. at 1385. 
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LOWER COURT DECISIONS ON EDUCATION AS A "PUBLIC FUNCTION" 
Perhaps the most significant statements in the area of 
"Public Function," as it applies to education, are found in 
Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University. 116 There, 
Judge Skelly Wright wrote: 
At the outset, one may question whether any school 
or college can ever be so 'private' as to escape the 
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a country 
dedicated to the creed that education is the only sure 
foundation ... of freedom, without which no republic can 
maintain itself in strength, institutions of learning 
are not things of purely private concern . 117 
Clearly, the administrators of a private college are 
performing a public function. They do the work of the 
state, often in place of the state. Does it not follow 
that they stand in the state's shoes ? 118 
It is important to note that, although Guillory was 
later reversed, Judge Wright's comments on education as a 
"public function" were not repudiated. 119 
Another major statement on the relevance of the "Public 
Function" theory to education was made in Belk v. Chancellor 
116Gui11ory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 203 
F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), judgment vacated & new trial 
ordered, 207 F. Supp. 554, aff'd per curiam, 306 F.2d 489 
(5th Cir.), rev'd on retrial, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 
1962) . 
117Id. 203 F. Supp. 857. 
118Id. at 859. 
119See Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 
306 F.2d 489. 
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of Washington University. 120 The Belk court began by 
quoting Greene v. Howard University: 121 "The amenability to 
constitutional commands of what was once widely assumed to 
be purely private activity is a fluid and developing122 
concept. " 123 Belk then continues with a clear statement 
that private education should be considered a "public 
function." 
It is the opinion of this court that the acts of a 
private university can constitute ''state action" when 
said university is denying to its students their right 
to participate in the educational process. Education 
is a public function ... The private university's 
performance of a public function could render its 
actions subject to constitutional restraints. 124 
Belk recognized that Guillory was concerned with racial 
120Belk v. Chancellor of Washington University, 
336 F. Supp. 45 (1970). 
121Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 
1969) . 
122 Professor Van Alstyne makes an important comment 
regarding Greene v. Howard University: "Essentially no 
procedural due process was required in Greene v. Howard 
Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.C.C. 1967), on the theory that 
the university was private and not subject to the fifth or 
fourteenth amendments. The case is surely in error; even 
before hearing an appeal on the merits, the court of appeals 
ordered temporary reinstatement of the students." William 
W. Van Alstyne, "The Student As University Resident," 45 
Denver Law Journal 582, 594, n.32 (1968) 
123 Greene, 412 F.2d at 1132, n.2. 
124Be1k, 336 F.Supp. at 48. 
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discrimination, though it likened the acts of private 
administrators in a university to other cases the Supreme 
Court had decided. These included cases regarding the 
actions of private persons who governed the company town in 
Marsh125 or who ran the streetcar and bus service in Public 
Utilities. 126 The Supreme Court concluded that the best 
way to measure state involvement is through the inductive 
process of "sifting facts and weighing circumstances. 11127 
The Belk decision followed the Court's advise and found that 
private universities serve a "public function." The Belk 
decision concludes with a quote from Brown v. Board of 
Education, 128 "Today, more than ever before, the area of 
education is a matter of greatest public concern and 
interest. 11129 
Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University, 
125Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
126Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack, 343 U. s. 451 
(1952). 
121see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 
715, 722 (1961). 
128Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
129Id. at 493. 
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Etc . 130 concluded that, because a finding of "public 
function" means that there is "state action," nonpublic 
schools would certainly be included as "state action." As 
the Isaacs court found, "State action would be present in 
the operation of every non-public school, for example, 
because education is surely a state function. 131 
Another indication of "state action" may be gleaned 
from Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association. 132 There, the court found a substantial 
likelihood that "state action" would be found on the part of 
Boston University. The Buckton court relied on the view 
that the university, though a private institution, clearly 
performed functions governmental in nature such as providing 
higher education to and exercising substantial dominion over 
its students. 
Moreover, the holding in Braden v. University of 
Pi ttsburgh133 points to the blurring of clear definitions 
of "state action." There, the court said, "The difficulties 
130 Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University, 
Etc., 385 F. Supp. 473 (1974). 
131Id. at 486. 
132Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (DC Mass 1973) . 
133Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F. 2d 948 
(1977) . 
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of drawing a line between the state and private action are 
by now well-recognized. This is so because the realms of 
the government and the private sector are not as clearly 
defined as they were during the epoch in which the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were adopted." 134 
A Note discusses the fact that the public universities 
in the United States do not meet the total need for higher 
education in this country . 135 In fact, the community 
relies heavily on the educational services provided by 
private universities. And, "in the absence of a readily 
available alternative to a private higher education there is 
no way of lessening the impact of unreasonable restraints 
imposed by the private schools except by direct intervention 
in their affairs. " 136 Thus, it appears wholly appropriate 
for courts to review the actions of the private schools, as 
they do for public schools, to assure that no capricious 
decisions of expulsion are made. 
It appears to this writer that the courts should be 
willing to review the disciplinary decisions affecting 
134Id. at 956. 
135Note, "Developments In The Law - - Academic Freedom, " 
81 Harvard Law Review 1041 (1968) . 
136Id. at 1156. 
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youngsters attending private elementary and secondary 
schools as well. Approximately ten percent of all American 
children attend private schools. It appears that the 
government relies on many of its children being educated in 
the private domain. Certainly, it is at a significant 
savings to them that these children are educated off the 
public doles. This would appear to put education squarely 
in the area of a public function. Further, with the abysmal 
national achievement tests scores of many public schools, 
there is little alternative quality education available to 
students who are expelled from their private schools. At a 
minimum, private schools should be judged as fulfilling a 
"public function" and, thus, in the public service. Private 
schools should be considered public in their requirements 
for treating their students in ways similar to the public 
schools. The following of procedural fairness is surely in 
order. 
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THE IDENTICAL ANALYSIS FOR "EQUAL PROTECTION" AND 
"DUE PROCESS" PROTECTIONS 
An important question remains to be asked regarding 
"state action" and "public function" cases. In many cases 
where "public function" or "state action" were found, the 
case involved discrimination and the "equal protection" 
clause. The "equal protection" clause refers to the second 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution: "· .. Nor shall any State ... deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." The question is whether the decisions regarding the 
"equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment apply 
to due process cases of the same Amendment. 
The answer to this question was provided in Cohen v. 
Illinois Institute of Technology. 137 There, it was decided 
that the decisions based on the "equal protection" clause 
apply to the "due process" clause as well. Additionally, 
the state action analysis which applies to equal protection 
claims applies also to due process claims. 138 
This Cohen v. IIT decision follows Isaacs v. Ed. of 
137 Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 524 F. 2d 
818 (1975) 
138Id. at 822-23. 
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Trustees of Temple University, Etc. 139 In Isaacs, the 
court wrote that a finding of "state action" in cases that 
do not include racial discrimination may be just as 
plausible as a finding of "state action" where there is 
racial discrimination. Invocation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's "equal protection" clause because of racial 
discrimination should not be the sole reason for a finding 
of "state action." The court's analysis rests on the fact 
that "it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to arrange 
federal constitutional rights in an ascending hierarchy of 
value. 
It is clear from both the Cohen and Isaacs decisions 
that any deprivation of such a right, whether to the equal 
protection of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment or to the freedoms of speech and association as 
guaranteed by the First Amendment, is a matter of extreme 
importance to the person who suffers the deprivation. 11140 
Certainly, then, whatever deprivations would be disallowed 
because of one clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would also 
be disallowed under another clause of the same Amendment. 
139 Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University, 
Etc., 385 F. Supp. 473, n.11 (1974). 
140 Id. 
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Accordingly, findings of "public function" or "state action" 
that will reverse racial discrimination within a private 
school will also have application to due process rights 
within the same school. 
It is not difficult to construct an argument that 
private schools do serve this "public function." A finding 
that a private school serves a "public function" means that 
the administration of these schools must allow their 
students the same procedural fairness as in the public 
schools. 
Assuring procedural fairness is a wise educational 
decision. This is a measure of fairness that most people 
expect. It also shows a keen sense of justice by the 
administrators who are advocating on behalf of the students 
and providing them with every conceivable benefit. 
Fulfilling procedural fairness also shows a respect for the 
importance of education and the severe consequences of its 
limitation. The children deserve the fairness of "due 
process" procedures. 
We have moved from Marsh v. Alabama, 141 that 
institutions that serve the public take on public-like 
141Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946) . 
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responsibilities, to Justice Harlan in Evans v. Newton, i 42 
that schools serve a "public function," to Justice 
Marshall's dissent in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., i 43 that anything the state would do were it not for 
the private institution must be considered "serving a public 
function." We have seen education called a "public 
function" in both the majority and minority opinions of 
Flagg Bros Inc. v. Brooks. l.44 It can easily be read into 
dissents of Justices Brennen in Bl um v. Yaretsky145 and 
Marshall in Rendell-Baker. i 46 It has been stated 
explicitly by such lower courts as Guillory, i 47 Belk, i 4 s 
Greene, l.49 and Isaacs. iso Various legal commentators have 
i 42Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
i 43 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 365, 369 
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
i 44Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
i 45Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). 
i 46Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) 
i 47 Gui11ory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 203 
F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962). 
i 4 sBelk v. Chancellor of Washington University, 336 F. 
Supp. 45 (1970). 
i 49 Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128 (D:c. Cir. 
1969). 
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pointed to the importance of finding private education to be 
a "public function." Students are entitled to the 
constitutional rights that pursue in the wake of such a 
finding. 151 
150Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University, 
Etc., 385 F. Supp. 473 (1974). 
151 In a case not directly related to education, it was 
stated: "Society's administration has become so complex that 
private organizations are in a position of performing 
governmental functions and in the discharge of such function 
may be subject to the constitutional requirements of using 
fair and equal procedures." Ryan v. Hofstra University, 324 
N. Y. S. 2d 964, 978 (1971), quoting Silver v. New York 
Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341 (1963). 
CHAPTER VI 
THE "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE 
AND "DUE PROCESS" RIGHTS IN NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
The Constitution of the United States has been 
perceived as a document controlling the relationship between 
the government and the residents of the United States. It 
is often appreciated for the limits that it sets on the 
actions of the Federal and local governments. For example, 
the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the state may not 
limit its residents' rights of "life, liberty, or property 
without the due process of law." This guarantee of "due 
process of law" has been interpreted to apply only to 
actions of the government. The government may not deprive a 
resident of these benefits without the "due process of law;" 
an individual is not obligated to consider providing "due 
process of law" whatsoever. 
The requirement for the government's providing the "due 
process of law" is based on the wording of the first clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 Ever since the Civil 
1 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, states in relevant part: 
"nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." 
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Rights Cases, 2 this requirement has become known as "state 
action." In any situation where the state is directly 
involved, or even an extension of the state is involved, 
there will be a finding of "state action." These bodies are 
required to provide for the "due process of law" before they 
limit life, liberty, or property rights. As state 
institutions that are financially supported and administered 
by the state, public schools are considered extensions of 
the state. The public school's actions are, therefore, 
"state action." Public schools must provide due process 
rights to their students before meting out serious 
punishment. 3 
Regarding non-public schools, prevailing legal opinion 
has been that the actions of these schools are not 
considered "state action." 4 It follows, therefore, that 
non-public school students on the verge of disciplinary 
action are not constitutionally entitled to due process and 
2 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 
3 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
4Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D. Irid. 
1970), 445 F. 2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971) . 
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fundamental fairness. 5 This conclusion is not the sole 
possible conclusion, nor is it necessarily accurate. This 
chapter will review the substance of the "state action" 
requirement. It will also discuss the wisdom of limiting 
due process rights to public institutions. It will conclude 
5An interesting case that came before Judge H. Friendly 
was Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970) 
Here, New York had required public and private colleges 
within the State to adopt and enforce regulations for the 
maintenance of public order on college property. Several 
students at this private college had taken over the office 
of a college official during a sit-in and refused to end 
this occupation. The students were expelled, allegedly 
without due process. The students brought suit because of 
their expulsion without due process. They lost their 
original suit due a finding of insufficient state 
involvement. The Court of Appeals set aside the lower 
court's dismissal. The Court of Appeals held that, although 
the school was with a religious denomination and almost 
entirely supported by private funds, because the State had 
required that there be a policy regarding campus unrest, the 
State may now be perceived to be closely involved in the 
implementation of these specific policies. This would be a 
finding of "state action." The case was remanded for a 
further hearing at which the students might prove whether 
there was a meaningful state intrusion in the disciplinary 
policies of this private college. Judge Friendly, in 
concurrence, found "state action" in this case as he 
believed that the common citizen would not distinguish 
between public colleges and private colleges in New York. 
Id. at 1127 (Friendly, J., concurring). Judge Friendly 
further stated that he advocates a two-tiered analysis for a 
finding of "state action" in Fourteenth Amendment questions. 
Where there is racial discrimination he would require a 
lesser showing of state involvement to constitute "state 
action." It would appear that the same lower standard 
necessary to show "state action" should apply to § 1 of the 
same Fourteenth Amendment, thus gaining due process rights 
for "private" school students. 
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with suggestions for a new understanding of the "state 
action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The single most important reason for concluding that 
private school students are not entitled to due process 
rights is because of the absence of "state action." 
However, it has become more and more difficult to provide an 
accurate and clear definition of "state action. 116 An 
unclear definition of this difficult concept will limit its 
usefulness for any legal purposes. 
In an attempt to better define the "state action" 
doctrine, we shall review where a finding of "state action" 
has been appropriate. A private school that serves in lieu 
of a public school is considered serving a public function. 
"Public function" is an alternate way of requiring the same 
protections covered by "state action." The "public 
function" doctrine is discussed in Chapter V above. 
6 In attempting to define "state action" in Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the Court 
stated that "only by sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in 
private conduct be attributed its true significance." Id., 
at 722. One legal scholar compared this elusive definition 
of "state action" to Justice Stewart's famous "I know it 
when I see it" standard for judging obscenity (Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)) 
mainly in the comparative precision of the latter. (See 
Brest, "State Action and Liberal Theory, 130 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1296, 1325 (1982)). 
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There are several other ways of finding "state action" 
as well. Firstly, should a private school possess a 
"symbiotic relationship" with the government or be a "joint 
participant" in the challenged conduct, then a finding of 
state action would be warranted. 7 Secondly, even if no 
single factor may constitute a finding of "state action," a 
combination of several factors may paint a picture of a 
"symbiotic relationship" between the state and the private 
institution. 8 Thirdly, if there exists a "close nexus" 
between the government and the particular challenged 
conduct, then "state action" may be present. 9 All these 
approaches try to clarify the nature of the relationship 
between the state and the private institution. Where the 
state is closely involved in the administration, decision-
making, or finances of the private institution, courts will 
often find "state action." 
Once there is a finding of "state action," it remains 
7See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 
(1972) and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 
715, 725 (1961) 
8 Sament v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital, 413 
F. Supp. 434 (1976). See also Rackin v. University of 
Pennsylvania, 386 F. Supp. 992 (1972). 
9 See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 
351 (1974) . 
224 
to determine which "due process" is applicable, "procedural" 
or "substantive." "Procedural due process" looks only at 
the procedure to be followed, requiring a level of fairness. 
Typically the procedure is for a hearing of the charges and 
an opportunity for rebuttal. An objective tribunal may be 
offered as well. "Substantive due process" looks at the 
substance of the right that is being diminished. If it is a 
right that deserves extra protection, then the offending 
party must provide a compelling reason to overcome the 
protection. Examples of such rights include "fundamental" 
rights and rights that have gained importance for historical 
or social reasons. While studying the applicability of "due 
process" rights to private school children it will be noted 
whether the result would be "procedural" or "substantive due 
process" rights. 
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THE "POSITIVISTS," THE "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE, 
AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION 
We have seen that there are several ways for a finding 
of "state action" to issue. We shall now review why the 
requirements for "state action" have persisted. Why does 
the Fourteenth Amendment require the involvement of the 
states, or "state action," before it is said to apply? 
Professor Paul Brest opines that the doctrine of "state 
action" is an attempt to maintain a public/private 
distinction by attributing some conduct to the state and 
some to private actors. 10 As the theory goes, the actions 
of the state would be circumscribed by the limitations of 
the Constitution while the actions of the private party 
would not. This distinction is an important one. It 
respects the limitations on government that are appropriate 
for a constitution to provide. It also keeps the government 
out of the personal and private lives of the people. 
From a staunchly positivist perspective, however, such 
a theory is on tenuous ground. Positivists do not have a 
concept of natural law. Instead, they believe that every 
right of a citizen is only what is provided by the state and 
10Paul Brest, "State Action and Liberal Theory," 130 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1296 (1982). 
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affirmatively decided to be part of the state's panoply of 
rights. As such, every right becomes an act of the state, 
i.e. "state action." Even those rights only passively 
accepted by the state will be considered by the Positivists 
as "state action." Furthermore, "since any private action 
acquiesced in by the state can be seen to derive its power 
from the state, which is free to withdraw its authorization 
at will, Positivism potentially implicates the state in 
every "private" action not prohibited by law. " 11 Thus, 
according to the Positivists, a "state action" doctrine to 
limit governmental actions does not exist. They view every 
action as either actively legislated or passively approved 
by the state. According to the "staunch" positivists every 
action by both public institutions and private individuals 
is "state action." 
In Flagg Bros. v. Brooks12 Justice Rehnquist wrote a 
long footnote in which he recognized the danger inherent in 
Positivism and disavowed its broadest implications. In 
discussing the law regarding property interests of a private 
person in his own possessions, Justice Rehnquist states that 
these laws are not to be considered "state authorization of 
11Id. at 1301. 
12 Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
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private breach[es] of the peace." 13 His reasoning is that 
"[i]t would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of 
our previous cases, the notion of state action under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to hold that the mere existence of a 
body of property law in a state, whether decisional or 
statutory, itself amounted to 'state action' even though no 
state process or state officials were ever involved in 
enforcing that body of law. " 14 Thus, Justice Rehnquist 
holds that the state is not involved (viz., there is no 
"state action") if it merely "consents" to an action. 
Instead, according to Justice Rehnquist, there will be a 
finding of "state action" only when the state's action 
directly causes the breach in question. 
Professor Brest's response to Justice Rehnquist's 
positivism and view of "state action" is that it rejects a 
substantive, normative theory of rights. 15 Justice 
Rehnquist seems to look only at the "person" directly 
responsible for the act. If the state is this "person," 
then the act is considered "state action;" if the individual 
is this "person," then the act is not considered "state 
13 Id. at 160, n.9. 
14 Id. n .10. 
15Brest, 130 Univ. of Penn. L.Rev. at 1302. 
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action." Professor Brest would pref er to look at the 
substance of the litigation. He looks at the competing 
rights at stake between the two litigants, the state and the 
person. Brest would resolve the questions of the competing 
sides by balancing a possible abuse of power on the one hand 
and the protection of individual autonomy on the other. 
Similar balancing would be done to determine which level of 
"due process" would be appropriate, depending on the issues 
at stake. 
In addition, Brest objects to Justice Rehnquist's view 
of positivism because it renders the public/private 
distinction "at best meaningless and at worst a vehicle for 
manipulating outcomes to suit the Justices distribute 
tastes." 1 6 We had said above that the reason for a "state 
action" requirement was to preserve the public/private 
distinction. This distinction emphasizes the control put 
appropriately on government and the freedom allowed the 
individual. But, if according to Justice Rehnquist the 
public/private distinction is rendered an empty distinction, 
because it looks only at the "person" doing the action 
rather than its legitimacy, then the distinction serves no 
purpose and should be eliminated. It is then reasonable to 
16 Id. 
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say that if it was eliminated, there need not be any 
requirement for "state action" before a private person's 
acts would be reversed. In other words, private action 
would not be eliminated from constitutional control as there 
would be no "state action" instrument to eliminate it. All 
action, state and individual, would be required to fulfill 
constitutional guidelines. The result, for our purposes, 
would be that private schools would not be considered 
private. They would no longer be beyond the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; due process requirements would apply 
to private schools as well. Whatever "due process" rights 
are available to public school students should be 
immediately assumed by private school students. Without a 
finding of "fundamental" right, the only "due process" 
rights available to public school students are 
procedural . 17 
Let us take a closer look at the Positivist school. 
Justice Rehnquist recognized what he called "the danger of 
unyielding positivism. 1118 His solution, as noted above, 
17See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), for a 
delineation of what procedural rights are due public school 
students. 
18Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160 n.9 (1978) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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was to find "state action" only when the state directly 
caused the breach in question. We also saw that some 
Positivists would say that since it is only the state that 
can provide, or fail to provide, "due process of law," it 
would be more appropriate to say that a state "deprives a 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law" 19 when it permits him to be deprived of liberty 
without suitable legal redress in the government's 
courts. 20 That is, the state has an affirmative duty to 
protect its citizens from deprivation at the hands of other 
individuals. Positivists hold that every law or judicial 
decision is an affirmative act. They would picture this 
situation: The injured party comes to court for protection 
or help. If the court decides that there is no "state 
action," it will refuse to provide that protection or help. 
The court has made an affirmative statement that it will not 
help. This statement by the court is itself "state action!" 
The court's decision of non-action also implicitly sanctions 
the private infringement of rights. The state has breached 
its duty to ensure that "due process" will be followed; 
19 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
2
°Kenneth L. Karst and Howard W. Horowitz, "Reitman v. 
Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection," 1967 
Supreme Court Review 39, 55. 
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"state action" is now present. 21 
According to this view, if the state allows a private 
school student to be suspended or expelled from the school 
without due process, it has not fulfilled its affirmative 
duty of protecting an individual from the hands of other 
private parties. "State action" would be found to be 
present when the court decided not to help the grieved 
student. Once there is "state action," then the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment must be followed. 
Because there was no "due process" offered the student, the 
decision of the private school might not stand for lack of 
fulfillment of the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 22 
The basis for the discussion regarding positive law and 
a finding of "state action" is based historically upon the 
portentous Supreme Court decision of Shelley v. Kraemer. 23 
21This extension of Positivist thought is presented by 
Nerken, "A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth 
Amendment Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the 
Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory," 12 Harvard 
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law Review 297, 298 (1977) 
22 See Frank I. Goodman, "Professor Brest on State 
Action and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to Professor 
Stone." 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1331, 1344 
(1982). 
23 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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This case involved a restrictive covenant that had been 
signed by a group of neighbors in St. Louis, Missouri. 
These neighbors had agreed not to sell their homes to 
Negroes. One neighbor, however, breached the agreement and 
sold his house to Mr. Shelley, a Negro. The owners of the 
other houses brought suit to prevent Mr. Shelley from taking 
possession of his new home. The state courts had granted 
the relief requested, but the United States Supreme Court 
reversed unanimously, with three justices24 not 
participating. 
The opinion of the Court was written by Chief Justice 
Fred M. Vinson. The Chief Justice agreed with the neighbors 
that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to states, and 
not private persons. Accordingly, private persons remain 
free to discriminate against others in ways that the states 
may not, e.g., by color or race. Moreover, the restrictive 
covenant entered into by the neighbors does not violate any 
constitutional prohibition per se' . 25 However, by 
24Justices Reed, Jackson, and Rutledge disqualified 
themselves from sitting on this case because they themselves 
had signed racially restrictive covenants. 
25This statement by the Shelley Court, 334 U.S. at 13, 
upheld the earlier Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) 
decision that the Fourteenth Amendment "erects no shield 
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or 
wrongful." The Shelley Court accepted the legality of 
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enforcing a discriminatory restrictive covenant against Mr. 
Shelley, the Court would be participating in a 
discriminatory act. The Court reasoned as follows: The 
right to buy or sell property is clearly protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment from discriminatory state action. 
Therefore, the state cannot restrict a Negro's right to 
property on account of his race. The state cannot do this 
by statute or by actions of its courts. For the courts to 
be engaged in such a restriction would be to use the "full 
coercive power of government to deny ... on the grounds of 
race or color . . . the enjoyment of property rights ... 1126 
Such a judicial act would surely be "state action". 
Therefore, for the Court to uphold the restrictive covenant, 
even though it was entered into legally, would be "state 
action" and illegal discrimination. 27 
Read in its broadest interpretation, Shelley would 
appear to make every private case into a governmental one. 
Any private act that would later be upheld or retracted by a 
entering into a discriminatory covenant, because this is a 
private act and beyond the scope of the Fourteenth 
amendment, but it refused to enforce such a private 
arrangement. 
26 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19. 
27 Id. at 20-21. 
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court could then be seen as "state action." 28 Thus, 
constitutional requirements would seem to apply not only to 
the state but to all acts of private parties. 
There was another consideration, explained Chief 
Justice Vinson, in the Shelley Court's decision: The 
property from which the owner threatened exclusion (a home) 
was peculiarly necessary to the lives of other citizens; and 
the conditions the owner imposed were that citizens abandon 
significant exercise of constitutional rights (to 
nondiscrimination in housing) . 29 Regarding this study's 
topic of fundamental fairness for non-public school 
students, we must note: Certainly, a family having no place 
to live is a problem. But it is also a problem if they have 
no place suitable to educate their children. In addition, 
the right to choose the proper school for a child's 
upbringing is a family's "fundamental" right. 3° For a 
private school to exclude a child may leave the child 
28As one author wrote, [All state court enforcement of 
common-law principles constitutes "state action," because in 
each case] "the state must choose whom to vindicate and the 
vindication of either party is 'state action.'" See Thomas 
G. Quinn, "State Action: A Pathology and a Proposed Cure," 
64 California Law Review 146, 160 (1976). 
29 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13. 
30 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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without a suitable school in which to be educated and also 
deprive parents of their "fundamental" right to have the 
child educated in the school of their choice. It would 
appear, in light of Shelley, that it is wholly appropriate 
to find for "state action" in private school cases of 
expulsion. If it can be shown that a "fundamental" right is 
at stake, such as the religious upbringing of the child, the 
parent may force the school to provide a compelling reason 
why it must expel the child. This is an example of 
"substantive due process" being provided by the private 
school. If there is no "fundamental" right at stake, then 
the private school would be required to simply provide 
procedural fairness. 
In subsequent decisions, the Court limited the 
expansion of Shelley, though it never reversed its original 
decision. The Shelley decision was the logical conclusion 
of the Positivist argument. The opinion pointed out that, 
on the basis of a Positivist position, the doctrine of 
"state action" turns every private act into a public one, 
and is meaningless. This is because every judicial decision 
will always be considered "state action." Thus, a court's 
decision should not be based on whether the private person 
acted as a government officer. Rather, a court's decision 
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should be based on the merits of the case. Shelley was 
significant as a breach in the wall of ''state action." 
There was no longer a clean distinction to be made between 
public and private acts. 
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MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION 
WITHOUT RELIANCE ON THE "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE 
The distinction of public/private in the area of "state 
action" appears to be an important distinction to make and 
maintain. People of all political and ideological colors 
are concerned with the expansion of the "state action" 
concept and how this expansion will limit their private 
lives. Professor Charles L. Black Jr. addressed this 
concern as long ago as 1967. 31 His remarks should allay 
any concerns that might come with the blurring of this 
distinction. He points to the legitimate concern that the 
Fourteenth Amendment should not intrude into our private 
lives. The public/private distinction will remain. At the 
same time, however, he believes that an expansion of due 
process rights to private institutions will not cause such 
intrusion into our private lives. Even if the "state 
action" doctrine were expanded to include every form of 
state fostering, enforcement, and even toleration (of 
discrimination proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment), this 
does not mean that the Fourteenth Amendment will regulate 
31Charles L. Black, Jr. "Foreword: 'State Action, ' 
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14," · 81 
Harvard Law Review 69 (1967) . 
the "genuinely private concerns of man. "32 These concerns 
will never be affected. 
As Professor Black wrote so eloquently, 
No suit is of record in which the prayer was 
for a mandatory injunction that a dinner 
invitation issue. The leading cases in the Court 
. . . have been and will certainly continue to be 
cases where the problem is in the public life of 
the community -- in the prevailing policies of 
restaurants, in the structuring of neighborhoods, 
in the calling for books at the loan-desk, in the 
casual swimming of strangers past one another in 
some large pool, in the shouting of "fore!" down 
the fairway ... Law deals abundantly with the 
character of neighborhoods, with the obligation of 
restaurants to serve, with the management of 
public parks, with the conduct of common carriers, 
with picketing and parades, with schools. Law 
does not, in our legal culture, commonly deal with 
dinner invitations and the choice of children's 
back-yard playmates. 33 
This is the crucial point. Who does or does not 
receive a dinner invitation to my home and who will be 
allowed to play with my children in the our backyard will 
never be the stuff of litigation. 34 Our legal system 
concerns itself instead with the "private" life which is 
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really the public life of the community. These concerns, of 
the private institutions which serve the public, are to be 
32 Id. at 100. 
33 Id. at 102. 
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judged for their applicability to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Let us apply Professor Black's ideas to the non-public 
school. The private school is a private institution which 
serves the public. The private school is much more akin to 
a communal body than to my own living room. By expanding 
the doctrine of "state action" to include these communal 
institutions, we do no damage to the privacy of my living 
room. I shall always be free to include or exclude people 
at will. What we do accomplish with this expansion of 
"state action" is to expand, in a positive way, the basic 
tenets of fundamental fairness. If a "fundamental" interest 
is at stake, such as a private school that is racially 
discriminatory, then "substantive due process" rights would 
require even more protection of the affected interest. 
But we must be careful. Even if we were to view non-
public schools as "public institutions" for the purpose of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the public/private distinction 
should not be entirely abolished within the education realm. 
Consider religious schools. Such schools must be viewed as 
within the private domain because of their religious nature. 
To judicially view a religiously oriented school as a 
"public" institution brings us to the question of "excessive 
entanglement "35 between the church and state. The First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires that private 
schools not be financially supported or statutorily 
regulated by the state so that they not be considered 
governmental institutions. 36 Thus, it is important to 
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maintain this public/private distinction to a certain degree 
even in public-oriented private institutions. 
Returning to Shelley, it is important to note that the 
Court has rarely followed the thinking of that time. This 
would indicate that the holding might be considered an 
anomaly, but Shelley is still considered good law, and has 
never been overturned. In addition, scholars have applauded 
the Shelley decision, although some have challenged legal 
analysts "to show that sturdier foundations for the opinion 
can be laid." 37 Professor Louis Henkin has been 
particularly concerned about what might be called the "see-
saw problem" 38 that could result from the Shelley decision. 
35 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
36 See Jackson v. Statler, 496 F.2d 623 (1974). 
37Louis Henkin, "Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a 
Revised Opinion," 110 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
473, 474 (1962). 
38The "see-saw problem" is this author's 
characterization, not Professor Henkin's. 
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Every time a person's (the violator's) freedom to violate a 
constitutional right is upheld, then the victim's liberty to 
be free of such violations is sacrificed. 39 In each case 
when a question of "state action" arises, both the freedom 
of the violator and the liberty of the victim are at stake. 
No matter how a court decides, someone's liberty will be 
expanded and someone's liberty will be restricted. 
Recall that Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 40 concluded 
that the "state action" doctrine as applied to private 
parties was useful to preserve "an area of individual 
freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and full 
judicial power." 41 But to say that "state action" 
preserves an area of individual freedom is to look at only 
one side of the see-saw! If the "state action" doctrine is 
used to prevent judicial interference with a private actor, 
then the usual result is that the victor's freedom to 
violate the Constitution is seen as more important than the 
individual's rights that are infringed. Such a result 
should make one shudder. On the other hand, if the 
"victim's" rights were upheld, and the institution severely 
39Henkin, 110 Univ. of Penn. L. Rev. at 487. 
40Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) 
41Id. at 936. 
242 
limited by constitutional requirements, then the state may 
be imposing itself too much in the private sector. The 
history of the Constitution requires sensitivity to 
maintaining a "private domain" free of constitutional 
strictures. 
The better approach to resolving the respective rights 
of each side is, as stated above, to set aside the "state 
action" doctrine and look at the merits of each case. The 
court should ask in each individual case "Whose liberty is 
to be maintained, that of the 'violator' or that of the 
'victim'?" and respond accordingly. This is not to suggest 
that the court must halt all private infringements of 
constitutional rights, thereby eliminating the 
public/private distinction. Rather, it does suggest that, 
in each instance, the court should determine whether the 
"violator's" freedom provides an adequate basis for 
permitting the infringing activity. 42 
Regarding our goal of achieving constitutional rights 
for non-public school students on the verge of suspension or 
expulsion: While at first blush it would seem that there is 
no way to overcome the "state action" requirement adhered to 
42This approach is suggested by Edwin Chemerinsky, 
"Rethinking State Action," 80 Northwestern University Law 
Review 503, 538 (1985). 
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by the United States Supreme Court, it is reasonable to take 
a different approach, albeit not the prevailing one in most 
judicial decisions. This approach suggests that we set 
aside the "state action" doctrine and weigh the competing 
merits of each side, that of the administration and that of 
the student. It would enable us to provide students with a 
"fundamental" right to "due process" before they are 
suspended. At the same time, this approach would accept the 
school's right to administer its affairs as it sees fit. It 
would be the court's responsibility to "weigh and sift" the 
values at stake and reach a decision. The school officials 
would make a much better demonstration of thoughtfulness and 
equity if they could show the court that had they provided 
the disciplined student with procedural fairness similar to 
that offered the public school student. 43 In this way, the 
private school will have fulfilled (at a minimum) the spirit 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, without hiding behind the 
transparent veil of no "state action," in a feeble attempt 
to avoid procedural fairness. 
43 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
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REMOVING THE "STATE ACTION" REQUIREMENT IN SCHOOLS 
FOR THE SAKE OF THE CHILD 
Religious schools may be regulated by statute, their 
students may be bussed and serviced in various ways (e.g., 
the "Child Benefit Theory" of Everson v. Board of 
Education44 ) without their becoming "public" schools. It 
follows, then, that one may ask if it is possible for a 
sectarian religious school to remain "private" even as it 
takes on other characteristics and requirements similar to 
those of the state schools. This study seeks to show that 
such a "hybrid" is possible, and indeed, appropriate. 
Because of the "public" nature and function of the "private" 
schools, the "public" requirements may be the lesson of the 
"Child Benefit" Theory: 45 That the child is entitled to 
certain desiderata from the state government even when he is 
affiliated with a private school. The governmental 
character of the school the child attends is irrelevant, as 
it is the student who is being served, not the school. 
Considering the "fundamental" constitutional right of "due 
process" and our willingness to provide benefits to the 
44Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
45This theory was first advanced in Everson, Id. to 
allow certain state funding, not to the religious school 
directly, but to the children. 
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children, regardless of their school, the provision of "due 
process" 46 , in disciplinary cases would be a logical 
continuation of the "Child Benefit" theory. 
There are other issues to be considered as one steps 
close to the border between the private and public domains 
in education. Maintaining the public/private distinction, 
respecting the privacy of the private school, means that 
these schools are not required to conform to the same 
standards and operations of public schools. Maintaining 
this privacy is to be applauded as it accommodates the 
divergent goals and objectives of the non-public school. 47 
At the same time, even with divergent goals, it would seem 
that every school public and private -- has a goal of 
teaching respect for the individual student. There is no 
better way to teach this respect than to show it in 
practice. "An institution which professes to prepare youth 
for life in a democracy might wisely give them an example of 
46That "Due Process" is a fundamental right has been 
resolved since Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and 
reaffirmed in the more modern cases of Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973) . It is discussed at length in Chapters II and 
III above. 
47 See Donald A. Erickson, "Freedom's Two Educational 
Imperatives: A Proposal," in Public Controls for Nonpublic 
Schools, ed. Donald A. Erickson (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1969), 159. 
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fair play when it is conducting its own affairs. " 48 
Accordingly, even without imposing constitutional 
requirements binding private schools to the regulations of 
public schools, the private schools should provide for 
procedural fairness. This is good educational practice, and 
can be followed without blurring the public/private 
distinction. 
Another issue inherent in the pubic/private distinction 
is public financial support of non-public schools. This 
support must be accepted with great forethought. Many 
private schools need and seek governmental help to meet 
their financial obligations. But many also question the 
wisdom of spending taxpayers' monies on nonpublic schools. 
The issue gains even greater significance when the 
taxpayers' monies are spent for religious private schools, 
raising the issue of separation of church and state. 
The "child benefit theory" provides at least a partial 
answer to this question. The theory concludes that it is 
permissible for government to support the achievement of 
secular objectives, even in church institutions. According 
to this theory, it is not the church or its school that is 
48 Zachariah Chafee, Jr., "The Internal Affairs of 
Associations Not for Profit," 43 Harvard Law Review 993, 
1027 (1903). 
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benefitting, but rather the child. The child is being 
provided with bus transportation to and from school; the 
child is reading from secular texts provided by the state. 
No sectarian goal of the sectarian school is fostered or 
enhanced by the state expenditure. 
Let us take this "child benefit" theory a step further. 
If the government may contribute to the achievement of 
secular objectives, then the government is, to some extent, 
required to supervise that these objectives are being 
fulfilled. Once the government is already in the school, it 
should be able to insist that students are provided with 
procedural fairness before they are suspended or expelled 
from the school. The government is not breaking into the 
inner chambers of the private school. It is simply 
requiring that students be afforded elemental educational 
essentials. Just as Yoder49 recognized the state's right 
to require the fulfillment of certain minimal education, as 
well as safety and zoning regulations, 50 so should the 
49 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
50William J. Sanders, while commissioner of education 
of the state of Connecticut, went so far as to propose that 
it was legal for states to require that private schools 
provide qualified teachers, adequate libraries and 
laboratories, and programs that fulfill the stated goals of 
the school. William J. Sanders, "Regulation of Nonpublic 
Schools as Seen by a State Commissioner," Public Controls 
248 
state be allowed to require the provision of "due process." 
We must remain vigilant not to implicate the state 
unnecessarily in the school's governance, for this would 
make the private school no longer private. Imposing 
procedures for fundamental fairness before the traumatic 
steps of suspension or expulsion does not overstep the limit 
of state involvement. There appears to be no serious 
problem of excessive state regulation. 
The question of whether Fourteenth Amendment norms can 
be applied at all in private schools was resolved in the 
affirmative by Cooper v. Aaron. 51 The case was one of 
discrimination against blacks, and dealt with the "Equal 
Protection" Clause of the Amendment. The Cooper Court found 
that state support of segregated schools through any 
arrangement, management, funds or property cannot be squared 
with the demands of the "Equal Protection" Clause. 52 
Private schools that receive government support cannot go 
against the "Equal Protection" Clause. By extension, any 
private school that receives government support, even for 
for Nonpublic Schools, Erickson, ed., supra note 540, at 
177. Sanders' ideas, printed in 1969, are commonly 
implemented today. 
51 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
52 Id. at 4. 
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secular purposes, must follow all the guidelines of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, including the "Due Process" Clause. 
What is true about the second clause of the Amendment should 
be true about the first clause as well. 53 Accordingly, 
non-public school students should be afforded "due process" 
guarantees. 
53This is the explicit holding in Cohen v. Illinois 
Institute of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (1975). Cohen follows 
Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University, Etc., 385 
F. Supp. 473, n.11 (1974). These cases are discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter V. 
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PROVIDING "DUE PROCESS" WITHOUT "STATE ACTION" 
A question arises: What if there was no "state action" 
doctrine -- would "due process" still have to be provided? 
The answer, without a doubt, is "yes." "Due process" is a 
"fundamental" right to which every citizen of the United 
States is entitled.s4 As a "fundamental" right, any 
abridgement must stand up to "strict scrutiny" by the court 
before the abridgement will be upheld. ss While 
governmental abridgement of a right may be more severe than 
private abridgement (given the size and power of the 
government) we should, nonetheless, also review the acts of 
private parties. In this way, we may ascertain that the 
infringements are minor or sufficiently justified. "If one 
sees the Court's role as protecting fundamental values, then 
there is no reason why such rights should be safeguarded 
from only governmental action. Nothing in the definition of 
those values or in the rationale for their protection 
explains why protection is limited to government 
s4 U.S. Const. amend. V, made applicable to the states 
by amend. XIV in 1868. 
sssee, Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885) I and Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See also the 
more modern day case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965) . 
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conduct. " 56 The courts are there to protect our rights 
from abridgement, especially in cases of "fundamental" 
rights. If the courts protect us from private abridgement, 
and there is no reason inherent to the rights to prevent 
this, then why have a "state action" doctrine? The 
conclusion that necessarily follows is that, in protecting 
the private citizen from breaches of "fundamental" rights, 
the "state action" doctrine has become anachronistic. 
This is perhaps the unarticulated conclusion of Franz 
v. United States. 57 There, the court held that the U.S. 
Constitution should be viewed as a code of social morals, 
not just of governmental conduct. Included in these morals 
are individual rights that no entity, public or private, 
could infringe without a compelling justification. This 
conclusion of Franz makes sense because the "Constitution 
was designed to embody and celebrate values and to inculcate 
the proper acceptance of them, as much as to compel 
governments to abide by them. 1158 It is clear, according to 
some judicial opinions, that constitutional values are meant 
56Chemerinsky, 80 NW L. Rev. at 535. 
57Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) . 
58 Id. at 594, n.45. 
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to be kept by all of society's institutions, both public and 
private. Surely, this should be the case in schools that 
are teaching the very Constitution itself and a general 
approach to life and moral values. In order to do so, non-
public schools should provide their students with the "due 
process" rights guaranteed by the Constitution they are 
trying to teach. 
THE "POWER FACTOR" OF PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS 
AND FINDING "STATE ACTION" 
Prevailing judicial opinion today, especially after 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority59 and subsequent 
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"state action" decisions such as Reitman v. Mulkey, 60 Moose 
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 61 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
59Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 
(1961). "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances 
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private 
conduct be attributed its true significance." Id. at 722. 
Here, there was a finding of "state action" based on the 
"symbiotic relationship" between the private enterprise, a 
restaurant, and the state, which owned the parking garage in 
which the restaurant was housed. 
60Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The question 
here was whether California's Proposition 14, stating that 
the State will not limit individuals' rights to enter into 
restrictive covenants for the sale of property, was 
constitutional. The Court found that it was not 
constitutional as it "encouraged" racial discrimination. 
The Court explained that, although there is no exact 
definition for a finding of invidious (offensively unfair) 
discrimination, the Court must carefully assess the 
potential impact of official action in determining whether 
the State has significantly involved itself with this 
discrimination. 
61Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
Racial discrimination was disallowed at a private club based 
on ''state action," because the State of Pennsylvania 
provided the club with a liquor license. The Court said 
that even state regulation will not necessarily turn a 
private club into a state entity so that "state action" 
could be found. Rather, the relevant criterion for a 
finding of "state action" is the State's significant 
involvement with invidious discrimination. 
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Co., 62 and Flagg Bros. v. Brooks63 indicate that the "state 
action" doctrine is, at a minimum, not very useful. This is 
because cases testing Fourteenth Amendment rights for an 
individual against a private institution, must show that the 
state was directly involved in requiring the specific point 
of contention. This is rarely possible. The requirement 
for "state action" has seemingly put Fourteenth Amendment 
benefits beyond the reach of most children attending private 
schools. The original decision in Civil Rights Cases, 64 
that the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to "state 
action," has gone through many reviews and revisions. 
The "state action" doctrine is apparently putting "due 
62 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 
(1974). The private utilities company turned off Mrs. 
Jackson's electricity for her failure to pay her bills. She 
claimed that the electricity was turned off due to her race. 
The Court found in the utility's favor, rejecting the 
"public function" argument and finding no "state action" 
(despite the state regulation of the private utilities 
company) . In addition, the Court found that the state was 
not involved in the fostering or encouraging of racial 
discrimination. 
63Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). This 
case dealt mostly with the "public function" argument, 
though it also touched on "state action" to limit it once 
again. Here the Court said, "A state is responsible for the 
act of a private party when the State, by its law, has 
compelled the act." The decision also pointed out that the 
Court has never held that a State's mere acquiescence in a 
private action converts that action into that of the State. 
64Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-19 ( 1883) . 
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process" rights beyond the reach of private school children 
at the same time that we are finding increasingly blurred 
lines dividing public from private action. These blurred 
lines indicate that excluding private action from common 
public controls is unwise. Further, the large number of 
private institutions indicates that there is a great amount 
of private power; this power is having a profound effect on 
individuals and their rights. This power should be 
controlled in ways similar to those that society has, over 
the years, imposed on public power. The growth of private 
power should put private institutions within reach of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Let us take a closer look at the two litigants in a 
private school situation: the school and the student. The 
school itself, although essentially "private," is open to 
most students seeking enrollment. The school, in its role 
of overseer and "controller" of student behavior, determines 
the rules and regulations that will affect the individual 
student's life as a student. As long ago as 1927, Professor 
Morris Cohen analyzed the power of the "boss" or land owner 
over his "subjects." Cohen wrote, "Private property is a 
form of power, not unlike the power of a sovereign over its 
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subjects. " 65 By extension, school officials may also be 
said to have "sovereign" power over student "subjects." 
Administrators often set the school rules, control 
schedules, punish by recess- and after-school detention, and 
there is little students may do to overcome this control of 
their school lives. Accordingly, even though we are 
discussing private schools, school officials take on the 
role of government-in-miniature. They must be held 
responsible to conduct themselves in ways similar to other 
"sovereigns." This would include the assurance to the 
students (the "subjects") that they will provide with "due 
process." Students should not be excluded ("banished from 
the kingdom") without an explanation of the causes of their 
banishment. 
Officials and organizations in positions of power over 
underlings must be extremely careful in the exertion of 
their power. This is especially the case where there are 
limited alternatives for employment or education if the 
underlings wish to avoid this power. This was Justice 
Bradley's concern in The Civil Rights Cases66 • Justice 
65Morris Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty," 13 Cornell 
Law Quarterly 8 (1927) . 
66 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3. 
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Bradley looked at the particularly vital nature of the 
services offered by railroads and public accommodations. 
Concurrently, he looked at the resultant power over the 
public enjoyed by the owners of these facilities. All this 
resulted in a finding of these "private" properties (the 
railroads and private accommodations) being declared 
"affected with a public interest." Because of the 
importance of the service provided as well as the 
concomitant power that this provision included, Justice 
Bradley, for the Court, ruled that the public facilities 
were subject to state regulation. 
Private schools provide an important and high quality 
service in the form of education. Concurrently, their 
officials wield much power over the beneficiaries of this 
service, the students. This status of power, coupled with 
the importance of the service provided, indicate that the 
private schools should be considered "affected with a public 
interest" and subject to the same requirements as other 
"public interests." Fundamental fairness should be offered. 
Further, in Munn v. Illinois67 , the Court upheld state 
laws regulating the operation of grain transporting 
railroads and the operation of warehouses and grain 
67Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). 
258 
elevators. The Court declared that "[p]roperty does become 
clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make 
it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. 
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which 
the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the 
public an interest in that use, and must submit to be 
controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent 
of the interest he has thus created." 68 The underlying 
reason for this is that the public stands in a position of 
inequality with monopolies of public service. 
Such is the case with education as well. The school is 
essentially a communal institution. Parents and families in 
the community have an interest in the school and its 
vitality. Even though the school may have started as a 
private institution, it quickly grows into an integral part 
of the community as more parents enroll their children. In 
addition, it may be the only school in the area that 
provides quality education. As a community organization, 
the school gains a new role and new responsibilities. It 
should follow the same rules that apply to other public 
institutions. These rules include fundamental fairness. 
68 Id. at 126. 
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SCHOLARLY OPINION IN FAVOR OF SETTING ASIDE THE "STATE 
ACTION" REQUIREMENT, AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION 
We have seen that the courts have been quite respectful 
of the traditional Civil Rights Cases69 decision that "due 
process" requirements apply only when the state is closely 
or directly involved in the limitation of "life, liberty, or 
property. 1170 The doctrine has, however, not fared well 
among legal commentators. Several legal scholars have 
advocated deserting the "state action" doctrine in favor of 
a merit-oriented approach. 71 Over the last quarter 
century, we have begun to see the "state action" doctrine 
being pronounced as "'unsatisfactory' as a guide." 72 
Further, the "state action" doctrine, although attempting to 
provide a single approach to respond to the myriad cases 
69 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3. 
7011 Life, liberty, and property" are guaranteed to all 
American residents by the U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV. 
The finding by the U.S. Supreme Court that "state action" is 
required in order for these guarantees to be in effect is in 
The Civil Rights Cases, Id. at 11 - 19. 
71This approach, as discussed above, looks to the 
values and merits at stake, rather than the "person" 
performing the alleged activity. It offers the private 
person protection from abridgement of important rights by 
other private persons or institutions. 
72William w. Van Alstyne and Kenneth L. Karst, State 
Action, 14 Stanford Law Review 3, 58 (1961). 
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before the courts, has been rather unsuccessful. The search 
for this approach has fulfilled Holmes' prophecy: "Certainty 
generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of 
man." 7 3 Man, in search of a legal doctrine that will 
provide certainty, adopted "state action." This is a nice 
category, but it has not accomplished its goal. 
The "state action" requirement, as part of the 
pubic/private distinction, may, in part, be due to a 
compromise or an easing-into of the notion of equal rights 
for the newly freed slaves. 74 "By finding in the Civil 
Rights Cases that the Fourteenth Amendment would not allow 
the federal government to prohibit private discrimination, 
the Court assured that as a nation we would forbear 
punishing such violations, allowing enforcement of private 
civil rights violations, unless and until state action was 
found. Thus did the vision of private liberty to violate 
civil rights under the label "private action" become part of 
the Court's dogma as it entered the Lochner75 era. 76 It 
73 Id. 
74 Ira Nerken, "A New Deal for the Protection of 
Fourteenth Amendment Rights," 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review 297 (1977). 
75The Lochner Era began in 1905 with the Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), decision. Lochner struck down New 
York's maximum hours laws for bakers. More historically 
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must be noted that today, more than a century after the 
Civil Rights Cases, our country should be perceived as 
having grown beyond its earlier mentality. If the 
private/public distinction was originally articulated to 
ease the American people into an acceptance of nascent Negro 
rights, then this distinction should no longer be necessary. 
It is time to look at the substance of the violation, not 
its place within the outdated legalistic construct of "state 
action." 
Professor Howard Horowitz is another legal commentator 
who pointed to the ineffectual use of the "state action" 
doctrine. His claim is that state action always enfolds 
private action, that there is no reality of pure private 
action as the state always attributes some legal 
significance to private action. As soon as the state 
attributes legal significance, then their attribution alone 
has already connected the act to the state. In essence, 
significant, was the Court's use of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's perceived "substantive due process" clause to 
protect economic and property rights. The Court spent 
thirty years engaged in "Lochnerizing," i.e., scrutinizing 
economic regulations and often striking them down, based on 
"substantive due process" protections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Now, people could enter in almost any agreement 
both parties found acceptable. 
76Nerken, 12 Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law 
Review at 327-28. 
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then, every act is "state action." Horowitz recommends that 
instead of the question of the general absence or presence 
of "state action," we should rather ask about the 
constitutionality of the "state action" that is always 
present. 77 
Subsequently, Professor Jerre Williams noted our entry 
into a new era. He wrote, "We have entered the time of the 
twilight of state action; the sun is setting on the concept 
of state action as a test for determining the constitutional 
protection of individuals. " 78 Williams' suggested that the 
real issue was "the merits of accommodating the interests, 
not one in the nature of a formula which is irrelevant to 
the interests involved." 79 
Professor Charles Black suggested that we abandon the 
"state action" doctrine completely. He believes that "The 
field is a conceptual disaster area; most constructive 
suggestions come down, one way or another, to the suggestion 
that all attention shift from the inquiry after "state 
77Howard W. Horowitz, "The Misleading Search for 'State 
Action' Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 30 Southern 
California Law Review 208 (1957) . 
78Jerre Williams, "The Twilight of State Action," 41 
Texas Law Review 347, 382, 389 (1963). 
79 Id. at 389. 
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action" to some other inquiry al together." 00 
Harvard's Professor Duncan Kennedy, discussed the 
public/private distinction. He does not view the public and 
private domains as two distinct absolutes. Rather, he 
suggests putting the two domains on a continuum. "People 
who believe in continua tend to explain how they go about 
deciding what legal response is appropriate for a given 
institution by listing factors that "cut" one way or the 
other or must be balanced. 1181 The practical significance 
of this, according to Kennedy, is that the public/private 
distinction is no longer good as a legal argument, for the 
distinction may "land" elsewhere on the continuum in the 
next case. 82 Ultimately, the public/private distinction 
fails "as a description, as an explanation, or as a 
justification of anything." 83 It should be abandoned for 
lack of certainty or clarity. 
What we may conclude from Professors Van Alstyne and 
8
°Charles L. Black, "Foreword: , State Action, I Equal 
Protection, and California's Proposition 14," 81 Harvard Law 
Review 69, 95 (1967). 
81Duncan Kennedy, "The Stages of Decline of the 
Public/Private Distinction," 130 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1349, 1353 (1982). 
82 Id. at 1354. 
83 Id. at 1357. 
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Karst, Horowitz, Williams, Black, and Kennedy is that the 
continuation of the public/private distinction is no longer 
meaningful if it ever has been. The distinction calls for 
legal decisions based on the structural considerations that 
focus only on the governance or ownership of the school. 
Students attending schools governed by the public 
authorities are in the public domain and considered involved 
in "state action." These students are entitled to all the 
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 84 
Students attending schools governed by private parties are 
in the private domain and, heretofore, not considered 
involved in "state action." These students have been found 
not entitled to the rights guaranteed by our 
Constitution. 85 Our legal system and people would be 
better served if we looked at the substance and merits of 
each argument. 
In the area of private schools, Powe v. Miles is a 
leading case. Its holding indicates how unhelpful the 
"state action" doctrine has become. Some students were 
suspended without "due process" for demonstrating on the 
84 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
85Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 
1970), 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). 
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campus of a private university. This university consisted 
of three private colleges and one college under contract 
with and substantially subsidized by the state. The court 
found ''state action" with respect to the "contract" college 
students, but no "state action" for the private college 
students This, although the suspensions were made by the 
same university officials for participation in the same 
demonstration. 86 This holding brings us to an important 
conclusion: "That the "state action" doctrine of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is too narrow a yardstick to measure 
the requisite degree of fair play essential in the legal 
relationship between students and universities, public or 
private. " 87 
We should decide the applicability of governmental 
requirements such as "due process" based on the rights 
affected rather than the public or private nature of the 
institutional charters. Thus, private school students 
would gain the rights to "due process" before facing serious 
86 Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (1968). 
87Sally Furay, "Legal Relationships Between the Student 
and Private Colleges or Universities." 7 San Diego Law 
Review #2, pp. 246, 247 (1970). 
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disciplinary action. 88 Although obviously in the private 
domain, these students would have the same rights as their 
public school compatriots. The Fourteenth Amendment would 
no longer require, above all, a finding of "state action." 
The rights that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, 
specifically the "due process" rights of Clause I, would now 
apply to all Americans regardless of the schools they happen 
to attend. 
This chapter reviewed the requirement for "state 
action" before the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "due 
process" will go into effect. "State action" has come to 
mean that not only is the government involved in the 
financial support or governance of private institutions, but 
that it was directly involved in the particular incident of 
complaint. 
The "state action" requirement has persisted since the 
post-Civil War period. This persistence is usually 
attributed to its value at maintaining the distinction 
between public and private acts. This distinction prevents 
88These rights would include the rights elucidated in 
Goss v. Lopez for suspensions of ten days or less: "Oral or 
written notice of the charges, an explanation of the 
evidence the authorities have, and an opportunity to present 
his side of the story." Goss, 419 U.S. at 581. Longer 
suspensions or expulsions may require more formal 
procedures. Id. at 584. 
267 
the government from insinuating itself in uniquely private 
situations. The reasoning was that government could not 
control personal actions or limit personal freedoms because, 
in the absence of a connection between government and the 
act, government regulations do not apply. 
It has been suggested that the "state action" doctrine 
is no longer useful. Today, the focus is not the legalistic 
question of whether private institutions are connected with 
the state. Instead, the focus is on the merit of the claim. 
In the case of "due process," for example, no one wants to 
lose a right to which they are entitled or expect to 
continue enjoying, such as education, without procedural 
fairness being provided. "Due process" rights are 
considered too "fundamental" to our society to have them 
discounted for lack of "state action." A value such as 
education is also considered too precious to have diminished 
without procedural fairness. If "due process" and education 
are considered "fundamental," they will require even more 
judicial scrutiny before they are affected. 
Also, private institutions wield power over their 
clientele in ways similar to public institutions. Indeed, 
public and private institutions function in such similar 
ways that it is often difficult to differentiate between the 
two. 
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It is appropriate to apply the requirements of public-
governmental institutions upon such private institutions as 
private schools that serve a community of disparate 
individuals. 
Additionally, the doctrine of "state action'' is itself 
unclear. The Positivists may show that the doctrine itself 
admits of no clear definition and doctrinally cannot be 
imposed without inherent problems. It is an imprecise and 
unnecessary doctrine. 
The original benefit of the doctrine, the proper 
distinction between public and private affairs, can be 
resolved in other, more useful ways. No one is suggesting 
that, with the demise of the "state action" doctrine, courts 
will require an individual to host racially integrated 
dinner parties under the threat of a legal suit for racial 
discrimination. What has traditionally been considered 
staunchly private will remain private. What commentators 
have recommended is that legal doctrines must respond to 
society. The lines between public and private institutions 
are now blurred. The private institutions that service so 
many people have taken on the qualities of public 
institutions. Let private institutions that function like 
public institutions respect their clientele in ways that 
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public institutions have been mandated to provide for many 
years. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to identify 
constitutional principles that would warrant the provision 
of "due process" for non-public school students. The 
philosophical, legal and educational bases of these 
principles were examined. 
Relevant Supreme Court cases, federal appellate court 
rulings, and federal district court decisions were reviewed 
to ascertain the application of due process rights to non-
public school students. Additionally, the writings of 
various legal scholars were reviewed to determine the 
current state of legal thinking regarding possible changes 
and revisions in current judicial interpretations. 
The significance of "state action" was reviewed. The 
"state action" doctrine is based on the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, "nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law. 111 The Supreme Court 
interpreted the Due Process Clause to ref er only to acts of 
1 u.s. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. (Emphasis added.) 
270 
271 
the state, and not to proscribe acts of private parties. 2 
In the area of education, the Supreme Court recognized 
the "state action" inherent in public schools when it 
decided that public school students were entitled to 
procedural due process before suffering a suspension of ten 
days or less. 3 The question remains what the Supreme Court 
would decide regarding the public character of the private 
school. On the one hand, the school is private and beyond 
the scope of constitutional law. 4 On the other hand, the 
school services the community as a public institution. This 
study reviewed what an enlightened Supreme Court might 
decide when faced with a similar situation as Goss, but in 
the private sector. 
Five approaches to securing "due process" rights for 
private school students were presented and analyzed. They 
included: (i) natural law and the natural right to 
fundamental fairness; (ii) the students' property and 
liberty rights to education; (iii) the constitutionally 
"fundamental" right that students have to education; (iv) 
2 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 
3 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
4 See Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D: Ind. 
1970), 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). 
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the public function served by private education which should 
require private schools to follow the same procedures as 
public schools; (v) a reevaluation of the century-old "state 
action" requirement. All of these approaches were presented 
for the purpose of suggesting a legal, philosophical and 
educational rationale for securing "due process" rights for 
private school students involved in disciplinary action that 
suspends them from school. 
In addition to "procedural due process" which looks at 
procedural fairness, the Supreme Court has required a second 
form of "due process," called "substantive due process." 5 
This form looks at constitutionally protected "fundamental" 
rights and, for the sake of protection of these rights, 
requires a higher level of justification before their 
abridgement. Once the rationale for securing "due process" 
rights for private school students was presented, a 
discussion ensued regarding which form of "due process" was 
appropriate. 
Natural Law and Natural Rights 
The doctrine of Natural Law posits that there are 
certain laws that have always been part of nature that must 
5 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and its 
progeny. 
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be identified, by man's power of reason, and followed. 
These laws, in addition to man-made positive law, form the 
corpus of law today. Man follows these laws because of the 
moral weight of the natural law or because of the social 
compact he makes with society to ensure lawfulness and 
order. 
Positive law is morally legitimate only when it 
incorporates natural law. The closer the positive law's 
approximation to natural law, the more legitimate it is. 
Thus, governments and institutions are morally bound to 
include natural rights in their laws and procedures. 
Procedural fairness is an example of a natural right 
which became codified in positive law. Starting with the 
Magna Charta, proceeding to the Laws of England and 
eventually to the United States Constitution, "due process" 
has always been one of those natural rights that is 
incorporated in governmental lists of citizen rights. 
The constitutional requirement of "due process" is 
directed at the government because the Constitution is a 
document of citizens' rights and governments' 
responsibilities. This, however, does not free the private 
person from following the moral code that preceded and 
precipitated its inclusion in the Constitution. Indeed, the 
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fact that "due process" was included in the Constitution is 
an indication of its moral imperative and rightness. From 
the perspective of moral behavior, the Constitution was not 
meant to exclude private individuals and institutions, but 
to include governmental agencies. 
The doctrine of natural rights was included in the 
Declaration of Independence with the ''inalienable rights" 
clause. 6 Since that time, the doctrine found its way into 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution7 
and various Supreme Court decisions. 8 
The right to receive "Due Process" is a "natural" 
right. 9 The right to education was shown to be a "natural" 
right as well. This means that (constitutionally 
recognized) morality requires that education be preserved 
6
" [T]hat [all men] are endowed by their Creator with 
certain inalienable Rights" The Declaration of Independence 
para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
7
" [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law" U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
8 See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 
(1819); The Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 (1872) 
(Field, J., dissenting); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Corrunittee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1851) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515 (1961) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 511 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) 
9Lochner, 198 U.S. 45. 
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for all students, regardless of the governmental nature of 
their school. It also means that students may not be 
deprived of their education without procedural fairness. 
The constitutional requirement of "state action" is simply 
irrelevant in the area of "natural" rights. 
Legal scholars often debate the question of "What 
process is due?" At a minimum, the deprivation of education 
warrants "procedural due process." This means that an 
administrator, before subjecting a student to a disciplinary 
suspension of ten days of less, must give the student "oral 
or written notice of the charges against him and, if he 
denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities 
have and an opportunity to present his side of the 
story. 1110 
Education, though not yet recognized as a "fundamental" 
right, 11 carries tremendous inherent importance. It was 
shown to be a natural right of children to accumulate 
knowledge. Another natural right is to worship God 
according to one's conscience, and to raise children 
accordingly. When we combine the natural right to an 
10Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). 
11San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), but see 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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education and to a religious upbringing, sectarian schools 
take on additional importance. This importance may raise 
private religious education to a constitutional level, 
gaining for it even more significance. The deprivation of 
religious education may hinder the First Amendment 
guarantees of the "free exercise of religion. 1112 
Accordingly, disciplinary suspensions or expulsions may be 
subject to greater protections. These protections, called 
"substantive due process" rights, would require the school 
to explain why it had no choice but to impose such a serious 
punishment on the student. The same "substantive due 
process" would be appropriate if education is identified as 
a "fundamental" natural right. 
Students' "Property" and "Liberty" Rights and "Due Process" 
The Supreme Court has never defined "due process" with 
precision. The concept has purposely been kept vague so 
that it may fit different times and places as it guarantees 
fairness. 13 It has always been seen as an important 
protection against the unfair limitation of rights that are 
12
"Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion];" U.S. Const. amend. I, § 1. 
13 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S. at 
162-63. 
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rooted in our nation's conscience. 14 One of those rights 
is education. The fact that the educational institution 
providing the education happens to be private is of little 
concern for the Supreme Court has suggested that "due 
process" should be imposed by Congress on private 
institutions as well. 15 
The precise definition of "due process" may vary from 
time to time, but the existence of these rights is 
guaranteed by the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. After 
the decision of Board of Regents v. Roth, 16 that property 
rights are created by state statutes and constitutional 
guarantees, children now have a "property" right to 
education. This right stems from state constitutions that 
guarantee free public education and state compulsory 
education statutes. This property right cannot be limited 
without procedural fairness procedures. It was argued that 
these property rights are part of the student's rights and 
should be respected in all schools, even in the absence of 
"state action." The same protections apply to the "liberty" 
14Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 ( 1952) . 
15United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) 
16Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
right of maintaining a student's reputation from 
sullying. 17 
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Other approaches were suggested to earn private school 
students the same "due process" guarantees as their public 
school counterparts. One approach looks at the state's role 
in education. As parens patriae, the state may require a 
certain level of performance in the private school's 
provision of education. It is not unreasonable for the 
state to also insist that the school administration's 
approach to students be fair, to the inclusion of 
"procedural due process." 
Another approach suggests that, as a quid pro quo for 
requiring students to attend school (i.e., compulsory 
education statutes), the administration must provide quality 
education. This quality includes, in part, procedural 
fairness when a student is being disciplined by exclusion. 
In addition to the student's right to education, the 
parents have a right to send their child to private, 
especially religious, schools. 18 If the student is 
suspended without "due process," then the parents have lost 
their right unfairly. It is clear that "due process" should 
17Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
18Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) 
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be provided. 
An additional "property" right protected by the 
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment is that contracts should 
be fulfilled. Implicit in a contract is the understanding 
that students in good standing will be allowed to continue 
from year to year until completion of the academic program. 
Thus, there is a "property" right in continuance. When this 
"property" right is not fulfilled, such as when a student is 
suspended or expelled for disciplinary reasons, the school 
must provide a hearing to explain its reasoning. 19 
In summation, it was shown that students have various 
claims to "property" and "liberty" rights in the area of 
education. All of these are focused more on the individual 
student or parent, and only indirectly related to the 
presence of "state action." Accordingly, the requirement 
for "state action" is a side issue and of little 
significance to the larger picture of rights that students 
should enjoy. 
Education as a "Fundamental" Right 
A right is classified "fundamental" when it is either 
stated explicitly in the United States Constitution, or is 
inferred to be one of the Constitution's protected rights. 
19Ewing v. Board of Regents, 742 F.2d 913 (1984). 
280 
Once a right is "fundamental," anyone seeking to diminish it 
is required to respond to "strict scrutiny" by the courts. 
They will be required to provide an overriding reason for 
the diminution of the important right at stake. If they 
cannot provide this reason, one that sets the individual's 
right aside, then the act of diminution will be disallowed. 
If the right to education may be seen as "fundamental," then 
it will not be allowed to be diminished without procedural 
fairnesses being invoked. Further, the administrators will 
be required to explain why they have no alternative but the 
particular exclusion being imposed. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
education is not a "fundamental" right. 20 Justice 
Marshall, writing in dissent, provided an adequate rationale 
for judging education to be "fundamental. 1121 He looked at 
the "unique status accorded public education in our society, 
and the close relationship between education and some of our 
most basic Constitutional values. 1122 Justice Marshall felt 
that education is necessary for the child to adjust to the 
20 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
21 Id. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting) . 
22 Id. 
281 
environment, to feel at home in our culture, and to prepare 
for later professional training. He also believed that the 
other guarantees of the Constitution are meaningless without 
the requisite education. For example, there is a 
constitutional right to vote for elected officials, but this 
right cannot be adequately fulfilled if the voter cannot 
read the literature and make an intelligent choice between 
the candidates. 
Justice Marshall was in the majority in Plyler v. 
Doe, 23 when education was judged to require "heightened" 
scrutiny. This middle-tiered scrutiny, between "strict 
scrutiny" and "rationality," requires that the school 
district provide "a showing that [the limitation of 
education] furthers some substantial state interest. " 24 
This is a difficult showing to make. According to some, the 
Plyler decision made the non-"fundamentality" gleaned from 
Rodriguez now irrelevant. 25 
A significant number of state courts have ruled that 
the right to education, if not "fundamental" on a federal 
23 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
24Id. at 230. 
25 See Dennis J. Hutchinson, "More Substantive Equal 
Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe," 1982 Supreme·court 
Review 170, 192. 
level, is so on a state level. Beginning with Horton v. 
Meskill, 26 the Connecticut Supreme Court seemed to favor 
Justice Marshall's reasoning in Rodriguez, and ruled that 
education is a "fundamental" right in its state. Other 
states followed Connecticut's example, often disagreeing 
explicitly with the rationale of the Rodriguez Court, in 
addition to finding their own local reasons for the 
"fundamentality" of education rights. 
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The "heightened scrutiny" that is appropriate for any 
limitation of the right to education stems, in part, from 
the inherent and instrumental values of education. These 
values are not connected to the governance of the school. 
Accordingly, the requirement for "state action" plays no 
role in this case. We may conclude that "due process" 
rights must be maintained for all students, of public and 
private schools alike. 
The "Public Function" Theory 
When a private institution performs an essential 
service usually performed by the state, the private 
institution is said to be performing a "public function." A 
private school, despite its private governance, functions 
very much like a public school. Its students fulfill the 
26Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). 
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state's compulsory education requirements; 27 its 
educational mission is very similar to that of state 
schools. 
The "public function" theory is a form of "state 
action." This means that private institutions would be 
considered acting on behalf of the state even without the 
state governing their every act. The Fourteenth Amendment 
would then be applied to private schools. 
This study traced the development of the "public 
function" theory from its genesis to contemporary times. 
The "public function" theory began in the 1940's with a 
United States Supreme Court decision regarding a "private" 
company town which had prevented the distribution of 
religious literature. 20 The majority opinion stated that 
private facilities that serve a larger public were required 
27 Indeed, part of the strength of the private school's 
disciplinary power is its authority to expel students. Once 
a student is expelled, the compulsory education statutes 
require the student to attend a public school. To avoid 
this result, mindful of the state's compulsory education 
statute, the student might be more behaviorally cooperative. 
Moreover, education has been seen as one of the most 
important state functions. The state has an overriding 
interest in an educated citizenry. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972). The imposition of the state into 
private schools is obvious; the conclusion that the private 
school is doing the work of the state is justified. 
28Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 ( 1946) . 
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to fulfill the constitutional requirements of state-owned 
facilities. 29 
A similar decision was handed down regarding a 
"private" park that served a "public function" such that it 
was disallowed from discriminating on racial grounds. 30 In 
this case, Justice Harlan stated explicitly that private 
schools serve a "public function, "31 and that the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies to them. 32 
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., Justice Marshall 
applied the "public function" quality to any private service 
that is important for the state to provide, yet is also 
provided by private institutions. In these situations 
Justice Marshall required private institutions to follow the 
same requirements as states. 33 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion, 
stated explicitly that education was one of those functions 
"which have been administered with a greater degree of 
29 Id. at 506. 
30Evans v. Newton, 383 U.S. 296 (1966). 
31 Id. at 315 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
32 Id. at 322. 
33Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 365, 372 
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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exclusivity by States. "34 
In a later case, Justice Marshall reiterated that he 
considered private education to serve a "public 
function. "35 He also stated that education is different 
from other services done by private contractors which might 
be considered "public function" cases. 36 Education is 
unique because of its "vital public function." 37 
Additionally, Justice Marshall wanted to avoid a state's 
freeing itself of Fourteenth Amendment guidelines by 
privatizing traditionally public services. 38 This 
particular concern was also expressed by Professor 
Schneider, with the solution being that ways be found to 
recognize the public role and responsibility of private 
institutions. 39 There is judicial opinion that the courts 
34Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 
(1978). 
35Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 851 (1982) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. at 849. 
38 Id. at 851. 
39Ronna G. Schneider, "The 1982 State Action Trilogy, " 
60 Notre Dame Law Review 1150, 1164 (1985). Professor 
Schneider, writing regarding private activities that should 
be required to follow Fourteenth Amendment requirements, 
states: "[e]ducation is an excellent example of this kind of 
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would be even more willing to consider education a "public 
function" if the rights of the students were at stake. 40 
Other judicial opinion in favor of viewing private 
education as a "public function" can be found in lower 
courts. The Guillory court wrote, "Clearly, the 
administrators of a private [school] are performing a public 
function. "41 The Belk court wrote, "Education is a public 
function." 42The Isaacs court wrote, "State action would be 
present in the operation of every non-public school 
because education is surely a state function. " 43 
Thus, there is sufficient judicial and scholarly 
opinion to conclude that private schools provide an 
important "public function." In this role, private schools 
are considered acting on behalf of the state with the "due 
process" requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment applying. 
Specifically, the private schools should be required to 
activity." Id. at 1168. 
40Rendell-Baker, 641 F. 2d at 26. 
41Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 203 
F. Supp. 855, 859 (E.D. La. 1962). 
42Belk v. Chancellor of Washington University, 336 
F.Supp. 45, 48 (1970). 
43 Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University, 385 
F. Supp. 473, 486 (1974). 
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follow the same "procedural due process" guidelines as 
public schools. 44 
Reevaluating "State Action" 
Finally, this study confronted the "state action" 
notion for its relevance to non-public schools. If "state 
action" can be discarded for lack of relevance to modern-day 
jurisprudence, then Fourteenth Amendment guidelines can be 
brought to bear upon private schools. In this way, private 
school students would be entitled to "due process." 
According to the Positivists, it is an easy task to 
discard the notion of "state action" due to its inherent 
ambivalence. Positivists believe that citizen's rights are 
assigned or allowed by the state. They believe that only 
those rights agreed to by the state exist. Every state act 
that allows a right, either actively or passively, may be 
considered "state action. " 45 Thus, the entire concept of 
44These are described in detail in Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. at 581. 
45 Perhaps the lead case for the Positivists is Shelley 
v. Kraemer, where the Court said that "state action" would 
be involved if a court upholds a private contract entered 
into by private parties. Although the Court recognized a 
private group's right to enter into such agreements, it 
could not judicially uphold discriminatory agreements. 
Shelley broke the wall of "state action," blurring the clear 
distinction of what is a private act and what is a public 
one. The Positivists had their case on which to rely. See 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1(1948), overturning Corrigan 
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"state action" is contrived and not useful. 46 
While some legal scholars have written that the "state 
action" notion is not useful and should be discarded, it 
should be noted that the notion serves an important 
function. "State action" prevents the government from 
creeping into a person's private domain. It preserves the 
"public/private distinction. " 47 It is not suggested that 
private homes should become imbued with a public character. 
The Constitution was not written for private homes and 
should not be applied to them. But, when a private 
institution such as a school takes on a public character and 
goes beyond the norm for public institutions, then one must 
question whether these schools are truly free of these 
important and ennobling constitutional norms. 48 The 
significant point is that one may maintain the 
"public/private distinction" while abandoning "state 
v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (private discriminatory 
agreements are beyond the arm of the law for lack of "state 
action"). 
46 Paul Brest, "State Action and Liberal Theory, " 13 O 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1296 (1982). 
47Id. at 1302. 
48Charles Black, "Foreword: "State Action, " Equal 
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harvard Law 
Review 69, 95 (1967). 
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action." 
One may abandon the "state action" requirement by 
looking at the substance of the claim. When claims are made 
against private institutions, courts should look at the 
content of the claim, not the person of the claim. In this 
way, a state fulfills its responsibility to protect a 
citizen from deprivation at the hands of another. 49 
Concurrently, the competing rights of private persons and 
institutions can be weighed fairly. The state will not 
always be the violator of fundamental fairness and the 
individual, the victim, with no legal redress for lack of 
"state action." "State action" would not be invoked to keep 
the courts away from reaching an equitable resolution of 
"private" litigation. Private school students would then be 
entitled to "due process" rights as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Other approaches were described to show the interest 
and connection between the state and private schools. In 
this way, the presence of "state action" is evident, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment protections would apply. One approach 
applied the Child Benefit theory to the "state action" 
49 See Kenneth L. Karst and Howard W. Horowitz, "Reitman 
v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection," 
1967 Supreme Court Review 39, 55. 
notion. This theory allows states to provide certain 
benefits to children in religious schools without 
confronting the constitutionally mandated separation of 
Church and State. 50 Another benefit that could be brought 
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to the children within this theory is that of fundamental 
fairness. Just as the state provides busing for students to 
religious schools, it was shown that the state may demand 
that these schools provide their students with "due 
process." Further, the Supreme Court has ruled that the 
state may require an acceptable level of quality 
education; 51 it follows that it may require the school to 
follow certain norms of dignity. These norms include "due 
process." Also, just as education prepares students for 
their future role as wage earners, and the state has 
legitimate controls over all education, including private, 
so should education prepare students for proper citizenship. 
A key tile in the American mosaic of citizenship is 
fundamental fairness. Inasmuch as experience is the best 
teacher, the best way to learn fairness is to experience it 
in school. Accordingly, it seems wholly within the state's 
right to demand of private schools to provide "due process" 
50 See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
51See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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for their students before imposing disciplinary action. 
This is most appropriate for private schools that teach the 
Constitution itself, and that aspire to teach patriotism and 
respect for the American way. 
Another attempt at showing the presence of "state 
action" even in private schools is the close comparison 
between states and schools. Just as states control the 
lives of their citizens, so do schools control their 
students. The same protections afforded citizens to prevent 
the state from taking advantage of them should be afforded 
private school children as well. The power invested in the 
state that was restrained by the Constitution is similar to 
the power of the school over its students. The school, 
public or private, should follow the same requirements for 
fairness as the state. 
The conclusion to draw from this chapter is that the 
"state action" notion is not clear, nor does it guide us 
toward legal certainty. It should, therefore, be abandoned 
in favor of merit-based decisions that balance legitimate 
private concerns. Once this abandonment is accomplished, 
there is no doctrine to prevent us from applying the 
constitutional right to "due process" in non-public schools. 
All students would benefit equally and identically from the 
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right to fundamental fairness before being deprived of the 
great benefit of education. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
There are several additional approaches to inaugurating 
"due process" in private schools that should be researched 
in depth. This study researched constitutional theories, 
i.e., theories affecting the constitutional right to "due 
process" and the requirement for "state action." Another 
study is needed to research non-constitutional theories that 
might bring the entitlement for "due process" to the private 
school student's door. 
1. Fiduciary Rights Theory: A fiduciary relationship 
is one in which there is a confidence and trust between two 
parties. If one party reasonably reposes confidence in the 
fidelity and integrity of another, a fiduciary relation 
exists. If confidence is lacking, but one party dominates 
another, then, too, a fiduciary relation may be present. 52 
The nature of the relationship assumes that the 
fiduciary can succeed in exercising undue selfish influence 
over the entrusting party. This influence is sufficient 
reason for courts to impose special standards of conduct on 
52Higgins v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 312 Ill. 11, 
143 N.E. 482, 484 (1924). 
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the fiduciary. The fiduciary has the burden of proving the 
validity, fairness, and reasonableness of any transaction 
involving the subject matter of the confidence. 53 
All of these elements appear present in the student-
school relation. It is an act of confidence and trust for 
the student to be placed under the tutelage of the school. 
The value of the school experience is a direct result of the 
conscientiousness and faithful performance of school 
officials. The examination process discloses the students' 
levels of knowledge as they repose confidence in the 
teachers' abilities to interpret the evaluations and plan 
appropriate educational programs. 
Professor Seavy described the relationship between 
students and their schools as fiduciary. "Since schools 
exist primarily for the education of their students, it is 
obvious that ... administrators act in a fiduciary capacity 
with reference to the students. " 54 Accordingly, the burden 
is upon the school officials to prove that they have dealt 
fairly and reasonably with the students. School 
administrators, regardless of the public/private nature of 
53 Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 159 F. 
Supp. 104, 118-19 n.9 (W.D. La. 1958). 
54Warren Seavy, "Dismissal of Students: Due Process, " 
70 Harvard Law Review 1406 (1957) . 
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the school, should show that they followed procedural 
fairness. 
2. Contract Theory: The relationship between private 
schools and their students is generally seen as based on 
contract law.ss Most contracts represent the mutual and 
voluntary undertakings of parties operating in a commercial 
setting. School contracts, on the other hand, are usually 
one-sided in favor of the school. From the student's 
perspective, these contracts may be seen as "adhesion 
contracts. 1156 A study should be conducted on using the 
significant difference in power as a basis for creating 
special rights for students. Perhaps the school has certain 
obligations to follow procedural fairness, accept upon 
itself the burden of proof, and construe ambiguities in the 
student's favor. 
3. Implied Condition of the Contract Theory: This 
theory suggests that there are certain procedures that have 
developed to the point of becoming the "standard of the 
ssDixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 
150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) 
56An adhesion contract is "a contract that is so 
restrictive of one side, while so non-restrictive of 
another, that doubts arise as to its representation as a 
voluntary and uncoerced agreement." Gifis's Law Dictionary 
12 (1984) . 
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industry." As such, they may be required of all schools, 
private and public, regardless of where and how they began. 
Procedural fairness may be one of these standards. If so, 
private school parents may presume that this standard will 
be fulfilled as part of the contract between the family and 
the school. Moreover, the entire legal distinction between 
public and private schools may be unknown or insignificant 
to the parents and students. They may expect the same 
freedoms and rights on private campuses as they would enjoy 
on public ones. 57 The legal significance of these 
parental- and student-implied rights and expectations should 
be studied further. Procedural fairness may be seen as 
required in private schools. 
4. A Comparison to Other Countries: This study's 
historical review of the development of governmental "due 
process" began in England with the Magna Charta. It would 
be interesting to study the Laws of England to learn what 
procedural rights have developed in that country that affect 
private individuals and institutions. Perhaps we should 
glean from the English jurisprudential experience once 
again. 
57 See Note, "Developments - - Academic Freedom, 11 81 
Harvard Law Review 1045, 1151 (1968). 
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In addition, it would be enlightening to see what 
private rights are being accorded in the newly-developing 
democratic countries. As the countries of the former Soviet 
Union develop their own constitutions and statements of 
rights, what are they guaranteeing their private citizens 
and institutions? Is there something to be gained from 
their legal analyses that is meaningful for us? 
In addition to an inquiry into theories that would 
muster procedural fairness for private school students, 
other questions emerge from the current work that are worthy 
of study. 
5. What are the particularly religious values that are 
part of the milieu of religious private schools? Would 
these values support or suppress the acceptance of 
procedural fairness within the religious school? Are 
religious school administrators more or less willing to 
incorporate procedural fairnesses in their schools? How 
does this willingness differ from that of principals in 
secular private schools? Are there significant differences 
in implementation of procedural fairnesses based on 
ideological differences within the various religious 
denominations? 
6. What do the parents feel regarding the 
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incorporation of procedural fairnesses within the private 
school's discipline code? Do they prefer a liberal, 
student-centered code, or are they more concerned with 
providing their administrators with free reign of the 
students and unquestioned authority? Is there a difference 
in parent feeling based on the perceived authoritarian 
nature of the denomination? Do parents of girls differ from 
parents of boys? Is there a significant difference in 
response between ethnic groups? Are parents of 
"recidivists" (students who have faced disciplinary action 
several times and are quite familiar with "the system") more 
likely to prefer new, more fair procedures? 
7. After procedural fairness has been incorporated in 
a school, it would be useful to study several claims made by 
this study. For example, are the students learning and 
appreciating civic responsibility on a higher level? Have 
they learned from the experiences of procedural fairness? 
Is there a heightened awareness of self-control and 
accepting of personal responsibility for oneself? Are there 
less hostile and violent acts as a result of greater 
administrative fairness than before and in comparable 
schools? Do the answers to these questions change as more 
"due process" is provided? 
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8. Is there greater satisfaction in private schools 
that provide ''due process" than schools that do not? Is the 
school climate significantly different? Are the parents 
more satisfied with the discipline in the school with the 
inclusion of procedural fairness? 
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